



THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE 
JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON† 
Article II of the Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. 
Advocates of presidential power have long claimed that this phrase was originally 
understood as a term of art for the full suite of powers held by a typical eighteenth-
century monarch. In its strongest form, this view yields a powerful presumption of 
indefeasible presidential authority in the arenas of foreign affairs and national security. 
This so-called Vesting Clause Thesis is conventional wisdom among 
constitutional originalists. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on a 
comprehensive review of Founding-era archives—including records of drafting, 
legislative, and ratication debates, committee les, private and ocial 
correspondence, diaries, newspapers, pamphlets, poetry, and other publications—this 
Article not only refutes the Vesting Clause Thesis as a statement of the original 
understanding, but replaces it with a comprehensive armative account of the clause 
that is both historically and theoretically coherent. 
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The Founding generation understood “executive power” to mean something both 
simple and specic: the power to execute law. This authority was constitutionally 
indispensable, but it extended only to the implementation of pre-existing legal norms 
and directives that had been created pursuant to some prior exercise of legislative 
authority. It wasn’t just that the use of executive power was subject to legislative 
inuence in a crude political sense; rather, the power was conceptually an empty 
vessel until there were laws or instructions that needed executing. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1271 
I. THREE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE ................ 1274 
II. MAPPING THE ARTICLE II SETTLEMENT ................................ 1279 
A. America in Crisis ...................................................................... 1279 
1. The Critical Period .......................................................... 1280 
2. The Execution Problem .................................................... 1283 
B. The Presidency’s Role in the Constitutional Solution ....................... 1296 
III. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” MEANT THE POWER TO EXECUTE 
THE LAWS .............................................................................. 1305 
A. The Power to Execute the Laws Was Essential to a Complete 
Government ............................................................................. 1306 
1. Law Is Meaningless Without Execution ............................ 1306 
2. Executing Laws Was the Dening Function of the Article 
II President ...................................................................... 1309 
B. The Constitutional Term for this Power to Execute Laws Was “The 
Executive Power” ...................................................................... 1310 
1. The Root and Cognates of the Term .................................. 1311 
2. “The Executive Power” Meant “The Power to Execute” ..... 1315 
3. “The Executive Power” Was the Hallmark of a 
“Complete” or “Perfect” Government ................................ 1319 
C. The Executive Power Was Often Viewed as Either  
   Logically Entailing or Functionally Implying the  
   Appointment of “Assistances” ........................................................ 1325 
D. “The Executive Power” Was Unanimously Understood as an Empty 
Vessel, Both Subsequent and Subordinate in Character .................... 1334 
1. As a Form of Agency Authority, the Exercise of Executive 
Power was Fully Subordinate to Instructions by its 
Legislative Principal. ........................................................ 1334 
2. Executive Authority Was Immensely Potent, Especially 
When Its Holder Could Inuence the Exercise of 
Legislative Power to Convey Broad Delegations of 
Authority and Discretion .................................................. 1340 
2020] Executive Power Clause 1271 
IV. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” WAS NOT ANOTHER WORD FOR 
ROYAL PREROGATIVE ............................................................. 1345 
A. The Royal Residuum is Facially Implausible .................................. 1346 
1. It’s Politically Implausible ................................................. 1346 
2. It’s Doctrinally Implausible ............................................... 1348 
B. The Royal Residuum Was Expressly Rejected ................................. 1350 
1. They Knew Exactly What a Residuum Structure  
 Looked Like .................................................................... 1350 
2. They Repeatedly Denied that Any Such Residuum 
Existed in Article II .......................................................... 1353 
C. A Play Park of Silent Dogs ......................................................... 1358 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1365 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Article II of the Constitution vests “the executive power” in a President 
of the United States.1 The text of the provision is plain-spoken, even 
underwhelming at rst glance. And yet what it meant to the founders is “one 
of the most important questions of any kind, on any subject, under the Federal 
Constitution . . . .”2 This Article aims to resolve the historical debate. For the 
founders, “the executive power” meant the power to execute the law. Nothing 
more. And nothing less. 
For the uninitiated, this conclusion may seem obvious on its face. And yet 
the meaning of the Executive Power Clause is not just immensely important; 
it is also “one of the most contested questions in constitutional law.”3 Broadly 
speaking, there are three interpretations.4 First, the cross-reference thesis. 
On this view, the clause has no standalone content; it simply refers to the 
more specic powers listed later in Article II, from the power to appoint 
ocers to the power to receive ambassadors. Second, the law execution thesis. 
On this view, the clause grants the power to execute the laws and is otherwise 
an empty vessel until it has legislative instructions to carry out. Third, the 
royal residuum thesis. This last view reads the Executive Power Clause as 
granting all the powers typically possessed by an eighteenth-century 
“executive”—with the British Crown as the presumptive referent—except as 
specically reallocated or prohibited elsewhere in the document. 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1. 
2 Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
375, 383 (2008). 
3 Michael McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King 144 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on le with author). 
4 For a full description of these positions and their consequences, see infra Part I. 
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It’s hard to overstate the consequences of this dispute. The least aggressive 
version of the royal residuum reads the Executive Power Clause as a 
defeasible power authorizing the president to take any action he deems 
necessary in the realm of national security or foreign aairs, so long as neither 
the Constitution nor any specic statute forbids it.5 The most aggressive 
version reads it as indefeasible: that is to say, if it’s the sort of thing the 
eighteenth-century British Crown could presumptively have done, then 
nothing short of the Constitution itself can stop our American President from 
it too.6 This has consequences of the highest order for real-world disputes 
ranging from the seizure of steel mills7 to the torture of suspected terrorists.8 
On the defeasible version, the President might be able to engage in dragnet 
surveillance to gather intelligence on organizations associated with al-Qaeda, 
so long as statutes that authorize wiretapping only in more limited forms 
don’t expressly prohibit its use in war.9 On the indefeasible version, the 
President might be able to bomb Syria for gassing its own civilians so long as 
he doesn’t purport to formally declare “war.”10 
You don’t have to be an originalist on questions like these to understand 
that it’s immensely important to get the historical meaning right. For one thing, 
even those who think constitutional meaning evolves—clap your hands if you 
believe in precedent!—understand that original meaning is often one of the 
things worth having in view. For another, a great many constitutional 
 
5 See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1172-73 & n.10, 1184-85 (2019). 
6 Id. 
7 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in [the Article II Executive Power Clause]. 
Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view, this 
clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable.’”). 
8 Cf. Oce of Legal Counsel, Memorandum to William J. Haynes II, Department of Defense 
General Counsel, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United 
States 18-195 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Torture Memorandum] (“[A]ny power traditionally 
understood as pertaining to the executive—which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense 
of the nation—unless expressly assigned to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II, Section 
1 makes this clear by stating that the ‘executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.’”). 
9 Cf. JOINT INSPECTORS GEN., Unclassied Report on the President’s Surveillance Program 11 (July 
10, 2009) (quoting an unreleased Oce of Legal Counsel memo’s assertion that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act “cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches 
that protect the national security”). 
10 Cf. April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities 42 Op. O.L.C. ___, at 
*3-4 (May 31, 2018) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he President, as Commander in Chief and 
Chief Executive, has the constitutional authority to deploy the military to protect American persons 
and interests without seeking prior authorization from Congress. . . . [This authority] arises from 
Article II of the Constitution, which makes the President the ‘Commander in Chief . . . ,’ and vests 
in him the Executive Power.”). 
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interpreters are indeed committed originalists,11 ready to give sufficiently well-
established original meaning not just significant but conclusive interpretive 
weight. And so what follows is valuable not only as history but as a source of 
guidance for some of the most important questions in a modern democracy. 
This Article shows that the founders understood the opening sentence of 
Article II to vest exactly what it said: the power to execute the law. This 
essential element of governance comprised two core components: the 
authority to enforce private compliance with the law’s negative prohibitions, 
and the authority to carry out projects assigned by law’s armative 
authorizations.12 Many founders thought the executive power also either 
functionally implied or logically entailed the authority to appoint 
“assistances” for its implementation.13 The Executive Power Clause thus 
represented an incredibly potent delegation to an incredibly important 
ocial. Indeed, the power it vested may have been the Constitution’s single 
most controversial innovation—and not for lack of competition.14 
The signal characteristic of executive power, however, was that it was 
substantively an empty vessel. The only thing the clause authorized the 
President to do was to carry out legal instructions created pursuant to some 
other authority. This fundamentally derivative characteristic meant that 
executive power was incapable of serving as even a defeasible source of 
independent substantive authority, let alone one that would be immune to 
legislative revision.15 While the founders disagreed vehemently about a great 
many questions relating to the separation of powers generally and the 
President specically, this issue prompted no debate at all. The executive 
power meant the power to execute. Period. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the current state of 
the scholarship. Part II explores the founders’ competing visions of the 
 
11 This includes at least four and probably five current Supreme Court Justices. For the Supreme 
Court Justices, see Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 242, 262 (2017) 
(statement of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 465 (2006) (Statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito); Confirmation Hearing on Nomination of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
182 (2005) (Statement of Judge John G. Roberts); Cass R. Sunstein & Eric A. Posner, Institutional Flip-
Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 502 (2016) (describing Justice Clarence Thomas as a self-proclaimed 
originalist); see also Alex Swoyer, Brett Kavanaugh best described as ‘originalist,’ say legal scholars, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018) https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/sep/3/brett-
kavanaugh-best-described-as-originalist-say-/ [https://perma.cc/UA9N-STLE] (noting disagreement 
about how best to read Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence). 
12 See infra Sections III.A and III.B. 
13 See infra Section III.C. 
14 See infra at 38-41. 
15 See infra Section III.D. 
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presidency and the gradual emergence of a negotiated compromise between 
the imperatives of vigor and safety. Part III focuses on the Executive Power 
Clause as the central piece of that compromise, and shows that it vested the 
empty-vessel power to execute law. Part IV shows that the founders 
repeatedly rejected the concept of a royal residuum. The Conclusion sketches 
some implications of this research. 
I. THREE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE 
There are at least three ways to understand Article II’s reference to the 
executive power.16 The rst is what I will call the “Cross-Reference” theory, 
which understands “the executive power” as a content-free referent to the rest 
of Article II. This thin reading of the Executive Power Clause has been 
embraced by Supreme Court justices,17 national legislators,18 and a number of 
academics.19 On this view, the term is a convenient lexical handle for a grab 
bag of powers. The full contents are set out in the remainder of Article II. 
And nothing else goes in the bag. While this approach reads the Executive 
Power Clause as substantively prefatory, it does leave the clause with one 
signicant job: clarifying that the listed powers belong to the President and 
no one else. 
The second understanding, which I will call the “Law Execution” theory, 
gives the opening clause its own independent substantive content. On this 
 
16 This Part’s summary of scholarly positions both condenses and extends material from 
Mortenson, supra note 5.). 
17 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this 
clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the 
presidential oce of the generic powers thereafter stated.”); id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(noting a similar view as Justice Jackson). Justice Burger’s majority opinion in INS v. Chadha 
gestures at this view as well. 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“When the Executive acts, he presumptively 
acts in an executive or administrative capacity as dened in Art. II.”). 
18 See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER, Speech on the Appointing and Removing Power (Feb. 16, 1835), in 
4 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 179, 187 (18th ed. 1881) (“By the executive power conferred 
on the President, the Constitution means no more than that portion which it itself creates, and 
which it qualies, limits, and circumscribes.”). 
19 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting 
Clause”: Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 35 (2009) 
(“[T]he the rst sentence [of Article II] was merely a designation clause rather than a conferral of 
power.”); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 309 (2009) 
(“[T]he Vesting Clause is not a residual source of plenary powers in the presidency.”); see also 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, 177 (5th rev. ed. 1984) 
(denying that Article II’s grant of executive power is a viable source of unenumerated foreign aairs 
power); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42-44 
(1990) (same); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) (“[T]he framers intended the Vesting Clause to vest constitutionally 
little more than the enumerated executive powers.”). 
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view—which has found support among Presidents,20 Supreme Court 
justices,21 and scholars22—”the executive power” is exactly what it sounds like: 
the power to execute the law. The executive power, thus, authorizes the 
President to bring that law—which before execution exists only on paper—
into eect in the real world. Sometimes this might mean coercing obedience 
from private parties, like ticketing jaywalkers. Other times it might mean 
implementing an armative project of the legislature, like picking up the 
garbage. Either way, the executive power authorizes the President to connect 
legal imperative to physical reality: “Interpreting a law enacted by Congress 
to implement the legislative mandate,” the Supreme Court tells us, “is the 
very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”23 And no other provision of the 
Constitution gives it to the President as an armative enforcement authority 
rather than as the compliance obligation imposed by the Take Care clause.24 
The third understanding is what I will call the “Royal Residuum” theory. 
Advocates of this theory claim that “[b]ecause supreme executives in [many] 
countries had a similar basket of powers, it became common to speak of an 
 
20 Cf. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 140 (1916) 
(denying that there is an “undened residuum” of executive power and arguing that a President can 
only act “within the eld of action plainly marked for him”). 
21 E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The 
Founders . . . . sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws 
by placing in the [President] . . . the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the 
Constitution divides among many.”). 
22 See, e.g., Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early 
American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557, 618-20 (2018) (arguing that the Constitution’s drafters 
considered, but ultimately rejected, vesting the executive with the prerogatives of the British 
monarch); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Aairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 309, 344 (2006) (“Whatever the proper scope of the president’s implied Article II authority, 
it remains in its essence a power to execute, not create, the law.”); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The 
President and the Law 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 334 (1952) (“[The Founding Fathers] had very precise, 
eighteenth-century notions about the denition of executive power: it was a power to carry into 
execution the national laws—that and nothing more.”). For some legal historians who appear 
possibly to embrace this view, see, for example, WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 5 (1965) M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 32 (1998) (describing the seventeenth century view of “executive power” as “the machinery 
by which the law was put into eect”); FRANCIS WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 61 (1949) (describing the notion that the executive merely enforces law). Cf. 
Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Aairs, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 545, 551-52 (2004) (arguing that the historical sources “most relevant to the Founding” contain 
little support for claims of unenumerated executive power). 
23 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
24 For a terric account of the historical meaning of the Take Care Clause, which imposed a 
compliance obligation that was distinct from the authorization conveyed by the Executive Power 
Clause, see Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2019) (“The history we present . . . supports readings of 
Article II that tend to subordinate presidential power to congressional direction.”). 
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‘executive power’ that encompassed an array of powers commonly wielded by 
monarchs.”25 Here’s a typical modern description of what went in the basket: 
Traditionally, the “executive power” was understood at the time of the 
framing as including the power of war and peace, and all external relations of 
the nation . . . . [T]he President was left with whatever remained of the 
traditional “executive power” in matters of war, peace, and foreign aairs, 
diminished to a signicant extent, but not completely, by the re-allocation of 
some very important, traditionally executive, powers to Congress.26 
For judges who subscribe to these claims, the doctrinal implications are 
straightforward: “the ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by Article II 
includes the residual foreign aairs powers of the Federal Government not 
otherwise allocated by the Constitution.”27 
The Royal Residuum thesis has been remarkably successful. Besides 
express support from Supreme Court justices,28 national legislators,29 leading 
executive branch ocials,30 and at least one president,31 it is easily the 
dominant historical account among modern commentators.32 The 
 
25 SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 31 (2015). 
26 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 237-38 (2002); 
see also JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 19 (2005) (citing “political theory” and “Anglo-
American constitutional history” to assert that “the executive power was understood at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing to include the war, treaty, and other general foreign affairs powers”). 
27 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
28 See id.; Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
proposition that “[t]he broad executive power granted by Article II . . . cannot . . . be invoked to 
avert disaster”). 
29 E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S2640 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]he 
President’s powers include inherent executive authorities that are unenumerated in the 
Constitution. Thus, any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature—
particularly in foreign aairs—should be resolved in favor of the executive branch.”). 
30 E.g., Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 73 (2007) (statement of Bradford Berenson, former Assoc. Counsel to the 
President) (“The Vesting Clause provides the President a vast reserve of implied authority to do 
whatever may be necessary in executing the laws and governing the nation.”). 
31 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913) (“My belief was that it was not 
only [the President’s] right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded 
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”). 
32 The canonical modern summation is Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The 
Executive Power over Foreign Aairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253-54 (2001). For other typical examples, see, 
for example, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 21 (2002) (“Unless the Vesting Clause is meaningless it incorporates the 
unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative.”); ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 55 (1991) (describing 
foreign aairs authorities vested elsewhere in the Constitution as “exceptions to the large grant of 
executive power to the president”); Charles J. Cooper, What the Constitution Means by Executive 
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consequences of that success are stark, at least for originalists willing to stick 
with the full logical consequences. If the Executive Power Clause really is a 
royal residuum, then the President is endowed with those aspects of kingly 
authority that have not been reallocated to other actors. The Executive Power 
Clause was front and center, for example, in the now-retracted memo advising 
President George W. Bush’s Defense Department that it could torture 
suspected terrorists without legal consequences for committing war crimes.33 
So too with the Oce of Legal Counsel’s later advice that, because of the 
president’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive, for ‘foreign and military aairs,’ as well as national security,” 
President Barack Obama had constitutional authority to initiate the use of 
force against Libya without congressional approval.34 And Justice Thomas 
argued that the Executive Power Clause, standing alone, justied presidential 
deance of a statute that required the U.S. to issue a passport listing “Israel” 
as the place of birth for a young boy born in Jerusalem.35 
Particularly among constitutional originalists, the residuum thesis is 
dominant. At most, criticism of the historical claim waves a caution ag of 
uncertainty, contingency, and historical contestation. As Aziz Huq’s generally 
sympathetic account explains, even the strongest critics of the royal residuum 
“decline to draw a strong conclusion from the Constitution’s text, 
preratication practice, or Founding-era interpretative conventions about the 
precise contours of each branch’s authority.”36 It is here that this Article picks 
up the challenge. 
 
Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 177 (1988) (“[T]he founding generation understood executive 
power as conferring a broad authority that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws.”); Gary 
Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Aairs Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 141 
(2006) (stating that the Vesting Clause “grants, in eighteenth-century terms, the power to execute 
the law plus foreign aairs powers”); Eugene Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Monarch?, 83 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 740, 742 (1989) (“No one has ever improved on Hamilton’s denition of executive power. 
All governmental power that is neither legislative nor judicial, he said, is executive.”); John C. Yoo, 
Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2002) (“Article 
II’s Vesting Clause establishes a rule of construction that any unenumerated executive power, such 
as that over treaty interpretation, must be given to the President.”); McConnell, supra note 3, at 198 
(“[T]he executive power comprises all unassigned national power that is neither legislative nor 
judicial in nature. In eect, this encompasses the “strict” executive power plus the prerogatives 
powers as truncated by the constitutional text.”) . 
33 See Torture Memorandum, supra note 8, at 18-19. 
34 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6 (2011). 
35 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2101 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
36 Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1530-31 (2018) 
(reviewing JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017)). For examples of such basically equivocal historical criticism of 
residuum theory, see, e.g., Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552 (noting that the residuum theory 
“fails to take account of complexity within eighteenth-century political theory, the experience of 
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What follows will not only refute the residuum thesis as a claim about 
original understanding, but also oer an armative replacement theory that 
is both historically and theoretically coherent. In earlier work, I laid the 
intellectual foundation for this claim by showing that the Law Execution 
understanding of “executive power” pervaded the eighteenth century 
bookshelf. The earlier article showed that, for late-eighteenth-century 
English speakers, “the ‘executive power’ was nothing more than ‘a power of 
putting [the] laws in execution.’”37 That conclusion, however, only teed up 
the real question. The most important task still remains: to show that this 
dictionary denition was in fact reected in both the drafting and ratication 
of the Constitution itself. 
It is therefore the project of this Article to show that the ordinary Law 
Execution understanding of executive power pervaded the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution itself. The sources relied on are varied, but at 
bottom the claim is grounded on an exhaustive review of every instance of the 
word root “exec-” in three major collections spanning millions of words: the 29-
volume Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,38 the 34-
volume Journals of the Continental Congress,39 and the 26-volume Letters of 
 
state constitutionalism before 1787, and the Founders’ self-conscious rejection of the British model 
of government”); Reinstein, supra note 19, at 309 (“The powers delegated to the President in Article 
II do not suggest a residue of unspecied powers that can be characterized as ‘executive’ in nature.”). 
For some typical responses from residuum advocates, see, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 32, at 
42 (“At the risk of engaging a 144-page discussion in a few sentences: it does not suce to say, as 
Professors Bradley and Flaherty convincingly say, that ‘executive Power’ was a messy, contested 
concept in the late eighteenth century.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Aairs 
and the Jeersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1661 (2005) (“[W]hile Bradley and 
Flaherty devote much energy to the Constitution’s creation . . . . [o]n the most important points 
they either concede our view, make only conclusory statements, or say nothing.”). 
37 Mortenson, supra note 5 at 1169, 1173 (reporting on a review of more than a thousand works 
of political, theological, and legal theory, as well as some forty dictionaries). 
38 The Documentary History is a collection of “records of town meetings, legislative 
proceedings, convention journals and debates, and forms of ratication; personal papers, such as 
letters, memoirs, and diaries; diplomatic correspondence; and printed primary sources, such as 
newspaper articles, broadsides, and pamphlets.” For the Documentary History, I have personally 
read each document agged by the “exec-” search, taking care in each instance to read the entire 
agged document and any others potentially helpful for understanding its context. 
39 The Journals of the Continental Congress are a collection of “the records of the daily 
proceedings of the Congress as kept by the oce of its secretary” as supplemented by materials 
from other sources. Journals of the Continental Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html [https://perma.cc/9YPV-CUK5]. The initial 
review of documents agged by an “exec-” search in this collection was done by a team of Michigan 
law students. We worked in an intensively collaborative process, with careful up-front training and 
weekly discussions about potentially useful documents as they emerged. I then read all documents 
that the research assistants agged as potentially useful, taking care in each instance to read the 
entire agged document and any others potentially helpful for understanding its context. 
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Delegates to the Continental Congress.40 That work was supplemented by a 
similar search through numerous state databases.41 From there, the leads 
followed have been varied, inductive, and less categorizable, but those three 
collections form the core of evidence on which this Article establishes its claim. 
On the strength of that research, this Article concludes that founders did 
“ha[ve] in mind, and intend[] the Constitution to reflect, a conception of what 
is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ within executive power.”42 That meaning, however, 
was unambiguously limited to Law Execution. 
II. MAPPING THE ARTICLE II SETTLEMENT 
A. America in Crisis 
To properly frame the question of how the founders arrived at the 
Executive Power Clause, we must start with a wide-angle lens. What 
prompted the Constitutional Convention? Why did a sense of crisis emerge 
so quickly after the revolutionary triumph of 1781? Why did the founders so 
radically transform the national system of government? The following 
 
40 The Letters are a collection of “documents written by delegates that bear directly upon their 
work during their years of actual service in the First and Second Continental Congresses,” including 
“letters from delegates . . . diaries, public papers, essays, and other documents”). Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwdg.html 
[https://perma.cc/6RNX-9CR9]. As with the Journals, the initial review of documents agged by 
an “exec-” search in this collection was done by a team of Michigan law students. We worked in an 
intensively collaborative process, with careful up-front training and weekly discussions about 
potentially useful documents as they emerged. I then read all documents that the research assistants 
agged as potentially useful, taking care in each instance to read the entire agged document and 
any others potentially helpful for understanding its context. 
41 This leg of the research is ongoing. Collections reviewed to date include the following: 
Maryland Province/State, Journals of the Council/State, LLMC Digital at llmc.com (reviewing 
materials from 1777 to 1790); New Jersey Constitutional Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com; New 
Jersey Laws, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1704-1800); New York 
Constitutional Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1754-1788); New York 
Legislative Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1776-1800); New York 
Executive Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1776-1778); Early State 
Records (Virginia), LLMC Digita, at llmc.com; THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE 
CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790. THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE 
PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM 
PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (1825); THE POPULAR SOURCES OF 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780 
(1966); THE JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF 
GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1832); THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1867). 
42 Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 22, at 551-52 (disagreeing with this proposition). 
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account barely qualies as even a sketch of the consensus historiography.43 
But it’s worth letting the founders’ own words speak to the urgency they felt 
about their governments’ inability to execute the law. Grasping the intensity 
of that concern is essential to understanding why the executive power was so 
central to the settlement that resulted. 
1. The Critical Period 
The 1780s were a time of experimentation and failure, hope and 
disappointment, uncertainty and—increasingly as the decade wound on—
anger. By the time politicians began exploring serious constitutional reform, 
Americans shared a broad sense of crisis. Any number of alarm bells were 
ringing. The states were descending into a destructive economic competition 
that European powers were only too happy to exploit.44 Both national and 
state budgets were in a parlous state.45 One American wrote of state nances 
in 1787 that “their Ars will be through their breeches before they can buy new 
ones,”46 and only George Washington’s maudlin-like-a-fox intervention may 
have stopped an infantry revolt after Virginia and Rhode Island vetoed 
national taxes that would have covered the soldiers’ unpaid wages.47 The 
states’ inability to coordinate left them militarily vulnerable to “little 
 
43 For more detail on any particular point see the scholarship referenced in the footnotes. For 
an excellent survey of the traditional historiography of the era’s politics, see Martin Flaherty’s The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1758-79 (1996). 
44 For a highly readable overview of the foreign aairs dimensions of Critical Period politics, 
see NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, RICHARD DEAN BURNS, & JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: FROM CONFEDERATION TO CONSTITUTION, 1776-
1787 (2011); see also, JACK RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN 
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 243-274 (1979) (focusing on 
connection between domestic factions and international relations); Patrick O’Brien, Inseperable 
Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815, in 2 OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 53 (1998) (focusing on commercial relationships and 
competition); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 
952-1014 (2010) (focusing on international power politics). 
45 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 44 at 275-329. 
46 Archibald Stuart, Letter to John Breckinridge, Richmond (Oct. 21, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 89, 89 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
1988) [hereinafter DHRC]. 
47 See THOMAS FLEMING, THE PERILS OF PEACE: AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
AFTER YORKTOWN 271 (2007) (“‘Gentlemen,’ [Washington] said, ‘You will permit me to put on 
my spectacles, for I have not only grown grey but almost blind in the service of my country.”); see 
also id. at 253 (describing the Rhode Island and Virginia decisions). Washington did more than just 
pull their heart strings; he also wrote a circular to the government of all thirteen states putting his 
immense political capital behind major reform of the system. George Washington, To the Executives 
of the States, PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1783, reprinted in 13 DHRC supra note 46, at 60 
(1981). 
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insurgents”48 like the “ignoble contemptible Shays,”49 to “depredations of the 
savages”50 as white settlers pressed ever harder on the frontier, and to slave 
rebellions, the great terror of the south.51 
All of this gave rise to a mood of intense crisis. Regardless of whether the 
Philadelphia drafting convention exceeded its remit by producing an entirely 
new governing document,52 many Americans understood that profound 
change was afoot. As one Pennsylvanian argued in June 1787: 
The present Confederation may be compared to a hut or tent, accommodated 
to the emergencies of war—but it is now time to erect a castle of durable 
materials, with a tight roof and substantial bolts and bars to secure our 
persons and property from violence, and external injuries of all kinds.53 
Americans were happy to hold forth on any number of failures by their 
governments. But a common theme was clear: the ardent expectations for 
republicanism had come a cropper. In Gordon Wood’s classic account, 
[t]he belief that the 1780’s, the years after the peace with Britain, had become 
the really critical period of the entire Revolution was prevalent everywhere 
during the decade . . . .  
 
48 Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter V (Nov. 8, 1787), in 19 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 203, 239 (2003); see also id. (describing these “insurgents” as “men in debt, who want no law”). 
49 David Daggett, Oration Delivered in New Haven (July 4, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 160, 162 (1981). 
50 Extract of a Letter from Augusta, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, Oct. 15, 1787, reprinted in 
3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 223, 223 (1978); see also id. (warning it would require “martial law” to repel). 
For more on diplomacy, trade, and conflict with Native American tribes, see, e.g., KATHLEEN DUVAL, 
THE NATIVE GROUND: INDIANS AND COLONISTS IN THE HEART OF THE CONTINENT (2007); 
PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA 
(2008). For a work exploring the cultural salience of this fear, see NICOLE EUSTACE, PASSION IS THE 
GALE: EMOTION, POWER, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2012). 
51 See, e.g., HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (1993); DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009) 
(arguing that the fear of slave rebellions directly inuenced the Constitution’s militia and suspension 
clauses). The comments of Convention delegates, at least as recorded by Madison and other 
notetakers, were often indirect on this point. But see, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 371 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Oliver 
Ellsworth) (pointing out, perhaps archly, that “the danger of insurrections . . . will become a motive 
to kind treatment of the slaves”). 
52 For two of the best narrative accounts of drafting and ratication in all their contextual 
complexity, see CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) (discussing the 
drafting convention), and PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION 1787–1788 (2011) (discussing the ratication debates). For a one-volume analysis 
synthesizing some key ideological and legal themes of debate, see JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997). 
53 PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 147, 148 (1981). 
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The move for a stronger national government thus became something more 
than a response to the obvious weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. 
It became as well an answer to the problems of the state governments . . . . , 
[which James Madison called] “so frequent and so agrant as to alarm the 
most stedfast friends of Republicanism . . . .”54 
For many, the signal failure of their governments was the inability to cope 
with the willful persistence of factions in domestic politics. There had always 
been reason to doubt, of course, whether political disagreement could really 
be resolved by pat reference to the general will.55 But in the late 1780s such 
skepticism was typically presented as a new insight “discovered”56 during 
America’s experimentations in governance after the revolution. As James 
Madison put it at the Convention, “what we once thought the Calumny of 
the Enemies of Republican Govts. is undoubtedly true—There is diversity of 
Interest in every Country the Rich & poor, the D[ebto]r. & Cr[editor]. the 
followers of dierent Demagogues, the diversity of religious Sects . . . .”57 
In truth, few of these social divisions were new. But many revolutionaries 
appear to have pinned sincere hopes on political salvation through the self-
restraint of a virtuous republic. Here too, however, hard experience dashed 
 
54 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 393, 467 
(1998); see also Sidney, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 6, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 88 (1981) (“[T]he melancholy experience we have had of the folly, instability, and tyranny of single 
legislatures” should lead Americans “to banish those dangerous experiments in government out of our 
country”). In a letter published in a Maryland newspaper, another citizen made a similar argument,  
[T]o attempt to form a virtuous republic on the unqualied principles of 
representation is as vain as to expect a carriage to run with wheels only on one side.—
Wheels will be added on the other, and the machine once set in motion down hill will 
never stop until it carries us to the bottom . . . .” 
A Farmer, VII (Part 1), BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
473, 476 (2015). 
55 See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989) 
(discussing New Model Army debates at Putney in 1647). I tend to agree with Merrill Jensen that 
“the leaders of the Revolution . . . took party politics for granted . . . gloried in partisan warfare, 
and . . . used methods as invariably deplored but as invariably used by practitioners of the art of 
politics in every age.” MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1774–1781, xxv (1940). 
56 Americanus, I, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 2, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 171, 173 (2003) (“It has also been discovered, that faction cannot be expelled even from a 
Representative body, while possessed singly of the whole of the Legislative power.”). 
57 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 108 (James Madison). The scholarship on these various 
axes of American identity and interest is extensive, to say the least. For socio-economic dimensions, see, 
e.g., JAMES HENRETTA, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1700–1815: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS (1973); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-66 (1985); GARY NASH, THE URBAN 
CRUCIBLE: THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986). 
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dreams of a New World birthing New Citizens. Americans, it turned out, 
were no more intrinsically virtuous than anyone else: 
It is idle to expect more virtue in an American than in an individual of any 
other nation. . . . Human nature is the same in all parts of the world, bad is 
the best . . . . We see in America the same vices, as abroad, and we are not 
backward in the practice of both wit and ingenuity in cultivating them.58 
This cheery assessment was shared by Federalists59 and Anti-federalists60 
alike, and the implication was clear. There was no reason to expect that 
American virtue would ever live up to the dearest hopes of revolutionary 
theorists. “[I]t must be evident to all by this time that our Utopian Ideas were 
to[o] ne spun for Execution . . . .”61 
2. The Execution Problem 
That brings us to the whole reason for adopting the Executive Power 
Clause in the rst place: the systemic failure of execution throughout much 
of American governance, and above all else at the national level. “Our Laws 
are generally good,” wrote one merchant; “[i]t is the administration that gives 
us pause.”62 The Governor of Maryland was more blunt: “the demands of 
 
58 John De Witt, IV, AM. HERALD, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
265, 266 (1997). 
59 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jeerson, (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787), in 8 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 97, 104 (“Experience . . . . shews” that “prudent regard” for the “general 
and permanent good of the whole . . . . has little eect on individuals, and perhaps still less on a 
collection of individuals; and least of all on a majority with the public authority in their hands.”). 
NEWPORT HERALD, July 3, 1788, reprinted in 25 DHRC, supra note 46, at 339, 343 (2012) (“The 
scene now before us is truly dark” because of “the want of public virtue” and “the neglect or abuse 
of public and private advantages” arising from “the dishonesty and villainy of some individuals, but 
principally [from] that blindness and infatuation which governs at large”). 
60 See, e.g., Cato, V, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 276, 278 (2003) 
(“[Y]ou do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be the case you rest on a weak basis, 
Americans are like other men in similar situations . . . .”); A Federal Republican, A Review of the 
Constitution, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 255, 264-65 
(1983) (quoting Montesquieu’s observation that “ministers of restless dispositions have [often] imagined 
that the wants of the state were those of their own little and ignoble souls” and noting “[t]hat this may 
happen here, we have a right, and indeed ought to suppose”). 
61 John Pintard wrote,  
Were we all as upright as Yourself & a very few others Mankind might be ruled by 
opinion, but as that can never be the case in an extensive dominion the Laws ought to 
be sucient & the executive powerful enough to restrain the turbulent & support the 
peaceable members of Society . . . . 
Letter from John Pintard to Elisha Boudinot (Sept. 22, 1787), in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 47, 
47-48 (2003)  
62 Letter from Logan & Story to Stephen Collins (Nov. 2, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 141, 141 (1988). 
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government are uncomplied with, . . . and your executive reduced to the most 
humiliating condition, and exposed to the most mortifying animadversions 
and censures.”63 Political and legal theorists, of course, had been grappling 
with this execution problem for centuries. But many Revolutionary-era 
governments managed to distinguish themselves as award-winningly bad at 
executing the laws they so loved to enact. 
Hamilton’s version of the point may have been tendentious: “It is said a 
republican government does not admit a vigorous execution. It is therefore 
bad; for the goodness of a government consists in a vigorous execution.”64 But 
even the arch-republican Richard Price knew there were problems, alerting 
his beloved Americans in a published letter from London that 
[a]t present the power of Congress in Europe is an object of derision rather 
than respect, at the same time the tumults in New-England, the weakness of 
Congress, the diculties and suerings of many of the states, and the 
knavery of the Rhode-Island Legislature, form subjects of triumph in this 
country. The conclusion is that you are falling to pieces, and will soon repent 
of your independence.65 
George Washington agreed with Price that the national government was 
literally a joke, calling congressional requisitions “little better than a jest and 
a bye word throughout the Land.”66 And one Federalist pamphleteer waxed 
metaphorical in making the same point: 
I scarcely need tell you that Congress is but a name, that her resolutions are 
cyphers. She is fallen into contempt. Our union is slender: exists rather in 
idea than in reality—in the shadow than in the substance. Her present state 
is the grief of the friends of the union, the source of the fears of strangers 
and the subject of the ridicule of enemies . . . . Without a government which 
can employ and improve the power of the whole to national purposes we are 
 
63 Letter from Governor William Paca and Council to Maryland Assembly (May 6, 1783), in 
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND (1783). 
64 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 304, 310 (Alexander Hamilton). 
65 Richard Price, On the American Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, May 16, 1787, 
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 100, 101 (1981). Price kept pushing the point over the course 
of the year. See, e.g., Richard Price to William Bingham, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 20, 1787, 
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 133, 134 (1981) (reprinted by at least 24 dierent newspapers) 
(“[T]he Federal Government, in particular, is unsettled, and, I suppose, will continue so, ‘till 
insignicance and discredit amongst foreign powers, and internal distresses of wars oblige them to 
give it due strength and energy.”). 
66 Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786), in THE CORRESPONDENCE 
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 208-09 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971) (1891) (“If you tell the 
Legislatures they have violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives of the confederacy 
they will laugh in your face.”). 
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an headless trunk: a monster in creation. Thirteen bodies without one soul to 
inspire, pervade and move the complicate, unwieldy and nameless machine.67 
Many blamed these problems on the dissipation of the Spirit of ‘76, which 
was now sooner seen as an idiosyncrasy of war than as a sign of special 
American virtue.68 
Practically speaking, the Confederation’s fatal aw—and this is by now as 
standard an observation in the scholarship as it was during the Founding69—
was that the national government relied heavily on the states to execute its 
measures. Instead of a reliably complete government staed by committed 
national ocials, the Continental Congress was “a diplomatic corps”70 
 
67 Numa, Political and Moral Entertainment VII, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 1789, reprinted 
in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 7, 8-9 (1997); see also, e.g., Editor’s Note, 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
159 (“Robert R. Livingston told the New York Society of the Cincinnati that ‘I sicken at the sight’ 
of the federal government. Congress, he continued, was ‘a nerveless council, united by imaginary 
ties, brooding over ideal decrees, which caprice, or fancy, is at pleasure to annul, or execute . . . .”). 
68 “During the war,” one Federalist wrote, “the fear of a powerful enemy answered all the purposes 
of the most energetic government. But as soon as that fear was removed, . . . . its powers . . . became a 
dead letter, for the fear of common danger was gone.” A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the 
Proposed Plan of Federal Government, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 655, 656 (1990); see also id. (“As soon as peace took place, confusion in every department of 
Congress, ruin of public and private credit, decay of trade, and loss of importance abroad, were the 
immediate consequences of the radical defects in the Confederation.). For others making this point, 
see, e.g., Speech of Simeon Baldwin (July 4, 1788), in 18 DHRC supra note 46 at 235 (1995) (“[T]he 
glory of the United-States—where is it? It expired with that patriot warmth which once united our 
councils, opened our purses, and strengthened our arms without the force of law.”); Statement of 
Alexander Hamilton, New York Ratification Debates (June 20, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1704, 
1730 (2008) (“[D]uring the War that Governt. only gave advice and the Patriotism of the People made 
them Execute the measures And even then where there was less Danger the Citizens were more 
Inactive—”); Publicola, Address to the Freemen of North Carolina, ST. GAZETTE OF N.C., Mar. 27, 1788, 
reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 493, 495 (1986) (“Our zeal during the war supplied the want of 
good government . . . .”); An Old Soldier, CONN. GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 256, 257 (1984) (“[D]uring the late war . . . the recommendations of Congress, like a decree 
from above, were implicitly obeyed. . . . But peace . . . has made us fat, and we have waxed wanton.”) . 
69 See, e.g., JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1-3, 153-211 (1986); ALISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 126-135 (2010). For a representative example of the standard execution strategy, see 
16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 144-45 (Feb. 9, 1780) (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (resolving 
to appoint a committee to ask the Pennsylvania executive branch to convene its legislature to “carry[] 
into execution the above resolves” seeking the procurement of 50,000 barrels of our or wheat). 
70 James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution (c. May 25, 1788) (not generally 
circulated), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 844, 850 (1990). 
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plagued by chronic absenteeism.71 And the states were often disinclined to 
carry out its instructions.72 As John Jay wrote on the eve of the Convention: 
[The existing Congress] may resolve, but cannot execute either with dispatch 
or with secrecy—In short, they may consult, and deliberate, and recommend, 
and make requisitions, and they who please may regard them. From this new 
and wonderful system of Government, it has come to pass, that almost every 
national object of every kind, is at this day unprovided for.73 
In response, Congress became almost a parody of itself, creating first a 
committee to explore solutions to the “public embarrassments”74 of their 
execution problem;75 then a committee to explore the implementation of the 
 
71 See, e.g., Motion of Charles Pinckney (Aug. 16, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 629-30 (“[I]t has not been in [Congress’s] power to keep nine States upon 
the floor—a number without which any important resolution cannot be passed . . . . [T]his arises from 
some of the States not sending any, and others having but two members attending . . . .”); 21 JOURNALS 
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1113-16 (Nov. 14, 1781) (“Ordered, That the 
President write to the executives of the states, requesting the attendance of delegates from such states 
as are not represented, and urging the necessity of sending forward and keeping up a representation in 
Congress for conducting the affairs of the United States”). 
72 For a sampling on this point, see, e.g., A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, reprinted in 9 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 656, 656 (“Congress might advise, or recommend measures; might approve 
the conduct of some States, and condemn that of others; might preach up public faith, honour, and 
justice: But was this sucient to preserve a union of thirteen States, or support a national 
government? It had no authority . . . .”); BALT. MD. GAZETTE, May 22, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 112, 112 (1981) (reprinted by 18 other newspapers) (“In short, [the Confederation 
Congress] may DECLARE every thing, but can DO nothing. If any thing can be added to this 
description of the impotence of our federal Government, it must be a total want of authority over 
its own members.”). 
73 A Citizen of New-York (John Jay), An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr. 
15, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 922, 930; see also, e.g., Americanus, I, VA. INDEP. CHRON., 
Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 200, 201 (1988) (“It was found, that a want of 
energy prevailed in our national Assembly, and that jealousies pervaded our local legislatures; that 
the pressing requisitions of Congress were treated with haughty contempt . . . .”); Statement of 
Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 28, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 69, at 872 (urging that the general revenue “be collected by ocers under the appointment of 
Congress,” who would “deriv[e] their emoluments from & consequently [be] interested in 
supporting the power of Congress”). 
74 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 525 (June 17, 1780) 
(“Resolved, That the United States, from New Hampshire to South Carolina, inclusive, . . . be requested, 
at this critical conjuncture, to inform Congress . . . what measures they have taken in consequence of the 
several resolutions . . . .”). Such simultaneously peevish and plaintive requests for updates from the states 
on their execution of national law were a common occurrence. Cf. 10 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 261 (Mar. 16, 1778) (“Resolved, That the governors and presidents of the 
said states be earnestly requested to transmit to Congress, as soon as possible, attested copies of the acts 
passed by their respective legislatures, in pursuance of recommendations of Congress . . . .”). 
75 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 236 (Mar. 6, 1781) 
(appointing James M. Varnum, James Madison, and James Duane “to prepare a plan to invest the 
United States in Congress assembled with full and explicit powers for eectually carrying into 
execution in the several states all acts or resolutions passed agreeably to the Articles of 
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solutions identified by the first committee;76 and then still more committees to 
take over the implementation and execution of specific national portfolios.77 
What apparatus there was often fell prey to infighting—as with the furious 
complaints from the national Treasurer of Loans about the “very reprehensible 
[and] extremely disgusting” behavior of the Board of Treasury, including its 
refusal to conduct business “between the hours of nine and twelve in the 
forenoon” and its insistence on transacting even “the most trivial affairs in 
writing only.”78 By the end they were grasping at straws. At least one delegate 
thought the path to respect might run through the garment district, urging his 
colleagues to adopt a resolution requiring that “the President of Congress shall 
in future while in the Chair be seated in his robes . . . .”79 
In truth, writes Gordon Wood, “by the middle eighties Congress had 
virtually collapsed.”80 And so the sense of urgency around getting the laws 
executed pervaded the Philadelphia discussions, both in- and out-of-doors. 
“Let us be under one vigorous government, established on liberal principles,” 
exhorted one Philadelphia newspaper, “possessed of coercion and energy 
sucient to pervade and invigorate the whole—we will then rise immediately 
 
Confederation”). Varnum’s appointment at least may have signaled the mood of the committee; he 
had written to a friend the month before that “in the United States[, the] Manners are generally 
corrupt, & the Laws but feebly executed.” Letter of James M. Varnum to Horatio Gates (Feb. 15, 
1781), in 16 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 716 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1986) 
[hereinafter LETTERS OF DELEGATES]. For the Committee’s report, see 21 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 893-96 (Aug. 22, 1781) (listing several dozen 
recommendations reforming the national government). 
76 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 896 (Aug. 22, 1781) 
(“Resolved, That a Comee [sic] be appointed to prepare a representation to the several States of the 
necessity of these supplemental powers and of pursuing in the modification thereof, one uniform plan.”). 
77 For a more detailed discussion of the Continental Congress’s experimentations with 
governance, see Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 44 (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512154 [https://perma.cc/ABC4-ZQQZ] 
(internal citations omitted) (“By the time of the [constitutional] convention, congressional delegates 
were executing the body’s legislation variously ‘by themselves,’ through ‘committees’ both ad hoc 
and formalized, through individual agents, and through the creation and supervision of 
institutionalized ‘boards’ of governance.”). 
78 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 779-80 (Aug. 25, 1780); 
see also id. (emphasizing that “even . . . ocers in the department” had been subjected to this 
rigamarole, and bemoaning Treasury’s “unintelligible and impracticable” orders). It does not appear 
that Treasury exercised its right of reply. 
79 Motion of Charles Pinckney (Aug. 19, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69 at 649. And yes, the delegates promptly appointed a committee to explore 
the question. Id. at 649 n.2. 
80 WOOD, supra note 54, at 464; see also RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 192-215, 275-296, 333-352 
(detailing Congress’s ineectiveness and the failure of various eorts to reform national 
administration under the Articles). 
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into the highest consideration . . . .”81 Inside the convention hall, Governor 
Edmund Randolph opened the proceedings with a speech that focused almost 
completely on the Confederation’s execution problem.82 This single-
mindedness turned out to be basically common ground, with the delegates 
generally agreeing that “[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive 
sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”83 
Even comparatively anti-consolidationist members of the Convention 
acknowledged the political reality that “[t]he Language of the people has been 
that Congs. ought to have the power of collecting an impost and of coercing 
the States when it may be necessary.”84 
This theme carried over full force into the ratication debates, where the 
Confederation’s inability to take meaningful practical action was the butt of 
relentless criticism. The basic challenge was simple— “What is advice, 
recommendation, or requisition? It is not Government”85—and Federalists 
from Connecticut,86 Maryland,87 Massachusetts,88 New York,89 North 
 
81 Virginia Gentleman, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, (June 26, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 145, 146-47 (1981) (citing “contempt [Americans] have so universally incurred on 
account of the weakness of government”). 
82 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 18-20 (Edmund Randolph). 
83 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 9 (James Madison). Roger Sherman offered a typical 
republican concession of the point at the Convention: “The complaints at present are not that the views 
of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful, but that that their powers are insufficient for the execution of their 
views.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 341 (Roger Sherman). See also, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 43 (Gouverneur Morris) (“The federal gov. has no such compelling 
capacities . . . .”); see also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 284-85 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(similar); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 70 (James Wilson) (similar) . 
84 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 491-92 (Gunning Bedford); see also id. at 491 (“We 
must like Solon make such a Governt. as the people will approve.”). 
85 Letter of Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger (1788), in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
563, 563; see also id. at 564 (“What security is it possible to have under such a Government? A 
Government without energy, without power.”). 
86 E.g., Oliver Walcott, Sr., Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 15 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 312, 315 (1984) (“It is generally agreed, that the present confederation is inadequate 
to the exigencies of our national aairs.”). 
87 E.g., Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan, Annapolis (Jan. 31, 1788), in 11 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 229, 247 (2015) (“At this moment, congress is little more than a name, without power to 
eect a single thing . . . .”). 
88 E.g., Statement of James Bowdoin, Massachusetts Ratication Debates (Jan. 23, 1788), in 6 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1313, 1317-18 (2000) (noting that because the national government lacked 
“any power of coercion . . . . the requisitions of Congress, have in most of the States, been little 
regarded”); Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 734, 
737 (1998) (“We have long seen the futility of a nominal power in Congress, unsupported by 
reality . . . . Bare recommendations have been too long slighted and the delinquency of some States 
hath engendered evils in them all.”). 
89 E.g., Statement of Robert R. Livingston, New York Ratication Debates (June 19, 1788), in 
22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1681, 1686 (2008) (“[W]ith the addition of a few powers, those [the 
national government] possessed were competent to the purposes of the Union. But . . . the defect 
of the system rested in the impossibility of carrying into eect the rights invested in them by the 
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Carolina,90 Pennsylvania,91 South Carolina,92 and Virginia93 competed to 
make the point most forcefully. As one bit of doggerel put it: 
Nor can you boast this present hour, 
The shadow of the form of power; 
For what’s your congress or its end? 
A power to advise and recommend; 
To call for troops, adjust your quotas, 
And yet no soul is bound to notice; 
To pawn your faith to the utmost limit, 
But cannot bind you to redeem it . . . . 
Can utter oracles of dread 
Like Friar Bacon’s brazen head; 
But should a faction e’er dispute ‘em 
Has ne’er an arm to execute ‘em.94 
 
States.”); id. at 1693 (“[M]any powers were given, yet they were withheld, by withholding the means 
of executing them.”); see also Letter of John Brown Cutting to William Short (c. Jan. 9, 1788), in 14 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 492, 493-97 (1983)(“[T]he confederation of 1781”—“a Code thus feebly 
formed thus carelessly executed”—“was from the rst formation of it unsustainable . . . and in short 
built upon the unstable breath of State Legislatures who might and did pu its contexture and edicts 
into empty air at pleasure.”). 
90 E.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 21-22 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (William Davie) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“Another radical vice in the old system . . . was, that it legislated on states, 
instead of individuals; and that its powers could not be executed but by re or by the sword . . . .”). 
91 E.g., An American, PA. GAZETTE, May 21, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 833, 
836 (1990) (“[W]e have not constitutional powers to execute our own desires, even within our own 
jurisdiction <dominions>.”). 
92 E.g., A Back Wood’s Man, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, May 8, 1788, reprinted in 
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 277, 278 (2016) (“[T]he inecacy of our laws, which though they 
answered the purpose pretty well, during our late troubles, are notwithstanding in their present 
state, inadequate to the execution of domestic or foreign regulations . . . .”). 
93 E.g., Nov. Anglus, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Dec. 12, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 235, 235 (“A want of energy in the laws of some States, and a want of their execution in 
others . . . .”). For a satisfyingly sarcastic version of the point, see Statement of Edmund Randolph, 
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 970, at 986 (1990) (“We humbly 
supplicate, that it may please you to comply with your federal duties! We implore, we beg your obedience! Is 
not this, Sir, a fair representation of the powers of Congress? . . . Their authority to recommend is 
a mere mockery of Government.”). 
94 A Federalist, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, May 16, 1788, reprinted in 27 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 284, 284 (2016). The verse is from John Trumbull’s “M’Fingal.” See JOHN TRUMBULL, 
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A central theme for many Federalist authors was thus precisely how well 
the laws would be executed under the draft Constitution. However much 
some modern thinkers may minimize the “errand boy” nature of Law 
Execution,95 the founders never made that mistake: 
[H]ow humiliating is our present situation . . . . [H]ow necessary for the union 
is a coercive principle. No man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel this 
necessity. The only question is, shall it be a coercion of Law, or a coercion of 
arms . . . . [W]e must establish a national government, to be enforced by the 
equal decisions of Law, and the peaceable arm of the magistrate.96 
 
M’FINGAL: A MODERN EPIC POEM IN FOUR CANTOS (1782). It doesn’t get any better. Thanks to 
Jo Ann Davis for explaining that the “brazen head” allusion is to a failed enchantment in Robert 
Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay (1630). 
95 HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN 
EXECUTIVE POWER 2-3 (1989) (“[I]f any real president conned himself to this denition, he would 
be contemptuously called an ‘errand boy,’ considered nothing in himself, a mere agent whose duty 
is to command actions according to the law”); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Under this messenger-boy concept” of the Presidency, “the President must conne 
himself to sending a message to Congress recommending action”). 
96 Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 273, 279 (1984) (reprinted in 15 other newspapers). 
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Time and again, it was the lead point raised or first issue discussed: at the 
Philadelphia drafting convention;97 at the Pennsylvania98 and Connecticut99 
ratifying conventions; in public propaganda;100 and in private correspondence.101 
Certainly the Federalist Papers rarely lost an opportunity to laud the 
constitutional x for the Articles’ “great and radical error”102 of leaving its 
government “destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce 
 
97 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 19 (Edmund Randolph) (“[T]he prospect of 
anarchy from the laxity of government every where.”). 
98 James Wilson opened the Pennsylvania Convention with a speech hammering on the point. 
And then his nal stemwinder—which stretched over two sessions and according to Yeates’s notes 
lasted more than two and a half hours—focused almost entirely on the new government’s capacity 
to execute its law and other legislative projects. On his opening speech, see James Wilson, Opening 
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 333, 
335 (1976) (“He forcibly contrasted the imbecility of our present Confederation with the energy 
which must result from the proered Constitution.”); cf. Alexander J. Dallas, Version of Wilson’s 
Speech (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 340, 348 (“In short, sir, the tedious tale disgusts 
me . . . .”). For a pithy summary of Wilson’s endless closing pitch, see James Wilson, Speech in the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 550, 570 (1976) (“It 
is of great consequence to us and our posterity whether we shall continue under a Confederation 
without ecient powers to carry its purposes into execution, despised abroad and without credit at 
home; or whether we shall adopt a system of Union; with energetic powers, which can eectually 
carry into execution such measures as may be calculated and devised for the common safety.”). For 
a perhaps unreliably orid recapitulation of the latter, compare James Wilson, Speech to the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Morning Session) (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 550, 557-58 (1976)(“[A]fter making a law, they cannot take a single step towards carrying 
it into execution.”), with James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention 
(Afternoon Session) (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 571, 580-81 
(1976)(“Congress may recommend, they can do more, they may require, but they must not proceed 
one step further.”). 
99 Oliver Ellsworth opened the ratifying convention with a speech focusing entirely on the need 
for a more energetic system. “The present is merely advisory. It has no coercive power . . . . [H]ave we 
not seen and felt the necessity of such a coercive power? . . . The Constitution before us is a complete 
system of legislative, judicial, and executive power. It was designed to supply the defects of the former 
system . . . .” Ellsworth, supra note 96, at 245-48 (reprinted in 20 other newspapers); see also id. at 246 
(surveying the “coercive power” of various European executives to “execute decrees” and “set their 
unwieldy machine of government in motion”). William Samuel Johnson came next, and doubled down: 
“Our commerce is annihilated; our national honour, once in so high esteem, is no more . . . . The 
gentleman’s arguments have demonstrated that a principle of coercion is absolutely necessary.” William 
Samuel Johnson, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 243, 248 (reprinted in sixteen other newspapers). 
100 James McHenry, Speech to Maryland House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 14 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 279, 279-80 (1983) (“[T]he Journals of Congress are nothing more than a 
History of expedients, without any regular or xed system, and without power to give them ecacy 
or carry them into Execution . . . [T]here is no power, no force to carry their Laws into execution, 
or to punish the Oenders who oppose them.”). 
101 See, e.g., Letter from the Reverend James Madison to James Madison (c. Oct. 1, 1789), 
reprinted in 8 DHRC supra note 46, at 31, 31 (1988) (noting as rst concern the need for “ready 
Compliance amongst ye Bulk of ye People of America, with federal Measures”). 
102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
353, 355 (1984). 
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the execution of its own laws.”103 (To be honest, Publius was a little obsessed 
with the need for enforcement authority.104 As the generally sympathetic 
Charles Johnson wrote to James Iredell, “I am surprised that he should have 
thought it necessary to take so much pains to establish, what appears at the 
rst glance, at least to me, an incontrovertible truth . . . .”105) Nor was the 
Madison-Hamilton-Jay troika unusual in this respect. Many Federalist 
propagandists defended the draft constitution rst and foremost as a solution 
for the Confederation’s “very certain” lack of “vigor enough to carry [its] 
actually delegated power into execution . . . .”106 The very existence of “union 
can never be supported,” said another Federalist, “without denite and 
eectual laws which are co-extensive with their occasions, and which are 
supported by authorities and laws which can give them execution with 
energy  . . . .”107 What the constitution principally oered was thus “an 
energetic government capable of putting in execution prohibitory laws 
uniformly throughout the states.”108 And on and on and on.109 
 
103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
414, 414 (1983). 
104 For just a few of the longer passages, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 339, 341 (1983) (“It must carry its 
agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must 
itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 95, 97 
(1984) (“[T]here is good ground [under the draft Constitution] to calculate upon a regular and 
peaceable execution of the laws of the Union . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), reprinted 
in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 555, 557 (1981) (“[U]nder the national Government, treaties and 
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed 
in the same manner . . . .”). Even Publius’s discussion of the legislative powers of the draft federal 
government emphasized the point. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), reprinted in 15 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 476, 480 (1984) (“[T]he new Constitution . . . does not enlarge [the 
Confederation’s] powers; it only substitutes a more eectual mode of administering them.”). 
105 Letter from Charles Johnson to James Iredell (Jan. 14, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
363, 363 (1984) (“[T]hat the States, united under one ecient government, properly balanced, will 
be much more powerful . . . than the States disunited into distinct, independent governments, or 
separate confederacies.”). 
106 A Freeman, I, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 453, 456 (1984). 
107 A Citizen of Philadelphia, Remarks on the Address of Sixteen Members (Oct. 18, 1787), 
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 297, 304 (1981); see also id. (“[T]he superlative authority and 
energetic force vested in congress and our federal executive powers . . . . extensive as they are, are 
not greater than is necessary for our benet . . . .”). 
108 Letter from New York (Oct. 24 & 31 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 380, 381 (1978); 
see also id. at 387 (Oct 31, 1787) (observing that the Philadelphia convention resulted from “the 
opinion of a majority of the citizens of America that a national government, of energy and eciency, 
ought to be established over the United States for the better security and promotion of the interests 
of the individual, as well as the confederated states”). 
109 For but a small further sampling, see, e.g., Common Sense, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1788, 
reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 693, 694 (1998) (“Men of penetration have grown weary of 
such a weak and inecient system, and wish to lay it aside; and have substituted in its room, a 
government that shall be as ecacious throughout the union as this state government is throughout 
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What about the loose and diverse group of skeptics and outright 
opponents known to history as the Antifederalists? Certainly some contested 
the premise. Agrippa hued that “our government . . . is respected from 
principles of aection, and obeyed with alacrity,”110 and Patrick Henry pued 
that “the people of Virginia” have “manifested the most cordial acquiescence 
in the execution of the laws.”111 But the urgency of such denials just betrayed 
the power of the argument.112 Indeed, for the most part Antifederalists agreed 
 
the Massachusetts.”); Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 10 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1623, 1623, 1626 (1993) (“Union is only to be preserved by a Fœdral Energetic 
Government, and . . . the Articles of Confederation Possess not an Atom of such a Government 
. . . . a strong & rm Govt. of wholsome laws, well executed, to protect the honest Peaceable Citizen 
From Oppression, Licentiousness, Rapine & violence, appear to me indispensibly necessy.”); A Freeholder, 
VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 719, 727 (1990) (“[T]his 
constitution . . . . gives an energy and dignity to the supreme legislative and executive powers, of 
which energy and dignity the present Congress have not even the shadow . . . .”); One of the People, 
PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 186, 188 (1976) (noting that 
while “no one state can carry into eect their impost laws,” the new government “will have energy 
and power to regulate your trade and commerce, to enforce the execution of your imposts, duties 
and customs”). 
110 Agrippa, XII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 720, 
721 (1998). Agrippa was notably insistent on the point. See also Agrippa, II, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 
27, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 322, 323 (1997) (“[T]he sheris, have in no case been 
interrupted in the execution of their oce . . . . [T]he law has been punctually executed”); Agrippa, 
I, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 303, 304 (1997) (“It is now 
conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes were never better executed than at 
present.”); cf. NAKED GUN (Paramount Pictures 1988) (“Nothing to see here. Please disperse.”). 
111 Statement of Patrick Henry, Va. Ratication Debates (June 5, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 943, 954 (1990); see also id. (“What could be more awful than their unanimous acquiescence 
under general distresses? Is there any revolution in Virginia? Whither is the spirit of America gone? 
Whither is the genius of America ed?”). The Virginia delegates chased their tails on this question 
for some time. See Virginia Ratication Debates (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1006, 
1016-46 (1990) (recounting a multi-session back-and-forth among James Madison, Edmund 
Randolph, and Patrick Henry). 
112 See also, e.g., A Plebeian: An Address to the People of the State of New York (1788), in 20 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 942 (2004) (“[A]ll the powers of rhetoric . . . are employed to paint the 
condition of this country, in the most hideous and frightful colours . . . . [But the] laws are as well 
executed as they ever were, in this or any other country.”); Benjamin Gale, Speech at a Town 
Meeting (Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 420, 422 (1978) (“All these combining have 
raised a mighty outcry of the weakness of the federal government . . . . But, gentlemen, have not we 
the same power we ever have had . . . . If any opposition is made to government, has not our sheris 
power to call to their assistance the militia to support him in the execution of his oce, and is it not 
so in every state in the Union.”); Statement of John Lansing, New York Ratication Debates (June 
28, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1976, 1999 (2008) (“Sir, have the states ever shewn a 
disposition not to comply with the requisitions? We shall nd that, in almost every instance, they 
have, so far forth as the passing the law of compliance, been carried into execution.”). 
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with the diagnosis, both privately113 and publicly.114 Brutus was typical in 
“acknowledg[ing] . . . that the powers of Congress, under the present 
confederation, amount to little more than that of recommending,”115 and 
Centinel called it “universally allowed” that “extraordinary diculties [have] 
hitherto impeded the execution of the confederation . . . .”116 
Rather than denying the problem, Antifederalists typically responded by 
warning that the draft Constitution went too far in xing it. The new 
government’s dramatically improved enforcement power, they urged, would 
overshoot the mark and result in tyranny.117 “The publick mind, I fear,” 
worried Cornelius, “is at this critical juncture, prepared to do the same that 
almost every people, who have enjoyed an excessive degree of liberty have 
done before;—to plunge headlong into the dreadful abyss of Despotick 
 
113 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to John Adams (Sept. 3, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 9, 9 (1988) (“The present federal system, however well calculated it might have been for its designed 
ends if the States had done their duty, under the almost total neglect of that duty, has been found quite 
inefficient and ineffectual—The government must be both Legislative and Executive, with the former 
power paramount to the State Legislatures in certain respects essential to federal purposes.”). 
114 See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of 
Pennsylvania to their Constituents, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18, 1787 [hereinafter Dissent of the Minority], 
reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 617, 618-19 (1976) (“[T]he annual requisitions were set at 
naught by some of the states, while others complied with them by legislative acts, but were tardy in 
their payments . . . . The Congress could make treaties of commerce, but could not enforce the 
observance of them”); Statement of William Grayson, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 11, 1788), 
in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1142, 1169 (1990) (“I admit that coercion is necessary in every 
Government in some degree, that it is manifestly wanting in our present Government, and that the 
want of it has ruined many nations.”); Statement of Samuel Jones, New York Ratication Debates 
(June 25, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1877, 1904 (2008) (“[A] fact universally known, that 
the present confederation had not proved adequate to the purposes of good government.”); Town of 
Preston Instructions to State Convention Delegates (Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
438, 439 (1978) (calling for a series of amendments while expressing “our ardent wish that an ecient 
government may be established over these states” with “sucient provision made for carrying into 
execution all the powers vested in government”). The “Federal Farmer” was notably preoccupied 
with this issue in his rst three letters. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 18-19 (“[T]he 
interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you, 
that, if I am under any biass at it, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those 
advantages.” (footnote omitted)). 
115 Brutus, IX, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 393, 397 (1984). 
116 Centinel, IV, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 317, 318-19 (1983); see also id. (conceding that “the present confederation is inadequate to the 
objects of the union,” while cautioning that these diculties were “temporary” and should not be 
attributed to irreparable “defects in the [Confederation] system itself ”). 
117 See, e.g., A Countryman, AM. HERALD, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 757 (1998) (“Are we to give up every thing dear to us, because it is demanded by a set of men, 
who, while they make the demand, exhibit a spirit of despotism—equalled only by that of the Batons 
of the Germanic Empire . . . over their vassals[?]”); The Impartial Examiner, I, VA. INDEP. 
CHRON., Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 459, 463 (1988) (“[C]an any one think 
that there is no medium between want of power, and the possession of it in an unlimited degree? 
Between the imbecility of mere recommendatory propositions, and the sweeping jurisdiction of 
exercising every branch of government over the United States to the greatest extent?”). 
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Government.”118 Dire warnings abounded about execution running amok, 
from “swarms” of enforcement agents119 to the “military execution”120 of the 
national laws.121 Cato’s litany of predictions was typical, including in its 
special concern for taxation: 
 
118 Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 11, 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
410, 416 (1997); see also id. (suggesting that the “great embarrassments under which we have 
laboured” could be remedied by narrower amendments facilitating tax collection and the regulation 
of commerce). At the Virginia ratifying convention, one Antifederalist had some fun on this score: 
“We are now told . . . that every calamity is to attend us . . . unless we adopt this 
Constitution. . . . [T]he Carolinians from the South, mounted on alligators, I presume, are to come 
and destroy our corn elds and eat up our little children!” Statement of William Grayson, Virginia 
Ratication Debates (June 11, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1142, 1167 (1990). 
119 See Statement of Melancton Smith, New York Ratication Debates (June 27, 1788), in 22 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1921, 1924 (2008) (“Will it not give occasion for an innumerable swarm of 
ocers, to infest our country and consume our substance?”); John De Witt, V, AM. HERALD, Dec. 
3, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 351, 356 (1997) (“[T]hat swarm of revenue, excise, 
impost and stamp ocers, Continental assessors and collectors, that your new Constitution will 
introduce among you . . . . will, of themselves, be a STANDING ARMY to you . . . . without the 
blessed assistance of any military corps.”); Dissent of the Minority, supra note 114, at 639 (“[J]udges, 
collectors, tax gatherers, excisemen, and the whole host of revenue ocers will swarm over the land, 
devouring the hard earnings of the industrious, like the locusts of old . . . .”); The Republican 
Federalist, VII, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 869, 870 
(1998) (“[T]he executive and judicial departments of the union, will necessarily produce through the 
Continent, swarms of ocers . . . .”). John DeWitt was so distraught about this point that he wrote 
two straight essays on it. See also John De Witt, supra note 58, at 269 (“A new set of Continental 
pensioned Assessors will be introduced into your towns, whose interest will be distinct from yours.—
They will be joined by another set of Continental Collectors, still less principled and less adequate 
than the former.”). 
120 See A Federal Farmer, Letter II to the Republican (Oct. 9, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 
46 at 25, 29 (“the general government, far removed from the people, and none of its members elected 
oftener than once in two years, will be forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, 
unless a multitude of ocers and military force be . . . employed to enforce the execution of the 
laws. . . .”); Twenty-seven Subscribers, N.Y.J., Jan. 1, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
558, 558 (2004) (“do not be so irresolute as to be frightened out of your duty by any pert adventurer, 
whose principles may be despotic, from habit in the wars and whose ideas of government cannot be 
satised with less than military execution . . . .”). 
121 The Virginia ratifying convention saw especially long colloquies on the subject. See Virginia 
Ratication Debates (June 14, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1258, 1269-97 (1993) 
(recounting a debate involving Clay, Madison, Mason, Henry, Nicholas, Randolph, and Lee); see 
also Virginia Ratication Debate (June 16, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1299, 1299-
1304, 1325 (1993) (describing a debate between Henry, Madison, and Pendleton). See also, e.g., John 
De Witt, V, AM. HERALD, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 351, 353, 356 (1997) 
(warning that federal military power was an “infernal engine of oppression to execute their civil 
laws” and asking “[w]here is the standing army in the world” that has not “nally, tak[en] a chief 
part in executing its laws”); Philadelphiensis, IV, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Dec. 12, 1787, reprinted in 
14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 418, 420 (1983) (“[T]o carry the arbitrary decrees of the federal judges 
into execution, and to protect the tax gatherers in collecting the revenue, will be ample employment 
for the military . . . .”); Interrogator, To Publius or the Pseudo-Federalist Post-1 (Dec. 1787) 
(unpublished manuscript), reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 342, 343 (2003) (“And does not 
the [Calling Forth?] Clause . . . involve a State of War and military Execution to the Persons who 
are the objects of it?” (emphasis omitted)). 
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[T]he necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws (a fruitful source of 
oppression) on the extremes and in the other districts of the government, will 
incidentally, and necessarily require a permanent force, to be kept on foot—
will not political security, and even the opinion of it, be extinguished? can 
mildness and moderation exist in a government, where the primary incident 
in its exercise must be force?122 
Given longstanding Country anxieties about a standing army, these 
reactions made some sense, at least for the most paranoid.123 The key factor 
for our purpose is that both supporters and opponents understood the sales 
pitch for ratication to focus on a radically improved execution of national 
projects and prohibitions. 
B. The Presidency’s Role in the Constitutional Solution 
That brings us to the President. Expanded legislative power was, of 
course, an essential element of the proposed constitutional solution, and there 
was angst aplenty about the federal courts’ ability to enforce legal rights and 
obligations. But when it came to the execution problem, the Article II 
presidency was central. Certainly James Madison thought so. In a letter 
summarizing the proceedings for Thomas Jeerson, Madison listed executive 
power rst among “the great objects which presented themselves” to the 
Convention.124 The reason for this primacy was simple: The whole point of 
 
122 Cato, III, N.Y.J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 125, 128 (2003); see 
also Brutus, IV, N.Y.J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 313, 317 (2003) (“If then 
this government should not derive support from the good will of the people, it must be executed by 
force, or not executed at all . . . . The convention seemed aware of this, and have therefore provided 
for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the union.”). Brutus’s rst number was in much the 
same vein. See Brutus, I, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 103, 113 (2003) 
(“[T]he government will be nerveless and inecient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, 
but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet . . . .”). 
123 See, e.g., Luther Martin Addresses the House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 11 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 87, 93 (2015) (“Should the power of these Judiciaries be incompetent to 
carry this extensive plan into execution, other, and more certain Engines of power are supplied by 
the standing Army unlimited as to number or its duration, in addition to this Government has the 
entire Command of the Militia . . . .”); Dissent of the Minority, supra note 114, at 617 (noting that 
“as standing armies in the time of piece are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up”). Cf. 
A Baptist, N.Y.J., Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 331, 336-37, (2003) 
(suggesting that the new Congress would “call [the militia] out to execute the laws of the union,” thereby 
“grievously oppressing the people, and greatly endangering public liberty”). 
124 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jeerson, supra note 59, at 98; see also id. (“1. to 
unite a proper energy in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with 
the essential characters of Republican Government.”); id. (“Hence was embraced the alternative of 
a Government which instead of operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention 
on the individuals composing them . . . .”). One of the most strangely persistent misunderstandings 
of Madison is the idea that he was uninterested in the executive branch or resistant to strong 
centralized authority. Clinton Rossiter had it right back in 1964: “I am far more impressed by the 
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the presidency was to cure the national government’s inability to bring its 
laws, policies, and projects into anything like eective execution.125 
Many Federalists traced the Confederation’s execution problem to an 
overreaction by their fellow citizens in the wake of independence. “[T]he 
immediate crush of arbitrary [British] power,” they lamented, had prompted 
Americans to “lean too much . . . to the extreme, of weakening than of 
strengthening the Executive power in our own government.”126 In the throes 
of the Critical Period, however, even the staunchest republicans began to 
concede the need for some kind of oce to “preside over our civil concerns, 
and see that our laws are duly executed,”127 and even the smallest states 
eventually signed onto New Jersey’s call for a new “federal Executive” vested 
with authority “to enforce and compel” and “carry[] into execution” “all Acts 
of the U. States in Congs. made.”128 The resulting presidency thus served as 
the Convention’s answer to the following choice: “We must either . . . 
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sucient 
vigor to pervade every part of it.”129 As one North Carolina Federalist said of 
the President: 
If he takes care to see the laws faithfully executed, it will be more than is done 
in any government on the continent; for I will venture to say that our 
government, and those of the other states, are, with respect to the execution 
of the laws, in many respects mere ciphers.130 
Unfortunately, creating an executive magistrate wasn’t just one of the 
most pressing questions. It was also one of the hardest. James Madison later 
explained to the Virginia convention that—while debates about “the 
organization of the General Government” were certainly “in all [their] parts, 
 
large area of agreement between Hamilton and Madison than by the dierences in emphasis that 
have been read into rather than [written] in their papers.” CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 58 (1964). 
125 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 52 (Gouverneur Morris) (“It is necessary to 
take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of 
which must depend the ecacy & utility of the Union among the present and future States.”). 
126 Marcus, III, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 322, 326 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
127 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 85 (Benjamin Franklin). 
128 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 245 (New Jersey Amendments); see also id. 
(requesting an executive who could “enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an 
Observance of such Treaties”). OK, not Rhode Island. But they weren’t even there. 
129 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 52 (Gouverneur Morris); see id. (“It is necessary 
to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of 
which must depend the ecacy & utility of the Union among the present and future States.”). 
130 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 136 (Archibald Maclaine). 
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very dicult”—there was “a peculiar diculty in that of the Executive.”131 At 
times, the diculty seemed almost paralyzing. The Convention’s discussion 
of the subject began with a motion “that the Executive consist of a single 
person.” Then: 
A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman asking if he should put the 
question, Docr. Franklin observed that it was a point of great importance and 
wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the 
question was put. 
Mr. Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other 
subjects.132 
Whence this weird silence among delegates who—John Rutledge’s 
reference to “other subjects” notwithstanding—had so far showed no 
detectable reticence on any other topic? Surely it was due in part to the 
identity of their presiding ocer, “whose election [as President] will 
doubtless be unanimous, unless he declines the trust . . . .”133 But that can’t 
be the whole story: indeed, the topic of presidential power prompted an 
identically awkward “silence” when introduced at the North Carolina 
ratication debates, where General Washington was nowhere to be found.134 
The founders’ persistent “embarrass[ment]”135 on the topic had a 
thoroughly substantive reason. Indeed, structuring the chief magistracy 
might have been the hardest design problem in governance.136 As Virginia 
 
131 Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1412, 1412 (1993) (emphasis added); see also id. (“Every thing incident to it, 
must have participated of that diculty.”). Madison made the same point privately. See Letter from 
James Madison to Thomas Jeerson, supra note 59, at 98 (“The rst of these objects as it respects 
the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing.”); see also 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 118 
(George Mason) (“In every Stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the diculty of the 
subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared.”). 
132 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 65. 
133 A Citizen of New-York, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 54, 54 (2003); see also id. (listing other politicians “equal to the oce of President” 
should Washington decline). Cf. A Letter from Philadelphia, FAIRFIELD GAZETTE, July 25, 1787, 
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 172, 172-73 (1981) (suggesting that there was a plot to install 
a monarch, and speculating that “Gen. Washington, though unexceptionable in every respect of his 
virtues, would probably decline the crown were it oered him . . . .”). 
134 On the relevant day, the secretary’s notes observe that “Article 2d, section 1st” was read for 
comment. The next recorded comment comes from an irritated Federalist challenging the opponents 
of the Constitution to object. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 102 (William Davie) (“Is 
it not highly improper to pass over in silence any part of this Constitution which has been loudly 
objected to?”). Silences continued throughout the North Carolina convention’s discussion of Article 
II. See, e.g., id. at 107 (James Iredell) (“The rest of the 1st section read without any observations”); 
id. (“Mr. Chairman, I was in hopes that some other gentleman would have spoken to this clause.”). 
135 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jeerson, supra note 59, at 98. 
136 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1207-19. 
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Governor Edmund Randolph said to the Virginia ratifying convention, 
“[e]very Gentleman who has . . . considered of the most eligible mode of 
Republican Government, agrees that the greatest diculty arises from the 
Executive, as to the time of his election, mode of his election, quantum of 
power, &c.”137 Echoing the handwringing of parliamentarians a century 
earlier and an ocean away, Gouverneur Morris explained why: 
It is <the> most dicult of all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him 
too weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers. Make him too strong. He 
will usurp on the Legislature.138 
This dynamic forced the Framers to “act[] a very strange part” in 
structuring the presidency: “We rst form a strong man to protect us, and at 
the same time wish to tie his hands behind him.”139 The Antifederalist 
Melancton Smith borrowed the English treatise Bracton’s bridle metaphor to 
make the point: “Power is a Head strong Horse—requires a Curb and will 
even then sometimes [break free.140] Will the Rider then Hamstring To 
Contrive a Govt. to check it from operating?”141 
These were hard questions, to put it mildly. And so the Convention 
bogged down in what Madison called “tedious and reiterated discussions.”142 
(Smash cut to generations of scholars nodding vigorously.) A series of 
 
137 Statement of Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 17, 1788), reprinted in 
10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1338, 1366 (1993). See generally Mortenson, supra note 5. 
138 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 105 (Gouverneur Morris). Cf. Reply to George 
Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. J., Dec. 19 & Dec. 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 154, 159 (1978) (“May not every person you appoint, probably, also become venal, wicked, and 
oppressive? I answer . . . . If we must have no government till we can get one that cannot be abused, 
there is an end of the business at once.”). See also generally HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON 
SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND EXPRESSES (1642). 
139 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 317 (Gouverneur Morris). 
140 Melancton Smith, New York Ratication Debates (June 25, 1788), reprinted in 22 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 1877, 1901 (2008). McKesson did not get down the end of this thought. It seems 
safe to assume the reference was to the “Curb” sometimes failing. 
141 See id. (“With respect to the Powers of Govt. they must [be] adequate to the objects or it 
becomes useless—There must be checks or the Govt. will [be] dangerous—”). James Wilson, a 
Federalist, made a version of this same point when he noted, “Bad Governts. are of two sorts. 1. that 
which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which 
destroys thro’ oppression.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 483 (James Wilson). Something 
like a sensible middle did drive the discussions: Federalists like Wilson and Morris generally 
acknowledged that xing the execution problem risked making the government too strong; 
Antifederalists and skeptics like Smith and Randolph generally acknowledged that every 
government required some force and authority and capacity to execute. The calibration was the hard 
part—and the contested one. 
142 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jeerson, supra note 59, at 98 (“On the question 
whether it should consist of a single person, or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of 
appointment, on the duration in oce, on the degree of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and 
reiterated discussions took place.”). 
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interconnected issues was hotly debated, including the number of people at 
the head of the executive branch, the process of selecting them, the provisions 
for removing them, the length of their terms, their eligibility for re-election, 
and the provision for an executive veto.143 However mechanical each question 
may seem individually, the disagreement they provoked was entirely in line 
with Morris’s sketch of the basic problem: how to promote presidential 
independence and vigor (and how much) while restraining presidential abuse 
(and how strictly)? 
The vehemence of these debates over presidential independence, 
however, shouldn’t obscure a broad band of warm agreement on at least two 
equally central questions of presidential design. First, everyone knew that 
vehement antiroyalism was a singularly potent force in American politics. 
The King’s protection had of course for a time been invoked during the 
colonists’ various confrontations with Parliament,144 and there appear even to 
have been some pockets of genuinely revanchist sentiment.145 But what we 
now think of as Whig history was easily the dominant rhetorical trope, with 
all sides of the mainstream debate celebrating “that patriotic spirit which 
prompted the illustrious English barons to extort Magna Charta from their 
tyrannical king, John.”146 This bedrock fact of political life sharply constrained 
the founders’ options in designing an American executive. 
Both the Framers and the Federalists thus had to account at every stage 
for “that jealousy of executive power which has shown itself so strongly in all 
the American governments.”147 We might discount the Antifederalist 
 
143 For present purposes, tracking the chronological evolution of the Philadelphia proposals 
isn’t terribly useful. For discussions of how the Presidency evolved over the course of the drafting 
process, see CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 182-256 (1966); M.J.C. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 168-173 (1967). See also RAKOVE, supra 
note 52, at 244-87 (canvassing Founding-era debates about presidential power); Bradley & Flaherty, 
supra note 22, at 593-95 (describing Convention debates about presidential power). 
144 See generally JACK P. GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2011); ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCY AND THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995). 
145 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to John Jay, supra note 66, at 208-09 (“I am told 
that even respectable characters speak of a monarchical form of government without horror.”). 
146 Tar & Feathers, 2, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 2, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 152, 153 (1976). For particularly detailed contemporaneous surveys of the relevant English 
constitutional history, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted 
in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 65, 65-69 (1984); A Farmer, I, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1788, 
reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 306 (2015). 
147 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 115, 120 (William Davie). James Monroe made the 
same point from across the aisle. See Monroe, supra note 70, at 863 (“Against the encroachments of 
the Executive the fears and apprehensions of the whole continent would be awake, with a watchful 
jealousy they would observe its movements.”). 
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tendency to bang on about the draft constitution’s betrayal of liberty148—
always a surere way to irritate the Federalists, who saw in such warnings “the 
same design that nurses tell children many strange stories about raw-head and 
bloody-bones.”149 But even proponents of a vigorous executive like James 
Iredell admitted that “in every [American] country . . . there is a strong 
prejudice against the executive authority.”150 
To be sure, that didn’t necessarily translate into categorical opposition to 
any non-hereditary magistracy. While James Wilson conceded that “the 
manners of the United States . . . are [against] a King and are purely 
republican,”151 for example, he also reminded the Philadelphia delegates not 
to get carried away: “[a]ll know that a single magistrate is not a King.”152 But 
the resistance was to more than just a title. From Randolph observing that 
“the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of 
Monarchy”153 to Hamilton conceding “the aversion of the people to 
 
148 Cornelius, supra note 118, at 415 (“[T]he dignied station in which that ocer is 
placed . . . cannot be considered as far below that of an European Monarch . . . . with the most 
dreadful consequences.”); Philadelphiensis, IX, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 57, 58 (1986) (“Who can deny but the president general will be a king to 
all intents and purposes . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
149 Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 383; see also id. at 382-83 (“What snake in the grass is 
there here? . . . Such a whim could never have entered the noddle of any man of sense, unless it were 
for the purpose of frightening those who have been taught to start at the sound of ‘king.’”). Hamilton 
was a little over the top in his fury, accusing Antifederalists of inventing a President with a “diadem 
sparkling on his brow” and “murdering janizaries” and the “unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio” at 
his command. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 369, 370 (1986); see also id. at 371 (“[C]alculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, [the 
antifederalists] have endeavoured to [mischaracterize] the intended President of the United States; not 
merely as the embryo but as the full grown progeny of that detested parent.”). For further similar 
commentary, see also, for example, Aristides, supra note 87, at 229; Americanus, supra note 73, at 200; 
A Freeholder, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 719 (1990); 
Publicola, supra note 68, at 493. 
150 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 113 (James Iredell); see also, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 86, 87 (John Dickenson) (noting that he considered “limited Monarchy . . . 
as one of the best Governments in the world,” but conceding that “limited monarchy was out of the 
question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment”); Charles Pinckney, 
Opening Speech in the South Carolina Ratification Debates (May 14, 1788), reprinted in 27 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 324, 333 (2016) (“The citizens of the United States would reprobate, with indignation, 
the idea of a monarchy.”). Alexander Hamilton’s “despair that a Republican Govt. Could be established” 
in the United States didn’t prevent his “sensib[ility] at the same time that it would be unwise to propose 
one of any other form.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 288 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 
id. at 288-89 (emphasizing his “private” admiration of the “British Govt”). 
151 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 71 (James Wilson). 
152 Id. at 96; see also id. (“[Wilson] observed that [Randolph’s] objections [to a one-person 
presidency] were levelled not so much agst. the measure itself, as agst. its unpopularity.”). 
153 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 88 (Edmund Randolph) (emphasis added) 
(unsuccessfully urging an executive by committee); see also id. at 72 (“I Situation of this Country 
peculiar—II—Taught the people an aversion to Monarchy III All their constitutions opposed to it—
IV—Fixed character of the people opposed to it . . . .”). For others in this vein, see, e.g., 1 
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monarchy . . . . that detested parent,”154 this descriptive point was understood 
across the ideological spectrum. 
That brings us to a second point of broad agreement: at least in part 
because of the power of such antimonarchical politics, everyone understood 
that any politically viable proposal would have to subject the executive branch 
to the law of the land. As Blackstone’s enormously inuential treatise taught, 
“one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty” in Britain was “the limitation 
of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is 
impossible he should ever exceed them . . . .”155 Americans liked to imagine 
that this principle was embedded deep in English history, as in the sketch 
oered here by “A Farmer”: 
Henry Bracton a cotemporary [sic] lawyer and judge, who has left us a 
compleat and able treatise on the laws of England, is thus clear and express—
Omnes quidem sub rege, ipse autem sub lege, all are subject to the King, but the 
King is subject to the law—It will hardly then be imagined, that the supreme 
law and constitution were the grants and concessions of a Prince, who was 
thus in theory and practice, subject himself to ordinary acts of legislation.156 
While this point had been forcefully contested by the Stuarts and their 
intellectual minions, the long aftermath of the Glorious Revolution 
conclusively resolved the debate in favor of Parliament.157 So as a political 
matter, Federalists simply had to reiterate that the Constitution they were 
 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 432 (Elbridge Gerry) (“[T]he American people have the 
greatest aversion to monarchy, and the nearer our government approaches to it, the less Chance have 
we for their approbation.”); id. at 101-02 (George Mason) (“He hoped that nothing like a monarchy 
would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through 
the late Revolution.”); BALT. MD. GAZETTE, July 3, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
89, 89 (1988) (criticizing John Adams for supporting “monarchy, or what is the same, ‘a rst 
Magistrate possessed exclusively of the Executive power.’”). 
154 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
370, 370 (1986). 
155 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230. A recent and excellent Note sheds 
important light on the substantial inuence that legal writers other than Blackstone exerted on legal 
education. But its title is best read as an overstatement of the author’s thesis, which is impressively 
demonstrated. See Martin Jordan Minot, Note, The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the Eighteenth-
Century Importance of the Commentaries, 104 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2018) (arguing that Coke, Hale, 
and Rolle may have been more signicant than Blackstone in the instruction of eighteenth-century 
law students). 
156 A Farmer, supra note 146, at 311 (footnote omitted) (criticizing the draft constitution’s failure 
to include a bill of rights). 
157 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1210-15, 1223. 
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selling would put “every department and ocer of the federal 
government . . . subject to the regulation and controul of the laws . . . .”158 
But wasn’t subjecting the chief magistrate to “ordinary acts of legislation” 
incompatible with Federalists’ avowed and enthusiastic embrace of 
presidential vigor and independence? They didn’t think so. Just as the 
founders understood the dierence between conceptual powers and political 
entities, they also understood the dierence between the statutory framework 
and the various branches of government which created and interpreted it. 
The separation of powers was implicated when you forced the President to 
obey Congress, not when you forced him to obey the laws. The former was a 
political entity that existed and acted at a specic point in time. The latter 
was an abstract framework of rules that had been successfully enacted through 
a complex process that included presidential approval as a necessary step. 
Alexander Hamilton could not have been clearer on the point: 
It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on 
the legislative body. The rst comports with, the last violates, the 
fundamental principles of good government; and whatever may be the forms 
of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands.159 
Pause for a moment, if you don’t mind, and read that quote again. As the era’s 
most vocal advocate for a strong executive magistracy saw it, the 
considerations bearing on the President’s political independence from Congress 
had nothing to do with the considerations bearing on what substantive 
authorities he should possess.160 The two questions were wholly separate: 
[H]owever inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance 
in the executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety 
contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the Legislature. The latter 
may sometimes stand in opposition to the former; and at other times the 
 
158 A Citizen of New Haven, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, CONN. COURANT, 
Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 280, 283 (1984); see also id. (“[T]herefore the 
people will have all possible security against oppression.”). 
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
411, 413 (1986); see also id. (emphasizing the “tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every 
other” (emphasis added)). This was no aside. The excerpt above is perhaps the most important two 
sentences in perhaps Publius’s most important defense of presidential independence. FEDERALIST 
NO. 71 was the rst in a pair of essays defending two core elements of the Convention’s package deal 
on presidential independence: the duration of the oce and the president’s eligibility for re-election. 
It was thus a key task to explain why these bulwarks of independence were not at odds with the 
universally accepted principle that the chief magistrate should be subject to law. 
160 Prudence might have counseled more care about assuming a sharply binary distinction; it’s 
not hard to imagine how the form of law could be used to eectuate direct control by a political 
entity. But I have seen no evidence in the Founding debates that this proposition would have been 
adjusted in response to more careful thought about the ambiguity of that line. 
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people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable 
that the executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with 
vigor and decision.161 
It would be a perfectly natural response here to respond with limit-testing 
hypotheticals. But don’t let that reaction obscure the political centrality of 
Hamilton’s distinction. Even as they forcefully defended the wisdom of an 
independent and vigorous executive magistrate, Federalists not only didn’t, 
but couldn’t, question Bractonian piety. The president was subject to the laws. 
There was no question, however, of the President being weak. To the 
contrary: Federalists leaned hard into their pitch of an Article II president 
who would be independent in the exercise of his constitutional and statutory 
authorities.162 The Philadelphia deliberations had certainly created a series of 
safeguards to precisely that end. By combining selection by the Electoral 
College with an extended duration in oce, the Constitution reduced the 
likelihood that the President would be a catspaw for legislative factions. By 
giving him the rst move in the appointments process and a presumptively 
decisive veto power, the Constitution gave the President tools to defend that 
independence once in oce. By permitting impeachment, the Constitution 
created a limited route for real-time supervision; by requiring a supermajority 
for conviction, the Constitution reduced the likelihood that impeachment 
would become a tool of ordinary politics. 
For the Federalists, this hydraulic calibration was a triumphant solution 
to the age-old dilemma of executive authority. And so throughout ratication 
they trumpeted the Constitution’s success in giving the President both “that 
degree of vigour which will enable the president to execute the laws with 
energy and dispatch,” and also “that rm or independent situation which can 
 
161 THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 159, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton). 
162 This point has been made at least since Charles Thach’s seminal CREATION OF THE 
PRESIDENCY. See CHARLES THACH, CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1923). The latest entry in this literature is Eric Nelson’s ROYALIST 
REVOLUTION, which urges the non-parliamentary nature of the government scheme that emerged. 
See ERIC NELSON, ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICA FOUNDING (2014). 
Recall that in the Westminster system, literally anything Parliament enacted was law, including 
fundamental changes to the constitution. Nelson’s immensely learned book rightly argues that some 
of the king’s prerogatives were reintroduced by the American constitution. And certainly the 
revolutionaries’ deployment of the “evil counsellors” trope—so familiar to political debate in any 
monarchical system—conveyed a perhaps-sometimes-even-sincere regard for the British monarchy. 
E.g. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 391 (Nov. 29, 1775) (“The 
manner in which the last dutiful petition to his Majesty was received . . . are considered by Congress 
as further proofs of those malignant councils, that surround the sovereign . . . .”). But Nelson’s 
imprecision about legal terminology—and in particular about the constitutional signicance of 
prerogative as a well-dened suite of authorities—leads him to misread evidence of support for 
executive independence as an embrace of royalism in a politically or legally signicant sense. 
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alone secure the safety of the people, or the just administration of the laws.”163 
Did this raise its own risks to liberty? You betcha. This was no milquetoast 
president, and everyone knew it. In the ever-so-delicate words of one French 
emissary’s report home, it would “perhaps be interesting to examine, if . . . it 
is prudent . . . to elect an Ocer as powerful as the President of the united 
States will be?”164 As Federalists enjoyed reminding their opponents, though, 
“[i]t is a well established principle in rhetorick, that it is not fair to argue 
against a thing, from the abuse of it.”165 
As the founding era has receded further into memory, the more difficult 
problem for historians has been to identify the substantive scope of presidential 
power. At least where the constitutional authorities of the office are concerned, 
the enumeration principle simplifies that question quite a bit. If “[t]he powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few 
and defined,”166 then it’s hard to get around the fact that Article II doesn’t 
include many grants of presidential authority. And that brings us back to the 
Executive Power Clause. Does that mousehole hide an elephant?167 Did 
someone slip “the unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative”168 into the first 
sentence of Article II? Or does the clause convey only the functional authority 
to execute law? On either reading, the Executive Power Clause was the raison 
d’être of Article II. Let’s try to figure out which one is right. 
III. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” MEANT THE POWER TO EXECUTE 
THE LAWS 
Americans on all sides of the debates constantly invoked a standard lesson 
of eighteenth-century political theory: it’s not enough for government to 
 
163 Charles Pinckney, Opening Convention Speech of the South Carolina Ratification Debates 
(May 14, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 324, 329, 333 (2016). For a pair of more canonical 
examples, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 56 (James Madison) (“If it be a fundamental 
principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised; 
it is equally so that they be independently exercised . . . . It is essential then . . . [to] give [the President] 
a free agency with regard to the Legislature.”); JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA xii-xiii (1787) (“[T]he people’s rights and 
liberties, and the democratical mixture in a constitution, can never be preserved without a strong 
executive, or, in other words, without separating the executive power from the legislative.”). 
164 Letter from Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 422, 425 (1981) (editors’ translation). 
165 A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, at 664; see also id. (“Would you say there should be no 
Physicians because there are unskilful administers of medicine: No Lawyers because some are 
dishonest: No Courts because Judges are sometimes ignorant; nor government because power may 
be abused? In short, it is impossible to guard entirely against the abuse of power.”). 
166 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 104, at 479 (James Madison). 
167 Cf. Statement of Sir Edward Coke, 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1628) col. 357 (“This is magnum in 
parvo . . . . It is a matter of great weight, and to speak plainly, it will overthrow all our Petition.”). 
168 TRIMBLE, supra note 32. 
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make rules; it must also have the power to enforce them. As this Part will 
show, the name for that simple but crucial authority was “the executive 
power.” Many thought possession of the authority implied at least a 
presumptive power to make appointments. And everyone agreed that the 
executive power was an empty vessel with a simple executory function: to 
implement the law as generated by relevant sources of legislative authority. 
A. The Power to Execute the Laws Was Essential to a Complete Government 
1. Law Is Meaningless Without Execution 
The founders understood the Confederation’s ineectiveness as just the 
latest example of a recurring diculty in governance design. For Edmund 
Randolph, the point was practical: “No government can be stable, which 
hangs on human inclination alone, unbiassed by the fear of coercion.”169 For 
Publius, it was intrinsic to law as such: “It is essential to the idea of a law, that 
it be attended with a sanction; or, in Other words, a penalty or punishment 
for disobedience.”170 Either way, the implications were straightforward: 
“positive regulations ought to be carried into execution” and “negative 
restrictions ought not to [be] disregarded or violated.”171 
This was no abstract piety. To the contrary, the execution problem was 
a matter of deep and abiding concern. “It is an established truth that no 
nation can exist without a coercive power, a power to enforce the execution 
 
169 Edmund Randolph, Letter of his Excellency Edmund Randolph on the Federal Constitution 
(Oct. 10, 1787), in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 117, 124 (1984); id. (deriding the Confederation’s 
“wretched impotency . . . . sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish”); see also, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 90, at 182 (statement of Archibald Maclaine) (“[T]he powers given by this 
Constitution must be executed. What, shall we ratify a government and then say it shall not operate? 
This would be the same as not to ratify.”); id. at 139 (statement of Richard Spaight) (“When any 
government is established, it ought to have power to enforce its laws, or else it might as well have no 
power. What but that is the use of a judiciary? . . . . [N]o government can exist without a judiciary to 
enforce its laws, by distinguishing the disobedient from the rest of the people, and imposing sanctions 
for securing the execution of the laws.”); id. at 153 (statement of Samuel Spencer) (“I am ready to 
acknowledge that the Congress ought to have the power of executing its laws.”). 
170 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
324, 328 (1984); see also id. (“Government implies the power of making laws.”). 
171 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 156 (William Davie). Note that in the literature on 
which this discussion drew, the founders distinguished between two theoretically distinct powers of 
execution. First, the enforcement of negative prohibitions like a ban on piracy. See, e.g. Marcus, IV, 
NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 12, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 379, 381 (1986) 
(“[I]f they could not enforce such acts by the enacting of penalties, those powers would be altogether 
useless, since a legislative regulation without some sanction would be an absurd thing indeed.”). Second, 
the implementation of affirmative projects like the construction of postal roads. Letter from the 
Reverend James Madison to James Madison, supra note 101, at 31 (“[A] Govt. so wisely conceived in it’s 
general Plan . . . must possess Vigour & Energy sufft. to execute the Measures adopted under it.”). See 
generally Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 52-54 (2014). 
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of its political regulations.”172 Without the power to enforce, the power to 
legislate was “nonsensical”;173 “idle and nugatory”;174 “useless”;175 
“ridiculous”;176 an “inconceivable absurdity”;177 a “political farce” or 
“solecism”;178 “strange indeed;”179 even “a felo de se.”180 Some founders went 
so far as to argue that “[l]aws of any kind which fail of execution, are worse 
than none, because they weaken the government, expose it to contempt, 
destroy the confidence of all men . . . .”181 
As throughout the literature on which the founders relied, this point was 
often made through extended metaphors involving bodies or machines. 
 
172 Samuel Huntington, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), reprinted in 15 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 312, 313 (1984). 
173 Letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger, supra note 85, at 567; see also id. at 
564, 567 (“Can there be such a thing as Government without Power? What is advice, recommendation, 
or requisition? It is not Government . . . . When Laws are made they are nonsensical unless they can 
be carried into execution; therefore it is necessary somebody shou’d have a Power of determining when 
they are broken, and to decree ye forfieture in consequence of such breach.”). 
174 Cato, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
438, 440 (Dec. 19 1787); see also id. at 439-40 (“If a union is necessary, a government is also necessary 
for that union; for to make general laws without having power of executing them, would be idle and 
nugatory . . . . [T]he powers necessary to be given to a confederated government, for the purposes 
of executing the general laws of the union . . . .”). 
175 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 144, 145 (statement of James Iredell); see also id. at 
145-46 (“[L]aws are useless unless they are executed. At present, Congress have powers which they 
cannot execute. After making laws which aect the dearest interest of the people, in the 
constitutional mode, they have no way of enforcing them.”). 
176 A Jerseyman, To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in 
3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 146, 149 (1978); see also id. (“It will be readily agreed that it would be 
highly ridiculous to send representatives . . . to make laws for us, if we did not give power to some 
person or persons to see them duly executed. The wisdom and prudence is to be shown in the 
framing laws; the complete execution of them ought to follow of course.” (emphasis omitted)). 
177 Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 389 (discussing Calling Forth clause); see also id. 
(“[I]f Congress is invested with power to make laws, the power of executing laws in the most ample 
and eectual manner ought to be lodged there also. Without this, there would have been an 
inconceivable absurdity in the Constitution.”). 
178 Edmund Randolph, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Debates (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 915, 934 (1978); see also id. (arguing that the Confederation was “a system, that provided 
no means of enforcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a political farce, to pretend 
to vest powers, without accompanying them with the means of putting them in execution?”). 
179 Charles Carroll, Draft Speech for Maryland Convention (Jan.–Mar. 1788), in 12 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 832, 839 (2015); see also id. (“To have given to Congress an authority & power to 
make laws, & withheld the means of enforcing them would have been a proceeding strange indeed 
in men so well acquainted with the defects of the existing system . . . . and leave us nothing but the 
shadow, the mockery of an unreal government . . . .”). 
180 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 158 (statement of William Davie). 
181 A Citizen of Philadelphia, supra note 107, at 304 (emphasis partly omitted); see also id. (“[I]n 
ne, our union can never be supported without denite and eectual laws which are co-extensive 
with their occasions, and which are supported by authorities and laws which can give them execution 
with energy . . . .”). 
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Enforcement authority provided the “ligaments of Government,”182 the 
“limbs, or parts” of the institutions they served,183 and “[t]he nerves of the 
whole body politic.”184 Government is therefore “a nerveless mass, a dead 
carcase, without the executive power.”185 Its “powers . . . are mere sound”;186 
its “machine[ry]” can “no more move, than a ship without wind, or a clock 
without weights.”187 “[E]mpower[ing] one body of men to enact statutes; and 
another to forbid their being carried into execution,” Republicus wrote, 
“resembles a man putting forth his right hand to do some important business 
and then stretching forth his left hand to prevent it . . . .”188 
Their obsessive worry manifested in almost ritualistic reference to “good 
laws faithfully executed.”189 Indeed, that phrase became literal ritual when it 
 
182 Statement of Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 
10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1184, 1193 (1993) (citing Montesquieu, Locke, Sidney, and Harrington 
on the balance between excessive severity and excessive lenience in execution). 
183 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XV (May 2, 
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1043 (2004) (“[E]xecutive ocers [such] as clerks, sheris, 
&c . . . . are all properly limbs, or parts, of the judicial courts . . . .”). 
184 Speech of Simeon Baldwin, supra note 68, at 237; see also id. (“The nerves of the whole body 
politic should concenter in the supreme executive; and the great council of the nation, under due 
restrictions, ought to command the purse and the sword; or in vain will they weild the sceptre of 
government. To what purpose should a legislative enact laws if nobody is obliged to obey them?”). 
185 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 58 (William Davie); see id. (“Let your 
representatives be the most vicious demons that ever existed; let them plot against the liberties of 
America; let them conspire against its happiness,—all their machinations will not avail if not put in 
execution. By whom are their laws and projects to be executed? By the President.”). Compare THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 102, at 358 (James Madison) (declaring that government is “a lifeless 
mass” without “the means of carrying [its powers] into practice”), with id. (“[T]he Confederation is 
chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the fœderal government to be 
absolutely necessary, and at the time rendering them absolutely nugatory . . . .”). 
186 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 571, 581 (1976); see also id. (“Can we perform a single national act?”). 
187 Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra 
note 46 at 243, 246 (1984); see id. (“Mr. President, have we not seen and felt the necessity of such a 
coercive power?”); cf. Speech of William Pierce (July 4, 1788), in 18 DHRC, supra note 46, at 249, 253 
(1995) (“[T]he old Constitution . . . being placed, as it were, out of the perpendicular, it is like the 
hanging tower of Pisa; it is kept up and supported only by props, that must one day or other fall.”). 
188 Republicus, KY. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 375, 380 (1988); 
see id. (criticizing bicameral structure of legislative process rather than the executive power per se). 
189 PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 126, 126 
(1981). American antecedents stretched back at least to the Rhode Island Compact of 1636. R.I. 
COMPACT (1636), in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3207-08 (1909) (“It is in the 
Powre of the Body of Freemen orderly assembled, or the major part of them, to make or constitute 
Just Lawes, by which they will be regulated, and to depute from among themselves such Ministers 
as shall see them faithfully executed between Man and Man.”); see also, e.g., Statement of Edmund 
Randolph, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 970, 
987-88 (1990) (“No extent on earth seems to me too great, provided the laws be wisely made and 
executed.”); id. (“[L]aws . . . made with integrity, and executed with wisdom . . . .”); Statement of 
Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 1412, 1427 (1993) (“To give execution to proper laws, in a proper manner, is the[] peculiar 
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came time to toast ratication. Whether accompanied by muskets or cannon, 
by folded hands or a raised tumbler, the formulation was strikingly consistent: 
“wise Federal Laws, and may they be well executed” in Maryland190 and 
Pennsylvania;191 “[w]isdom to frame laws and spirit to execute them” in South 
Carolina;192 and “grace, wisdom and understanding to make and execute such 
laws . . . to secure . . . the blessings of liberty” in Virginia.193 Meaningful 
execution was the central promise of ratication, and they knew it. 
2. Executing Laws Was the Dening Function of the Article II President 
Once you know the job that needs doing, the next step is to give it to 
someone.194 “Suppose that the three powers, were to be vested in three 
persons by compact among themselves,” Gouverneur Morris mused, such that 
“one was to have the power of making—another of executing, and a third of 
judging, the laws.”195 His analogy wasn’t subtle. The dening role of the 
legislature was promulgating law. The dening role of the judiciary was 
adjudicating law. And the dening role of the President was executing law. 
In this framework, it was the Article II presidency that made the new 
government “complete.” To be sure, a number of other provisions also spoke 
 
province” of the judiciary); Letter from William Vassall to John Lowell (Feb. 26, 1788), reprinted in 
7 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1709, 1709 (2001) (“[W]ithout an Ecient Government no State or 
Society of Men will be just or happy. By an Ecient government . . . that will make wise & 
Equitable Laws, And as Horace expresses it, Justos et tenaces propositi Vires be Armed with full 
compulsive power to Execute said Laws . . . .”). 
190 BALT. MD. J., July 11, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 751, 751 (2015); see also 
MD. J., July 1, 1788, reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1718, 1719 (1993) (toast to “Wise Federal 
Laws, and well executed”). 
191 Extract of a letter from Head of Elk, PA. MERCURY, July 15, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 752, 752 (2015). 
192 CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, May 7, 1788, reprinted in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 276, 276 (2016). 
193 E.g., The New Litany, VA. HERALD, Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 399, 400 (1988). 
194 Separation of powers theory advised at least two design principles for any distribution of 
the powers of government. First, the various entities needed to be meaningfully independent. E.g. 
Statement of Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 5, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 943, 947 (1990) (“Would any Gentleman in this Committee agree,” one Federalist 
asked in Virginia, “to vest these three powers in one body, Congress? No.—Hence the necessity of 
a new organization and distribution of those powers.”). Second, each individual entity needed to be 
structured so that it could most eectively implement its dening power. E.g. Speech of Simeon 
Baldwin, supra note 68, at 236 (“It is necessary in a good government, that the legislature should be 
so formed as not to enact laws without due deliberation—that the judicial be competent to the 
administration of justice, and that the executive have energy to carry their decisions into execution.”). 
195 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 78-79 (Gouverneur Morris) (responding to 
criticism of including the judiciary in proposed council of revision). Cato’s use of Vesting Clause 
terms was similarly unmistakable. Cato, supra note 60, at 277 (without certainty in “political 
compacts . . . you might as well deposit the important powers of legislation and execution in one or 
a few and permit them to govern according to their disposition and will”). 
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to the execution problem. But it was fundamentally “the president, . . . so 
much concerned in the execution of the laws,”196 who transformed the 
Confederation into a more perfect union. This point was common ground 
among the competing proposals in Philadelphia: both the New Jersey plan 
and its Virginia competitor listed “authority to execute” or “power to carry 
into execution” as the chief magistrate’s rst substantive authority.197 Indeed, 
the rst draft of each plan gave these provisions an almost-goes-without-
saying avor, listing presidential powers “besides a general authority to 
execute the National laws”198 and “besides [a] general authority to execute the 
federal acts,”199 respectively. 
What emerged from the ensuing negotiations was the President as “the 
superior ocer, who is to see the laws put in execution”:200 
[A] properly constituted and independent executive,—a vindex injuriarum—
an avenger of public wrongs; who with the assistance of a third estate, may 
enforce the rigor of equal law on those who are otherwise above the fear of 
punishment . . . .201 
This was an indispensable charge. As James Iredell put it, the “oce of 
superintending the execution of the laws of the Union” was “of the utmost 
importance. It is of the greatest consequence to the happiness of the people 
of America, that the person to whom this great trust is delegated should be 
worthy of it.”202 
B. The Constitutional Term for this Power to Execute Laws Was “The Executive 
Power” 
So everyone understood that the defining function of the President was his 
power to execute laws. In a limited constitution of enumerated powers, though, 
which clause conveyed that specific mandate as an affirmatively authorized 
governance authority? Stepping back from decades of highly politicized 
controversy, the question is so textually obvious that for newcomers it might 
seem rhetorical. Because the answer is staring you in the face: 
 
196 Fabius, IV, PA. MERCURY, Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 180, 181 
(1995); see also id. (surveying the dening features of each branch). 
197 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21 (Virginia Plan); id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan) 
(rst listing “authority to execute the federal acts”); cf. id. at 230 (Amended Virginia Plan) (“power 
to carry into execution the National Laws”); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 116 (Re-
Amended Virginia Plan) (“power to carry into execution the National Laws”). 
198 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21 (Virginia Plan) (emphasis added). 
199 Id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan) (emphasis added). 
200 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 47 (Archibald Maclaine). 
201 A Farmer, II, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 29, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
325, 330 (2015) (emphasis omitted). 
202 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 106 (James Iredell). 
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The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America. 
It really is that simple. The founders variously shorthanded the power therein 
granted as the “authority [or responsibility] to execute laws”;203 as “the whole 
executive government”;204 or as “the whole [or sole] executive authority.”205 But 
most often they just called it “executive power.”206 Sometimes it seemed like the 
only thing on which that squabbling generation could agree. 
1. The Root and Cognates of the Term 
Let’s start with the root of the word. The word “execute” meant to 
perform; to complete; to carry out; to implement; to bring into being; or 
simply to do.207 When you executed something, you took some intention that 
as yet existed only as a plan, and you brought it into reality. Execution thus 
meant success in creating something new, often with a avor of subordination 
 
203 A Countryman, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 115, 115 (2015); see also id. (“Are not the Governors of the dierent States equally absolute all along? 
Each of them have had the command of the eet, the army and militia, and authority to execute 
laws?”); A NATIVE OF BOSTON: THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1787), reprinted in 7 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1763, 1767 (2001) (advocating a single 
magistrate with a veto, the appointment power, and “responsib[ility] in the dernier resort for the 
execution” of law (emphasis omitted)). 
204 A Countryman, V, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1787, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 54, 55 (1984) (listing “the whole executive government” as a separate prerogative from the 
king’s military, veto, prorogation, and nancial powers). 
205 Id. (describing “the whole executive authority” as an alternative formulation); The 
Impartial Examiner, IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 11, 1788, reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
1609, 1610 (1993) (contrasting “the sole executive authority” with the separate prerogative of veto) 
(emphasis omitted); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 109 (James Iredell) (“In [Great 
Britain], the executive authority is vested in a magistrate who holds it by birthright. He has great 
powers and prerogatives . . . .”). 
206 See, e.g., Americanus, IV, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 5-6, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 354, 358 (2003) (contrasting the constitution’s placement of “the Executive power 
in the hands of a single person” with the King’s suite of “dangerous prerogatives”); The Impartial 
Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609 (contrasting “the supreme executive power” as an alternative 
formulation); Pierce Butler to Weeden Butler (May 5, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 268, 269 
n.6 (2016) (paralleling Caroliniensis; implications unclear for question of authorship vs. inuence);  
cf. Marcus, II , NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 242, 244-45 (1986) (describing the Crown “who has the whole Executive authority” and need not 
“consult []either house as to any exercise of its Executive power,” in a discussion of “the actual 
present practice of Great-Britain”—where, of course, other elements of the royal prerogative were 
regularly subject to legislative review and control); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), 
reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 498, 500 (1984) (explaining that the English constitution 
mixes powers because the King—who possesses “the whole executive power”—is thus “the executive 
magistrate” and yet also possesses “the prerogative of making treaties,” the veto, and the power of 
judicial appointments). 
207 E.g. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 732 (6th ed. 1785) 
(oering a typical range of denitions for “execute”). 
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to instructions from somewhere else.208 It was also a pretty ordinary word, 
appearing regularly in circumstances where we would likely use a lower-
register formulation today. 
The sheer range of objects taken by “execute” in eighteenth-century 
discourse is striking. But easily its most common209 grammatical object was 
the enforcement, implementation, and carrying out of “law.” If, as Publius 
declaimed, “[l]aw is dened to be a rule of action,”210 then enforcing that rule 
was obviously its “execution.” (Just to make extra sure, the busybodies of the 
Political Club of Danville agreed that it would be best to amend the 
Constitution by “strik[ing] out the word ‘execute’” each time it appeared and 
replacing it with “enforce obedience to.”211) This formulation was in constant 
use, whether the founders were chattering in informal contexts or declaiming 
in formal ones. They spoke of “executing” the law of the national government, 
the law of the individual states, the law of particular localities, the law of 
nations, and the law of political society in the abstract. Their state 
constitutions are covered in references to the “execution” of law, and often 
more than that—a constant collocation that both reected and reinforced the 
standard tripartite structure for the elements of complete government.212 
From here the key point for the Executive Power Clause followed 
naturally. As shown in previous work, scores of eighteen-century dictionaries 
oer the following uncontradicted denition of the adjective “executive”: 
“having the quality of executing or performing.”213 
The sheer unanimity is overwhelming. Consider how easy it would be to 
specify a metonymic denition of “executive” that could support a substantive 
residuum, even if only as a secondary meaning. All it would take is adding 
some variation on “relating to an executive,” “relating to the executive branch 
 
208 E.g., Rough Carver, NY DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 4, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 36, 37 (2003) (“[I]f a great villain orders one, or more, smaller ones, to cut our throats, 
they are all guilty, as well those who execute, as he who directs”); Letter from Zephaniah Swift to 
Paul Fearing (Apr. 10, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 599, 600 (1978) (“Their story was that a 
combination was forming in the western part of the state to dismiss Dyer from the Superior Court 
and that this depended on me as an instrument to execute the plan.”). 
209 At least as reected in the Documentary History, the Journals of the Continental and 
Confederation Congress, and the Correspondence of Delegates to the Continental and 
Confederation Congress. 
210 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 232, 
236 (1986) (criticizing mutability in government policy). 
211 The Political Club of Danville, Kentucky, Debates over the Constitution, (Feb. 23–May 17, 
1788), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 408, 413 (1988). We can apparently thank Mr. Innes for the 
initial motion, and Mr. McDowell for its second. 
212 See infra Section III.B.3. (discussing the concept of a “complete” and “perfect” government). 
213 JOHNSON, supra note 207, at 732; see also generally Mortenson, supra note 5 (surveying all 
Founding era dictionaries that could be identied and located after a comprehensive search). 
2020] Executive Power Clause 1313 
of government,” or “relating to an executive magistrate.” Indeed, precisely 
that “relating to” formulation was used regularly—in denitions of other 
words.214 But in dictionary denitions of “executive,” it didn’t appear once. 
An “executive ocer” was thus the one responsible for “execution of the 
laws,”215 for “carry[ing] . . . decrees into execution,”216 or simply for 
“compulsion.”217 The “executive part” of government was that which is 
“requisite for carrying those decrees into execution.”218 “Executive business” 
was implemented by “executive ocers” who “have it in charge, faithfully 
to . . . execute the laws”219 and whose reason for being was simply by 
 
214 For just a few examples of this standard “relating to [noun]” formula, see, e.g. JOHNSON, 
supra note 207, at 74, 124, 710 (dening “Abdominal” as “relating to the abdomen,” “Airy” as “Relating 
to the air,” and “Epistolary” as “Relating to letters”); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 666, 176 (1828) (dening “subjective” as “[r]elating to 
the subject” and “nominative” as “[p]ertaining to the name which precedes a verb”). 
215 NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA 16 
(1787); see also id. (“One half the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws; and it is 
impossible that an executive ocer can act with vigor and impartiality, when his oce depends on 
the popular voice.”) 
216 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 269 (May 7, 1787) 
(describing a proposal for the organization of the Illinois territory, resolving “that the said 
Commissioner with the advice and Consent of the major part of the said Magistrates of the district 
shall appoint executive ocers therein respectively to carry their decrees into execution. . . .”); see 
also 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 156 (Mar. 14, 1785) 
(describing a proposal for the organization of the Kaskaskie territory, resolving “[t]hat the 
Commissioner, with the advice and consent of the above magistrates, appoint executive Ocers in 
the respective districts to carry their decrees into execution.”). 
217 Statement of Robert Livingston, Convention Debates (June 26, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 1921, 1941 (2008) (arguing that a proposal for indirect taxation requires “compulsion” in 
the case the states refuse, which in turn “supposes that a compleat establishment of executive ocers 
must be constantly maintained . . . .”). 
218 Letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger, supra note 85, at 567. Sargeant 
expounded on the point at some length. 
This shows ye necessity of ye Judicial Power—and an executive with ye necessary 
ocers are requisite for carrying those decrees into execution—and without all this ye 
whole parade of making laws wou’d be idle. That these parts, ye Judicial and executive, 
shou’d be appointed by congress is necessary in order that ye proceedings may be 
uniform and to prevent one state from conniving at or disregarding ye laws made for 
ye benet of ye whole. If they are to raise money they must have ocers to collect it. 
Id. 567-68. 
219 Federal Farmer, supra note 183, at 1043. Federal Farmer went on to note that 
The business of the judicial department is, properly speaking, judicial in part, in part 
executive, done by judges and juries, by certain recording and executive ocers, as 
clerks, sheris, &c. they are all properly limbs, or parts, of the judicial courts, and have 
it in charge, faithfully to decide upon, and execute the laws, in judicial cases. 
Id.; see also RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 200 (quoting Robert Morris urging Congress to “pay good 
executive men to do [its] business . . . , because no man living can attend the daily deliberations of 
Congress and do executive parts of business at the same time.”). 
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denition “to carry into the eect the laws of the nation.”220 And referring to 
a government entity as the “Execut[ive] . . . power[]” meant that it was “the 
Executor . . . of laws.”221 
Enter metonymy. Because when the founders used the noun form of 
“executive,” they meant an entity that had the power of execution.222 No one 
put it better than Publius: “A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of 
the government. A feeble executive is but another phrase for a bad execution: 
And a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in 
practice a bad government.”223 So the denition of an “executive” in its 
nominal form simply meant an “[e]xecutor of the [l]aws,”224 a “person[] for 
the execution of the laws,”225 an “[e]xecutor . . . of laws,”226 and an ocer with 
“authority to enforce your laws.”227 An executive was thus necessarily 
“invested with power to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the 
 
220 A Landholder, V (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 480, 483 (1978); see also 
id. (“It is as necessary there should be courts of law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws 
of the nation, as that there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your state assemblies.”). 
221 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34 (James Madison) (“If it be essential to the 
preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to 
a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other . . . . In like 
manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well 
as the maker of laws . . . .”). 
222 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (“[O]n demand of the executive Authority of the 
State . . . .”); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (1777) (“[U]pon demand of the 
Governor or executive power, of the state . . . .”). 
223 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
396, 396 (1986). 
224 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 110 (Pierce Butler) (“Mr. Dickinson could not 
agree with Gentlemen in blending the national Judicial with the Executive, because the one is the 
expounder, and the other the Executor of the Laws.”). 
225 Aristides, supra note 87, at 236-37. Alexander Contee Hanson, the person behind the 
pseudonym Aristides, begins by discussing the basic units of government: First, the legislative 
function: “That the people should either make laws to bind themselves, or elect persons, without 
whose consent, no laws shall be made, is essential to their freedom.” Id. at 236 Next, the executive 
function: “But universal experience forbids, that they should also immediately choose persons for 
the execution of the laws”—people who are then described as “an executive.” Id.; see also id. at 237 
(“Against choosing an executive for life the reasons are weighty indeed.”). 
226 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34 (James Madison) (“If it be essential to the 
preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a 
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. . . . In like manner a 
dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker 
of laws . . . .”). 
227 John Kean, Comments on the Constitution (c. Apr. 8, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 248, 248 (2016) (noting that “an energetic executive is as necessary to government & the happiness 
of the governed as liberty—for without authority to enforce your laws, liberty degenerates into 
savage licentiousness, an extreme as much to be dreaded as tyranny”). 
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federal government,”228 and indeed dened by its ability to “execute the laws 
without restraint.”229 
2. “The Executive Power” Meant “The Power to Execute” 
On this background, the meaning of “the executive power” was exactly 
what you’d expect. If Publius could ask, “[w]hat is a legislative power but a 
power of making laws?”,230 then what indeed was the executive power but the 
power of executing them? As previous work has shown, the sources most 
prized by modern originalists reect a literally uncontested understanding of 
this point.231 Eighteenth-century dictionaries, legal treatises, political theory 
tracts, caselaw, politicians, clergymen, and pamphleteers all agreed that the 
phrase “executive power” meant something quite simple: “[t]he power of 
putting in execution.”232 
Rousseau’s use of a simplistic bodily metaphor was typical: 
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce it, one moral—the 
will which determines the act; the other physical—the strength which 
executes it . . . . The body politic has the same two motive powers—and we 
can make the same distinction between will and strength—the former is 
legislative power and the latter executive power.233 
This understanding held true in dictionary denitions for generic 
authority without any specic context.234 It held true in denitions that 
specied a legal hook or governance role.235 It held true in denitions that 
referenced the entire phrase as a singular term of art.236 And it held true in 
 
228 WEBSTER, supra note 215, at 54 (“The president of the United States is elective, and . . . 
[a]s the supreme executive, he is invested with power to enforce the laws of the union and give 
energy to the federal government.”). 
229 Statement of Alexander Hamilton, New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788), reprinted 
in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1921, 1954 (2008) (“What is your state government? Does not your 
legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without 
restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, 
but only to its separate branches.”). 
230 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 216, 220 (1984). 
231 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1230-43. 
232 A POCKET DICTIONARY; OR, COMPLETE ENGLISH EXPOSITOR (3d ed. 1765). 
233 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. III, ch. 1, at 101 (Maurice 
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). 
234 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1265-66 nn.391-417 (listing twenty-seven denitions for the 
adjective “executive” in non-governance contexts). 
235 Id. at 1267-68 nn.424-34 and accompanying text (listing eleven denitions for the adjective 
“executive” in governance contexts). 
236 Id. at 1269 nn.435-39 and accompanying text (providing ve denitions for the full phrases 
“executive power” or “the executive power”). 
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the formulations oered by canonical writers like Blackstone,237 De Lolme,238 
Filmer,239 Locke,240 Montesquieu,241 and Vattel,242 among many, many 
others.243 The evidence for this background understanding is uncontested, 
and it is overwhelming. 
The founders took this denition entirely for granted. Indeed, it was a 
presumption without which half of what they said about the presidency didn’t 
make sense. And it was everywhere, with late-eighteenth-century Americans 
variously dening the executive power as: 
• “the power of . . . enforcing laws,”244 
• “the power of executing the laws,”245 
• “the power of carrying th[e] laws into execution”246 
 
237 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142 (dening executive power as “the 
right  . . . of enforcing the laws . . . .”). 
238 See JEAN-LOUIS DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF 
THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 81 (1775) (“[T]he administration of Justice.”). 
239 See SIR ROBERT FILMER, THE ANARCHY OF A LIMITED OR MIXED MONARCHY 4 
(1648) (“[A] power of putting those laws in execution . . . .”). 
240 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 90 (1690) (“[S]ee[ing] to the 
execution of the laws that are made . . . .”). 
241 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 165 (Thomas Nugent, 
trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) (describing “the execution of [the] general will” as being 
determined by “the legislative power”). 
242 See M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, 134 (1820) (“[T]he 
. . . province to have [the laws] put into execution.”). 
243 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1230-43. 
244 Cassius, Letter I to Richard Henry Lee, Esquire, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted 
in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 641, 642-43 (1990) (quoting Blackstone); see also id. (“Are the legislative 
and executive powers in that government ‘separate,’ in which the King, who has the whole of the 
executive, occupies one entire branch of the legislative?” (emphasis omitted)). Cassius then goes on 
to quote “your favorite author, Blackstone”: “‘In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, 
or the right of making and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man . . . and whenever 
these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty.’ From this it appears, that 
liberty is only endangered, when the whole of the power of both making and enforcing laws is vested 
in one man . . . .” Id. at 643 (footnote omitted). 
245 Statement of Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 10, 1788), in 9 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1092, 1097 (1990); see also id. at 1097-98 (“It cannot be objected to the 
Federal Executive, that the power is executed by one man. All the enlightened part of mankind agree 
that the superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy with which one man can act, renders it more politic 
to vest the power of executing the laws in one man, than in any number of men.”). 
246 Pennsylvania Council of Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO 
CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, 84 (1825) (“The exercise of power in the greatest 
articles of it, those of making laws, and carrying those laws into execution, is, by [our constitution] 
assigned to two great branches. The legislative power is vested in the . . . general assembly, and the 
executive in a president and council . . . . [,] [t]he legislative [and] executive . . . powers of the people 
being thus . . . delegated to dierent bodies”) 
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• the “peculiar duty to see [legislative] act[s] carried into execution,”247 
• “that of executing the public resolutions,”248 
• “direct[ing] the execution of our laws,”249 
• “The execution of ye. Laws,”250 
• an “ecient power, to carry . . . article[s] into eect,”251 and 
• the “power to use . . . the powers nominally vested” in a government.252 
That’s why the Federal Farmer could breeze so quickly by the Executive 
Power Clause: “reason, and the experience of enlightened nations, seem justly 
to assign the [Article I] business of making laws to numerous assemblies; and 
the [Article II] execution of them, principally, to the direction and care of one 
man.”253 That’s why a Connecticut ratication delegate could refer so blandly 
to the clause as a simple, unobjectionable authority: “the power, which is to 
 
247 Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96, 105 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771) (defining “the executive power of the laws”). 
248 Brutus, VA. INDEP. CHRON., May 14, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 798, 
799-800 (1990); see also id. (“[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers. . . . Miserable indeed would be the case, were the same man or the 
same body of men . . . to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the 
public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes and dierences of individuals.”). 
249 BALT. MD. Gazette, Mar. 4, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 363, 364 (2015); 
see also id. (denying that the Senate would share “the executive power,” since it cannot “interfere 
with or direct the execution of our laws”). 
250 Letter from William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 107, 114 (1983); see id. (“That there must be an executive power independent of ye. 
Legislative branch, appears to have been generally agreed by ye. fabricators of modern 
Constitutions. But I believe it has not till now been supposed essential that this power should be 
vested in a single person . . . . Laws requires as much prudence as any other department, & ye. 
pardoning or refusing to pardon oences is a very delicate matter.”). 
251 William Cushing, Undelivered Speech (c. Feb. 4, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1438, 
1440 (2000) (along with the judicial power); see id. at 1339-1440 (“[T]he Confederation, in appearance 
imparted many, if not most of the great powers, now inserted in the proposed Constitution; . . . but 
not one ecient power, to carry a single article into eect . . . . These governmental [sic] powers, in 
order to have full & proper eect, must . . . consist of the Executive, the Legislative, & judicial. 
Without these govmt cannot be carried an End.”). 
252 Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 1299, 1304 (1993) (“He asked, if powers were given to the General Government, if 
we must not give it executive power to use it? The vice of the old system was, that Congress could 
not execute the powers nominally vested in them.”). 
253 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican Letter XIV (May 2, 
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976 (2004) (noting that “[b]y art. 2. sect. 1. the executive power 
shall be vested in a president”). He elsewhere explained the “business of the judicial department” is 
“properly speaking, judicial in part, in part executive” because courts are charged both “faithfully to 
decide upon, and [to] execute the laws, in judicial cases . . . .” Federal Farmer, supra note 183, at 1043. 
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enforce the[] Laws.”254 And that’s why a Georgia Federalist could describe the 
requisite authority so simply as “an ecient power to execute . . . laws.”255 
This understanding was unmistakable regardless of the precise 
terminology used, as when Brutus observed that the governments’ “authority 
to execute” amounted to “the means, to attain the ends, to which they are 
designed.”256 This resulted, among other things, in the frequent equation of 
“executive duties” and “administration,”257 as with the Continental Congress 
dening “the executive powers” as “the powers of administration,”258 or with 
Centinel observing that among “the great distinctions of power,” “the 
executive” element was simply “the ordinary administrative.”259 (The 
standard denition of executive power as the implementing authority was 
actually one reason the drafters decided to give Congress the power to 
“Declare” rather than to “Make” war. One delegate worried that “make war 
might be understood to ‘conduct’ it which was an Executive function . . . .”260) 
So Publius was just stating a commonplace when explaining that “[t]he 
administration of government . . . in its most usual and perhaps in its most 
 
254 William Samuel Johnson, supra note 99, at 249. 
255 Speech of William Pierce, supra note 7, at 253 (“In all the state governments the three great branches 
that maintain each other give each separate part of the Union an efficient power to execute its own laws. 
But, in the Federal Constitution, there is nothing but legislative and recommendatory powers, without even the 
shadow of authority to support or enforce its decrees.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
256 Brutus, VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 466, 472 (2003) 
(“[T]he objects of each [government] ought to be pointed out, and . . . each ought to possess ample 
authority to execute the powers committed to them . . . . This being the case, the conclusion follows, 
that each should be furnished with the means, to attain the ends, to which they are designed.”). 
257 E.g., A Citizen of Philadelphia, The Weaknesses of Brutus Exposed (Nov. 8, 1787), in 14 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 63, 68 (1983) (“[T]he execution and administration of [these government 
powers] will require the greatest wisdom . . . . The best constitution possible, even a divine one, 
badly administered, will make a bad government.” (emphasis omitted)); PHILA. INDEP. 
GAZETTEER, June 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 147, 148 (1981) (“[T]he 
administration or executive duties of government . . . .”); cf. Theophilus Parsons, Notes of 
Massachusetts Ratication Debates (Jan. 15, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1206, 1207 (2000) 
(noting “executors or administrators” of an estate). 
258 Continental Congress, Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in 1 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 104, 110 (“Apply these decisive 
maxims [of Montesquieu], sanctied by the authority of a name which all Europe reveres, to your 
own state. You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive powers, or the powers of 
administration . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying note 337 for more on this letter. 
259 Centinel, II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
457, 465 (1981) (emphasis omitted) (“The chief improvement in government, in modern times, has 
been the compleat separation of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative in dierent 
hands from those which hold the executive; and again severing the judicial part from the ordinary 
administrative. When the legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” (cleaned up)). 
260 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 319 (Rufus King) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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precise signication” is “limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly 
within the province of the executive department.261 
3. “The Executive Power” Was the Hallmark of a “Complete” or “Perfect” 
Government 
That brings us to one of the era’s most important political tropes: the idea 
of a “complete” or “perfect” government. This had nothing to do with morality 
or beauty. Rather, it built on an almost naive concept of government action as 
a simple three-part sequence of “legislative, judicial, and executive power.”262 
These “three grand immutable principles in good government”263 were 
logically intertwined, each indispensable to a coherent whole. Legislative action 
was the formulation of political intent in the form of operational instructions. 
Judicial action was the impartial assessment of how legislated instructions 
should apply to particular circumstances. Executive action was the active 
implementation of legislated instructions in the real world. Drawing on a rich 
foundation of political and legal theory,264 the sequence was so familiar that it 
verged on trite.265 Soap, scrub, rinse. Powder, ball, cartridge. Legislate, 
 
261 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
421, 422 (1986); see also id. (noting also that administration “in its largest sense, comprehends all the 
operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary . . . .”). 
262 Cato, II, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 79, 80 (2003); cf. 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE 26 
(1735) (“Of every perfect Law there are two Parts: One, whereby it is directed what is to be done or 
omitted: the other, wherein is declared what Punishment he shall incur, who neglects to do what is 
commanded, or attempts that which is prohibited.” (emphasis omitted)). 
263 A Bostonian, A View of the Federal Government of America, Its Defects, and a Proposed Remedy, 
BOS. INDEP. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1786, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 359, 360 (1981); see also 
An Address of the Convention, for Framing a New Constitution of Government for the State of 
Massachusetts Bay, No. III (1780), in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A 
CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 219 (1832) (“The 
Legislative; the Judicial and Executive Powers naturally exist in every Government: And . . . when 
the same Man or Body of Men enact, interpret, and execute the Laws, . . . a People are nally borne 
down with the force of corruption resulting from the Union of those Powers”). 
264 See Mortenson, supra note 5, Parts II–III. For perhaps the quintessential real-world 
example when the Framers sat down in Philadelphia, consider the 1783 Massachusetts Constitution: 
“The body politic” requires “an equitable mode of making laws . . . an impartial interpretation, and 
a faithful execution of them . . . .” MASS. CONST. pmbl., reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
440, 440. “[T]he people” therefore “vested” these three powers as “authority, whether legislative, 
executive, or judicial” in “the several magistrates and ocers of government” as “their substitutes 
and agents.” MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. V, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 440, 442. 
265 An exasperated British reviewer’s snark about John Adams’s work on mixed government can 
serve just as well to in describing the Founder’s discussions of the separation of powers: “We are 
indeed repeatedly told that no government can exist, but where a balance, consisting of three parts, is 
preserved. Upon this point, like Lord Chesterfield with the Graces, Dr. Adams dwells for ever.” John 
Adams, A Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America, LONDON MONTHLY 
REV., May 1787, at 394, 395. Note of course that, as Martin Flaherty has emphasized, the Founding 
debate engaged two quite different concerns: the separation of powers proper and the Aristotelian-
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adjudicate, execute. Once in a great while someone pointed out that the boxes 
had fuzzy edges,266 and—true to long tradition267—there were varying views 
on the taxonomic relationship between executive power and judicial power.268 
But for the most part the tripartite sequence was catechism.269 It’s like what 
 
via-Westminster theory of mixed government. See Flaherty, supra note 43, at 1755-1807. As I have 
shown in previous work, the distinction between those two concerns was well established in the 
Anglo-American legal and political discourse that undergirded the Founding era. See Mortenson, 
supra note 5, at 1210-42. This Article shows that the Founding debates reflected that fully. 
266 True to form, Madison oered the clearest thinking about the hard cases: “Even the 
boundaries between the Executive, Legislative & Judiciary powers, though in general so strongly 
marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere shades of dierence.” Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Jeerson, supra note 59, at 102; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James 
Madison), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 343, 345-48 (1984) (generically discussing line-
drawing problems, including in the separation of powers context). 
267 For more on the uneven development of distinctions between executive and judicial power, 
see Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1238. 
268 For examples that focused on a two-step process of moving from the formulation of 
intentions to their execution in the real world, see, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information III, 
BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 144, 144 (2015) (discussing 
a citizen’s “share in the forming of his own government, and in the making and executing its laws”); 
Philanthrop, To the People, AM. MERCURY, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 467, 
468 (1978) (“Are not the Congress and Senate servants of the people, chosen and instructed by them, 
because the whole body of the people cannot assemble at one place to make and execute laws?”); 
Reply to George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. J., Dec. 19 & 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, 
supra note 456, at 154, 156 (1978) (“Was it ever said that the people do not make their own laws or 
that the government of a republic is not in the people because they make the one, and execute the 
other, through persons delegated by them?”); Republicus, KY. GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 1788, reprinted in 8 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 446, 449, 451 (1988) (criticizing “president [who] may exercise the 
combined authority of legislation, and execution,” and noting that “the people . . . . and only they, 
have a right to determine whether they will make laws, or execute them”); A Watchman, 
WORCESTER MAG., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 879, 881 (1998) (“[T]he 
governments of Connecticut and Rhodeisland . . . have chose their own ocers, and made and 
executed their own laws . . . .”). 
269 For just a few examples, see, e.g., Curtius, II, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted 
in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 97, 100 (2003) (“What! resign all the three powers, legislative, judicial 
and executive, in the hands of one body of men?”) NEWPORT HERALD, Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 24 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 40, 40 (2011) (“It is presumed that those States who have heretofore granted 
powers to Congress for regulating trade cannot disapprove of the New Constitution; for the grant to 
Congress implied that they were vested with full powers to enact all laws relative thereto, to be adjudged 
and executed by officers of their appointment . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). James 
Wilson’s post-Ratification lectures were magisterial on the point: 
The powers of government are usually, and with propriety, arranged under three great 
divisions; the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial 
authority . . . . Wise and good laws are indeed essential; but though they are essential, 
they are so only as means. If we stop here, all that we have done is nugatory and 
abortive. The end is still unattained; and that can be attained only when the laws are 
vigorously and steadily executed; and when the administration of justice under them 
is unbiassed and enlightened. 
JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 394-97 (1791). 
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one Virginian said about the relationship between George Mason and Patrick 
Henry: “the former plans, & the latter executes.”270 
In this context, no government could be “complete”271 or “perfect”272 if it 
did not include “the powers of Legislation, Judgment and Execution.”273 If a 
government didn’t have the power to implement its intentions, then it was 
“incomplete”274 in the sense that it lacked the nal link in a sequential chain 
of governing.275 Certainly Federalists thought so, with one opening the 
Connecticut ratication convention by arguing that “[t]he Constitution 
before us is a complete system of legislative, judicial, and executive power,”276 
and another telling the Virginia convention: 
 
270 Letter from James Duncanson to James Maury (June 7 & 13, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 1582, 1583 (1993); see also id. at 1583-84 (describing the relationship between George Mason 
and Patrick Henry in organizing Antifederalists in Virginia). 
271 George Clinton, Remarks Against Ratifying the Constitution (July 11, 1788), in 22 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 2142, 2145 (2008) (The proposed system “commences in a complete system of 
government—divided into Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches”); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 51, at 284-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The great & essential principles necessary for the 
support of Government . . . . [include] Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion 
of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few cases . . . . How then are all these evils to be 
avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general Govermt . . . .”). 
272 Brutus alternated between the two formulations. See, e.g., Brutus, supra note 122, at 109 
(“[O]ne complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive 
powers . . . .”); see also, e.g., A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 596, 598 (1998) (“I am ready to concede, that ‘the government proposed . . . has as 
absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws,[‘] &c. with respect to every object to 
which it extends as any other in the world . . . .” (quoting Brutus while disagreeing with his 
conclusions)); POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Oct. 3, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
71, 73 (2003) (“[I]f the only eective and durable bond of union among states, as well as among 
individuals be a coercive government; . . . and if the perfection of that form consists in the accurate 
distribution of the legislature, executive and judiciary powers . . . the expediency of adopting the 
new constitution comes as strongly enforced as any thing which can be oered to the human mind.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
273 John De Witt, II, AM. HERALD, Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 156, 
159 (1997) (“[T]he future Congress of the United States shall be armed with the powers of 
Legislation, Judgment and Execution . . . .”). 
274 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 465, 476 (1976) (“I think it no objection, that it is alleged the government will 
possess legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Should it have only legislative authority! . . . .For 
what purpose give the power to make laws, unless they are to be executed? . . . Ought the 
government then to remain any longer incomplete?”). 
275 E.g., An Old Planter, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 394, 395 (1988) (“It is clear that wherever we give or delegate a trust to do any one act, we 
must lodge authority sucient to insure the execution of that act. When we choose an assembly to 
make laws and regulate the government of this state, what would an assembly avail, if they had not 
power to inforce every act necessary for our government?”); Letter from Richard Henry Lee to John 
Adams, supra note 113, at 9 (“The present federal system . . . has been found quite ineecient and 
ineectual—The government must be both Legislative and Executive . . . .”). 
276 Ellsworth, supra note 187, at 244-48 (“[T]he proposed Constitution . . . evidently 
presupposes two things; one is the necessity of a federal government, the other is the ineciency of 
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Government must then have its complete powers, or be ineectual: 
Legislative to x rules, impose sanctions, and point out the punishment of 
the transgressors of these rules,—an Executive to watch over ocers and 
bring them to punishment,—a Judiciary to guard the innocent, and x the 
guilty, by a fair trial: Without an Executive, oenders would not be brought 
to punishment: Without a Judiciary, any man might be taken up, convicted 
and punished, without a trial. Hence the necessity of having these three 
branches.277 
Antifederalists shared the same vocabulary for the “compleat and 
compulsive operation” of government.278 Indeed, it was Brutus who oered 
perhaps the most thoroughly worked-out model of governmental 
perfection,279 and certainly its most repetitive expression. To “give the general 
[government] compleat legislative, executive and judicial powers to every 
purpose,”280 he thought, would yield something very frightening: “one 
complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive 
powers . . . .”281 Brutus framed his rst letter around precisely this point, 
drawing a sharp distinction between the functional “powers” of government 
and the particular subject matter “objects” to which those powers would be 
applied.282 “It is true this government is limited to certain objects,” he 
conceded.283 But as to those objects, he continued, the federal government 
 
the old articles of confederation . . . . A more energetic system is necessary. The present is merely 
advisory. It has no coercive power . . . . The Constitution before us . . . . was designed to supply the 
defects of the former system . . . .”). 
277 Pendleton, supra note 194, at 947; see also id. (contrasting “complete” government in this 
sense with “consolidated” government in the totally centralized sense feared by Antifederalists). 
278 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34-35 (Gouverneur Morris) (urging the 
Philadelphia drafting convention to understand their very project as aimed at a new national 
government with “a compleat and compulsive operation”) (responding to a question from one of the 
Pinckneys whether the Convention was even “authorize[d] [to] discuss[] . . . a System founded on 
dierent principles from the federal Constitution.”). 
279 For others, see, e.g., Statement of John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates (Dec. 4, 
1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 465, 468 (1976) (“[A] complete [government], with legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers.”); Statement of John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates (Nov. 
28, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 382, 408 (1976) (“It contains all the necessary parts of a 
complete system of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial establishments . . . .”); 
Republicus, supra note 188, at 377 (“[E]qual natural right to legislative and executive power in all 
their dierent branches, which takes in all the powers that can exist in a state . . . .”). 
280 Brutus, XII, N.Y. J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 756, 759 (2004). 
281 Brutus, supra note 122, at 109-10. Brutus couldn’t get enough of this point. See also, e.g., 
Brutus, supra note 256, at 467 (“What will render this power in Congress eectual and sure in its 
operation is, that the government will have complete judicial and executive authority to carry all 
their laws into eect . . . .”); Brutus, XI, N.Y. J., Jan 31, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
512, 512 (1984) (“This [proposed] government is a complete system, not only for making, but for 
executing laws.”). 
282 Brutus, supra note 122, at 107. 
283 Id. 
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would be “as much one complete government as that of New-York or 
Massachusetts.”284 Indeed, 
It . . . has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to 
appoint ocers, institute courts, declare oences, and annex penalties, with 
respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world.285 
The framework explained by Brutus was pervasive. The founders 
repetitiously distinguished between [1] various subject matter objects of 
government action, “whether civil or military,” and [2] the tripartite 
mechanical sequence by which government took functional action on those 
objects, “whether . . . legislative, executive, or judicial.”286 The conceptual 
point was simply common currency; the only thing to debate was its 
implications. And so on one side, Samuel Chase objected to the fact that the 
“National Government has unlimited power, legislative, executive and 
judicial, as to every object to which it extends by the Constitution”;287 the 
Federal Farmer explained that “[t]hese powers, legislative, executive, and 
judicial, respect internal as well as external objects”;288 and A Farmer fretted 
about granting the national government “legislative, executive, and judiciary 
powers on every citizen of the empire.”289 And on the other side, the 
Federalist “A.B.” agreed that “[t]his government is to possess absolute and 
 
284 Id.; see also id. (“The [proposed] government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one.”). 
285 Id. Brutus returned to the formulation in his later letters, albeit in a less central role. Brutus, 
supra note 280, at 759 (warning against giving “the general [government] compleat legislative, 
executive and judicial powers to every purpose,” and then returning repeatedly to warn of the 
consequences of allowing that government to “pass[] laws on these subjects, as well as of appointing 
magistrates with authority to execute them” in various contexts). 
286 BOS. GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 274, 276 (1997) (“[A] 
charter of delegation, being a clear and full description of the quantity and degree of power and 
authority, with which the society, vests the persons intrusted with the powers of the society, whether 
civil or military, legislative, executive or judicial.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
287 Samuel Chase, Objections to the Constitution (Apr. 24-25, 1788), in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 631, 636 (2015). Chase’s next three sentences rehearse the same point in more detail. First: there was 
no serious subject matter limitation on the business of the federal government: “The powers of the 
National legislature extend to every case of the least consequence . . . .” Id. Second, the national 
government had the legislative power to extend to the formulation of binding policies in each such area: 
“[I]t may make laws to affect the lives, liberty and property of every citizen in America . . . .” Id. Third, 
the national government had the executive power to bring those into being: “[N]or can the Constitution 
of any State prevent the Execution of any power given to the National legislature.” Id. 
288 Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 224. Note how the author’s distinction between “internal” 
and “external” executive power tracks onto every power of government; it is not a special feature of 
“executive” authority. See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section IV.A. (discussing Rutherforth, 
Montesquieu, and Essex Result); see also Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 24 (“Let the general 
government consist of an executive, a judiciary and ballanced legislature, and its powers extend 
exclusively to all foreign concerns . . . and to a few internal concerns of the community . . . . In this 
case there would be a compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only.”). 
289 A Farmer, VII (Part 6), BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Apr. 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 535, 536 (2015). 
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uncoutroulable powers, legislative, executive, and judicial with respect to 
every object to which it extends.”290 
A casual reader might get the impression that completeness was just 
another way or talking about the police power. So let’s be clear: the question 
of completeness in government had nothing to do with the substantive scope 
of a government’s regulatory portfolio. To measure a government’s perfection 
required no knowledge about its power to regulate commerce, make treaties, 
establish a religion, or invade Canada. Any unit of government at any level of 
regional or administrative hierarchy with any sorts of subject-matter 
competences could easily possess all three powers as to those things where its 
jurisdiction extended.291 The point of perfection was that “the means of securing 
the welfare of the community must be coextensive with the objects to which 
the legislature extends its views.”292 
That’s why Oliver Ellsworth said of Hartford, “This very spot where we 
now are, is a city. It has complete legislative, judicial and executive powers. It 
is a complete state in miniature.”293 And that’s why Brutus was careful to 
emphasize that even entities with only limited subject-matter competences—
like the proposed federal government—were perfectly capable of being 
“complete” in the relevant sense: “This government is to possess absolute and 
uncontroulable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every 
object to which it extends for . . . . The government then, so far as it extends, 
is a complete one, and not a confederation.”294 
 
290 A.B., supra note 272, at 596-97 (somewhat misquoting Brutus to dispute the implications 
of this description). 
291 See also, e.g., Pendleton, supra note 194, at 947 (embracing the Constitution as creating 
“complete” government, and sharply distinguishing that from charges of it also creating a 
“consolidated” government, dened as “that which should have the sole and exclusive power, 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, without any limitation”). For an example of the kind of criticism 
prompting Pendleton’s point, see, for example, Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters 
to the Republican, Letter XVII (May 2, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1060 (2004) (“To 
form a consolidated, or one entire government, . . . all things, persons and property, must be subject 
to the laws of one legislature alone; to one executive, and one judiciary.”). 
292 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 569, 570 (1978). The Connecticut convention delegate was writing here to his Federalist 
colleague—and future Supreme Court Justice—in Massachusetts. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 
80 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 18 DHRC, supra note 46, at 96, 99 (1995) (implicitly endorsing 
the proposition that “every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions 
by its own authority” (emphasis omitted)). Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 103, at 414 
(Alexander Hamilton) (focusing on the Confederation’s gap in this respect as the “extraordinary 
spectacle of a government, destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the 
execution of its own laws”). 
293 See Ellsworth, supra note 96, at 278 (“Yet it breeds no confusion, it makes no scism. The 
city has not eat up the state, nor the state the city.”); see also id. (“Wherever the army was, in whatever 
state, there congress had complete legislative, judicial and executive power.”). 
294 Brutus, supra note 122, at 106-07. For other examples of the distinction, see, for example, 
PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1788, reprinted in 25 DHRC, supra note 46, at 383, 384 (2012). 
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Rather than omnicompetent subject-matter authorization,295 then, the 
idea of completeness meant the functionally sequential process of (rst) 
bringing an idea or project into being and (then) implementing it in the real 
world. And that functional relationship now brings us to an authority often 
viewed as either logically entailed in or functionally necessitated by the 
executive power: the right to appoint “assistances” for its implementation. 
C. The Executive Power Was Often Viewed as Either Logically Entailing or 
Functionally Implying the Appointment of “Assistances” 
Modern Supreme Court doctrine holds that “the power to appoint 
inferior ocers . . . is not in itself an ‘executive’ function in the constitutional 
sense.”296 A good number of founders would have disagreed. George Mason 
was in good company in considering “the appointment of publick ocers”297 
closely linked to the executive power—sometimes as a strict conceptual 
element of the thing itself, other times more loosely as an indispensable 
buttress for its meaningful exercise. 
This view of appointments as “executive” drew on a longstanding (though 
not uncontested) strand of Anglo-American legal thought. Certainly the 
inseparability of execution and appointment was central among Charles I’s 
objections to conceding a parliamentary role in appointments: 
He conceives, He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He 
abandon this power, and assume others into it. He conceives it such a Flowre 
of the Crown, as is worth all the rest of the Garland.”298 
Charles’s argument may have had special force under English law, which was 
often said to prohibit the King from personally executing the law.299 But its 
 
295 Contrast, for example, A Freeman’s argument that ““[S]uch would be the consequence of a 
single national constitution, in which all the objects of society and government were so compleatly provided 
for, as to place the several states in the union on the footing of counties of the empire.”  A Freeman, III, PA. 
GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 49, 49 (1986). 
296 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). 
297 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted 
in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 287, 289 (1997); see also id. (concluding that this power was 
“improper” in the Senate). 
298 HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND 
EXPRESSES 38 (1642); see also id. (“He conceives, That if He should passe this, He should retain nothing 
but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty, or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter . . . but as to true, 
and reall power, He should remain, but the outside, the picture, the signe of a King.”). There’s some 
irony in how much more evocative the parliamentarian’s paraphrase is than the King’s original. 
299 EDWARD BAGSHAW, THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN OF ENGLAND AS IT IS ESTABLISHED 
BY LAW 105 (1660) (“[H]e neither speaketh, nor acteth, nor judgeth, nor executeth, but by his Writt, 
by his Laws, by his Judges, and Ministers, and both these sworne to him to judge a right, and to 
execute justice to his People.”); MATTHEW HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 1-7 (“[H]e 
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deeper logic was quite generalizable. As Matthew Hale’s pathbreaking treatise 
observed, “the weight, multiplicity and variety of the occasions and 
emergencies of a kingdom doth necessarily require assistances.”300 Laying 
claim to the executive power in any large jurisdiction was thus arguably an 
exercise in ction unless you had the authority to appoint “assistances”—
implementing agents—to act on your behalf. 
This view of the relationship between appointments and execution 
inuenced thinking in the Americas well before the Founding. In a 1771 
Virginia dispute about appointments authority, for example, the winning 
counsel argued that “wherever an act of Parliament or of Assembly erects a 
new oce, without prescribing the particular mode of appointing the ocer, 
it belongs to the King to make the appointment.”301 Counsel’s explanation is 
key: the proposed canon of construction followed necessarily from the King’s 
executive power. “[P]ossessing the executive power of the laws,” it is the 
King’s “peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution, which cannot be 
unless an ocer is appointed.”302 That in turned implied that “[i]f then our 
acts of Assembly, erecting [an oce] have not said by whom the nomination 
shall be, it will follow that the King, who is to see the law executed, must 
nominate persons for that purpose.”303 
This commonsense view persisted into the Founding era. Some relied on 
formal arguments that King Charles would have found quite congenial,304 while 
 
neither speaks nor doth anything in the public administration of this realm but what he doth by 
these or some of these, especially the chancellor.”). 
300 HALE, supra note 299, at 105; see also id. at 107 (describing the king’s “legal council” as “the 
distributors of the king’s judgment and will according to rule, for he neither speaks nor doth 
anything in the public administration of this realm but what he doth by these or some of these, 
especially the chancellor”). As Hale later explained, the king’s appointments power was at least at 
times compulsory—that is to say, he could conscript private individuals into compulsory state service. 
Id. at 269 (“refusing to take” an “oce[] that [is] grantable by the king and concern[s] the 
administration of justice” was “punishable for a contempt”). Obadiah Hulme made a similar point. 
The king, who is in the constant exercise, of the executive power, in the state, always 
did the business of the state; and therefore, it immediately falls within his province, 
to see any plan, of national utility, put into execution, and to authorize the acting 
parties by a writing, vesting them with certain powers, for the accomplishment of the 
business which is to be done. 
OBADIAH HULME, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 182 (1771). 
301 Godwin v. Lunan, Je. 96, 105 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 538 (James Wilson) (“[O]bject[ing] to the 
mode of appointing, as blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive.”); see also 1 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison) (“[I]f any power 
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those 
who execute the laws.”); cf. id. at 538-39 (“Good laws are of no eect without a good Executive; and 
there can be no good Executive without a responsible appointment of ocers to execute.”); 2 
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others were agnostic on the formal classification305 and focused instead on 
prudential considerations.306 The limited and parasitic nature of the claim was 
evident, however, in the fact that this view focused only on the appointment of 
executive officers.307 There was much less angst about the Senate’s role in 
appointing judges—and much more angst about the President’s.308 
The point wasn’t uncontested.309 Indeed, some of the fussier formalists 
forcefully rejected the claim that the Senate’s role in appointments gave it 
any portion of the executive power. For them, the standard meaning of 
executive power decisively rebutted that claim: since the Senate “cannot 
 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 53 (July 19, 1787) (Gouverneur Morris) (“There must be 
certain great ocers of State . . . . These he presumes will exercise their functions in subordination 
to the Executive . . . . Without these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence.”). 
305 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 405 (Edmund Randolph) (“[T]he power 
of appointments was a formidable one both in the Executive & Legislative hands . . . .”). 
306 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 537 (George Mason) (arguing that 
legislative bodies were “too unwieldy & expensive for appointing ocers”); 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 81 (Edmund Randolph) (noting the “inconveniencies” with vesting 
judicial appointments in a multi-member body”). 
307 Publius explained a pragmatic aspect to the point. In general, “each department should have 
a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have 
as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 43, 43 (1986). But “[w]ere 
this principle rigorously adhered to, . . . [s]ome diculties . . . would attend the execution of it. 
Some deviations therefore from the principle must be admitted.” Id. 
308 George Mason, for example, supported presidential appointment of executive branch 
ocers, but opposed any presidential role in the appointment of judges. Compare Letter from 
George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1787), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 818, 822 (“[T]hat the 
Power of . . . appointing Judges of the Supreme Courts . . . be vested in the president of the United 
States with the Assistance of the [newly formed Executive] Council . . . .”), with 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 83 (George Mason) (“He considered the appointment [of judges] by the 
Executive as a dangerous prerogative. It might even give him an inuence over the Judiciary 
department itself.”). For others expressing similar views, see, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 51, at 120 (James Madison) (“On the other hand, He was not satised with referring the 
appointment [of judges] to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch 
. . . .”). Next to the Framers’ comparatively desultory discussion of judicial appointments, their tail 
chasing about non-judicial appointments was much more charged. Compare, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 232-33 (James Madison) (discussing appointment of judicial ocers), 
and 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 41-44 (James Madison) (same), and id. at 80-83 
(same), with, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 405-07 (discussing appointment of non-
judicial ocers), and id. at 522-25 (same), and id. at 537-40 (same), and id. at 627-28 (same). 
309 Dissent from the Committee Report, Second Session of the Pennsylvania Council of 
Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 
1776 AND 1790 (1825) 101-102 n.* (Notwithstanding the Pennsylvania Constitution’s vesting of 
executive power in a Council, it was “the right of the assembly . . . either by law to appoint . . . or 
to empower the executive council to appoint” ocials to oces created by statute, because “every 
power necessary for good government, not placed somewhere by the constitution, is vested in the 
assembly, as the representatives of the people”). But see Committee Report, Second Session of the 
Pennsylvania Council of Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in id. at 101 (“[T]he appointment of ocers is an 
executive prerogative, and belongs to the council in all cases, if it be not in-express terms vested in 
the assembly or in the people.”). 
1328 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1269 
execute” the laws, it was denitionally impossible for it to be “a part also of 
the executive.”310 One Maryland Federalist made the point at some length: 
Much learned and hackneyed declamation has been used against the executive 
power of the senate, and the making one body of men both an executive and 
a legislative. Happily the reasoning does not apply.—The objection would be 
valid, if the senate could alone make laws, and alone execute. This they cannot 
do, and we may rest assured, that the representatives, having no share in the 
execution, will never consent to tyrannical laws, to be executed in a tyrannical 
manner by the president and the senate. What are the executive powers of 
the senate? None at all. It has nothing at all to do with the execution of the 
laws it assents to.311 
For his part, Tench Coxe (writing under the pseudonym “An American”) 
called it an “evident” error to speak of “the executive powers of the senate.”312 
There’s no mistaking the prescriptivist condescension of his explanation: 
The Senate as a body & the Senators as individuals can hold or execute no 
oce whatever. They cannot be Ambassadors Generals, Admirals, Judges. 
Secretaries of War. or Finance, nor perform any other National duty, but that 
of Senators, nor can they even nominate a person for any post or 
employment. In short they can execute no oces themselves, nor can they 
declare who shall—Their power is merely to declare who shall not. You will 
pardon me, Sir. for applying the term to so elegant a Scholar as you are. but 
really to say as you do that the power of declaring who shall not hold an oce 
is to hold it oneself appears to me an absolute Solecism.313 
 
310 Charles Carroll, Notes on the Constitution (Feb. 1, 1788), in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
862, 864 (2015); see also, e.g., A Landholder, supra note 220, at 483 (“On examination you will nd 
this objection [to the Senate] unfounded. The supreme executive is vested in a President of the 
United States . . . . In the President, all the executive departments meet, and he will be a channel of 
communication between those who make and those who execute the laws.”). Other than the 
President’s legislative veto and the Vice-President’s presiding role in the Senate, Landholder 
continued, “[i]n no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or inuence between the 
two departments.” Id. When discussing the judiciary in the very next section, Landholder went on 
to discuss the need for “executive ocers, to carry into eect the laws of the nation,” so it’s not like 
the functional point was lost on him. Id. 
311 MD. J., July 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 867, 886 (2015). While the 
author was contemptuous of the formal claim, he was typical among Federalists in taking the 
functional concerns more seriously. See id. (disputing the notion that the Senate’s constitutional 
designation as a source of “advice” rendered it a “council to the president,” which was in itself a 
“formidable executive power[]”). 
312 Letter from An American to Richard Henry Lee, in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 173, 
175 (1984) (draft). 
313 Id. at 175-76. Coxe was typical of Federalists in both dismissing Antifederalists’ formalist 
argument and evaluating more seriously their functionalist criticism of the Senate’s mix of authorities. 
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This was just vanilla formalism pulled straight from the dictionary. The 
Senate had no power to execute the law. Therefore, the Senate did not possess 
executive power. Case closed. 
These objections aside, most Americans who spoke to the point seemed 
to conclude that the right to appoint “assistances” in execution was necessary 
on any functional understanding of the power to execute. Certainly this view 
was prominent among antifederalists. “Hampden” was typical in singling out 
“the most important and most inuential portion of the executive power, viz., 
the appointment of all ocers.”314 The list of constitutional skeptics who 
called appointments “executive”—among them Brutus,315 Centinel,316 the 
 
314 Hampden, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
663, 667 (1976); see also id. at 664, 667 (criticizing “the highly dangerous combination of the 
legislative and executive departments,” and noting that “the President only acts as a nominating 
member” for executive appointments). William Findley, who is thought to be the author of 
“Hampden,” urged the same point in opposing ratication at the Pennsylvania convention: “Only a 
part of the executive power is vested in the President. The most inuential part is in the Senate, 
and he only acts as primus inter pares of the Senate; only he has the sole right of nomination. The 
ocers of government are the creatures of the Senate . . . . The great objection is the blending of 
executive and legislative power.” Statement of William Findley, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates 
(Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 512, 512 (1976); see also id. at 513 (“President in 
appointing ocers will generally nominate such persons as will be agreeable to the Senate. The 
legislative and executive departments are mixed in this Constitution.”). 
315 See Brutus, supra note 122, at 313; McHenry, supra note 100, at 85 (“[The President’s] power 
when elected is check’d by the Consent of the Senate to the appointment of Ocers, and without 
endangering Liberty by the junction of the Executive and Legislative in this instance.”); see also, e.g., 
Brutus, XVI, N.Y. J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 907, 911 (2004) (“It may 
possibly also, in some special cases, be adviseable to associate the legislature, or a branch of it, with 
the executive, in the exercise of acts of great national importance . . . . But I think it equally evident, 
that a branch of the legislature should not be invested with the power of appointing ocers.”). 
Melancton Smith, often thought the likeliest author of the Brutus letters, seems to have made the 
same point at the New York Ratication debates. See Statement of Melancton Smith, New York 
Ratication Debates (July 4, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 2094, 2097 (2008) (“[T]he 
legislative & executive should be kept apart . . . it is improper that the Senate . . . should appoint 
Ocers.”); see also id. (“Objs. to appt of ocers by consent senate—executive power to be distinct.”). 
316 Centinel, I, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 158, 
165 (1976) (“The Senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the 
executive; none of the principal appointments to oce can be made without its advice and 
consent.”); see also, e.g., Centinel, supra note 259, at 464 (“The king of England is . . . in possession 
of the whole executive power, including the unrestrained appointment to oces . . . .”). 
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Federal Farmer,317 Richard Henry Lee,318 and George Mason319—goes on.320 
 Many Federalists readily conceded the point as well. Writing as Publius, 
Madison conceded that “the appointment to oces, particularly executive 
oces, is in its nature an executive function . . . .”321 A number of other 
 
317 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XIV (May 2, 
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1036 (2004) (“It has been thought adviseable by the wisest 
nations, that the legislature should so far exercise executive and judicial powers as to appoint some 
ocers . . . .”). The Federal Farmer’s discussion of the separation of powers spans many letters, and 
richly rewards close study. Given space limitations, I note here only that the author classies 
appointments as “executive” in nature. 
318 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, PA. PACKET, Dec. 20, 
1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 364, 371 (1983) (“In order to prevent the dangerous 
blending of the legislative and executive powers, and to secure responsibility, the privy, and not the 
senate shall be joined with the president in the appointment of all ocers, civil and military, under 
the new constitution . . . .”). 
319 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 101 (George Mason) (“Col. Mason observed that 
a vote had already passed he found (he was out at the time) for vesting the executive powers in a 
single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to oces in certain cases.”). 
320 See, e.g., A Federal Republican, supra note 60, at 272 (proposing “a sovereign executive 
council . . . [which would] have the appointment of all ocers” since “the senate . . . should have no 
executive or other powers whatever in that department”); John De Witt, III, AM. HERALD, Nov. 5, 
1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 194, 197 (1997) (“With respect to the Executive, the 
Senate excepting in [i.e., taking exception to ] nomination, have a negative upon the President . . . .); 
id. (referencing “their share above mentioned in the Executive department”). 
Less unequivocal, but hard to explain on any other theory, were more abstractly expressed 
Antifederalist claims that the Senate would “execute [the laws] tyrannically”—a concern with 
no obvious legal hook besides the Appointments Clause. E.g., Cincinnatus, IV, To James Wilson, 
Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 281, 285 (2003) (“[B]y 
making [the Senate] participant in the executive,” the Framers ignored Montesquieu’s adage: 
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person . . . the same monarch 
or senate will make tyrannical laws, that they may execute them tyrannically.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1788, reprinted 
in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 469, 470-71 (1988) (“The powers granted to Congress are 
boundless in some instances of the utmost consequence to the people, particularly . . . their 
power of legislation blended with that of the execution of their own laws, without controul.”). 
321 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 206, at 502 (James Madison); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 102, at 356-57 (James Madison) (“With another class of 
adversaries to the constitution . . . the junction of the Senate with the President in the 
responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the 
executive, alone, is the vicious part of the organisation.”). 
In fact, at the Convention, Madison had gone so far as to suggest that there might be no 
need to explicitly grant appointments authority, since it was logically entailed within the vesting 
of “executive power” simpliciter. Madison proposed amending the Virginia Plan to read: “[T]hat 
a national Executive be instituted . . . with power to carry into effect, the national laws—to 
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; and to execute such other powers, not 
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated by the national 
legislature.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 63 (James Madison). He then observed 
that he “did not know” that specifying the appointment power was “absolutely necessary,” since 
it was “perhaps included in the first member of the proposition,” which vested the executive 
power. See id. at 67 (“Mr. Madison did not know that the words [of the third clause] were 
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words. to appoint to offices &c. the whole being 
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supporters of the Constitution—including John Adams,322 John Brown 
Cutting,323 A Democratic Federalist,324 John Kean,325 and James Wilson326—
plainly held the same view.327 Indeed, Aristedes forthrightly “confess[ed]” 
that the objections to the Senate had “at rst, appeared formidable.”328 The 
separation of powers risk was obvious: permitting a legislature to appoint 
“persons for the execution of the laws” would arguably “be the same thing, in 
 
perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any 
inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent 
doubts and misconstructions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
322 See Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jeerson (Nov. 10, 1787), in 4 DHRC, supra note 
45, at 212, 212 (1997) (“They have adopted the Idea of the Congress at Albany in 1754 of a President 
to nominate ocers and a Council to Consent: but thank heaven they have adopted a third 
Branch . . . . I think that Senates and assemblies should have nothing to do with executive Power. 
But still I hope the Constitution will be adopted . . . .”). 
323 See Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 475, 478 (1983) (supporting the Constitution, but noting that his “principal apprehension” [was] 
“the mingled legislative and executive powers of the senate . . . especially in appointments to office”). 
324 A Democratic Federalist argued that: 
[t]he executive powers of the Union are separated in a higher degree from the 
legislative than in any government now existing in the world. As a check upon the 
President, the Senate may disapprove of the ocers he appoints, but no person 
holding any oce under the United States can be a member of the federal legislature. 
How dierently are things circumstanced in the two houses in Britain where an ocer 
of any kind, naval, military, civil or ecclesiastical, may hold a seat in either house. 
A Democratic Federalist, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 294, 298 (1976) 
325 See John Kean, Notes on the New Constitution (c. May 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 408, 408-09 (2016) (advocating without elaboration “[a] legislature . . . who has no executive or 
judicial powers,” and later urging in reference to “Defense” that “appointment of ocers—ought 
not be exercised by the Legislature”). 
326 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 530 (James Wilson) (“The dierent branches 
should be independent of each other. They are combined and blended in the Senate. The Senate 
may exercise, the powers of legislation, and Executive and judicial powers. To make treaties 
legislative, to appoint ocers Executive for the Executive has only the nomination.”); see also 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 66 (James Wilson) (“The only powers he conceived strictly 
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing ocers, not <appertaining to and> 
appointed by the Legislature.”). 
327 See, e.g., Statement of Thomas McKean, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 10, 1787), 
in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 532, 534, 536 (1976) (“[T]he whole of the executive power is not lodged 
in the President alone,” but “[a]s to the Senators having a share in the executive power, so far as to 
the appointment of certain ocers, I do not know where this restraint on the President could be 
more safely lodged.”); see also id. at 544 (similar); id. at 546 (“There is scarce a king in Europe that 
has not some check upon him in the appointment of ocers.”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
90, at 121-23 (William Davie) (“In this state, and most of the others, the executive and judicial powers 
are dependent on the legislature. Has not the legislature of this state the power of appointing the 
judges? Is it not in their power also to x their compensation?”). 
328 Aristides, supra note 87, at 236. 
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many respects, as if the legislature should execute its own laws.”329 That’s why 
George Mason explained that his proposed amendments330—like those 
suggested by both James Wilson331 and the Society of Western 
Gentlemen332—would restore each branch to its proper place by getting the 
Senate out of the executive function of appointments333 and by bringing the 
House into the legislative function of treatymaking.334 
So while the most strait-laced formalists disagreed, a great many founders 
did take a more functional view of Law Execution. Such commentators 
gravitated toward a more loosely disaggregated view of executive power, 
reecting the functional reality that executing the law includes not just (i) the 
power to impose prohibitions on private parties and (ii) the power to carry 
out the legislature’s armative projects, but also at least presumptively (iii) 
the appointment of dierent kinds of subordinates to do each kind of 
execution. This disaggregated understanding occasionally also emerges in 
scattered references to “executive powers” in the plural form,335 as in some of 
 
329 Id. Aristides went on to defend the Senate’s role in appointments as a necessary concession 
to pragmatics over theory: 
Let us reflect . . . whether it be proper for any one man (suppose even the saviour of his 
country to be immortal) to have the appointment of all those important officers  . . . . I 
confess, that the number of the senators for this purpose only is excessive. But I can 
confidently rely on the extraordinary selection to compensate for the excess. 
Id. at 237-38. 
330 See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb, supra note 308, at 819 (“[T]he Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial powers of Government should be separate and distinct . . . .”). 
331 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 538 (James Wilson) (“Mr. Wilson moved to add, 
after the word ‘Senate’ [in the Treaty Clause] the words, ‘and House of Representatives’. As treaties he 
said are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also.”). Wilson’s motion 
was rejected in the face of typical functionalist concerns about secrecy in a large body. 
332 The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 30 & 
May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 769, 771 (1990) (proposing to strip the President’s 
veto power and require House approval of all treaties). 
333 See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb, supra note 308, at 818 (“[T]hat the Power 
of  . . . appointing Ambassadors, other public Ministers or Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Courts, 
and all other Ocers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by 
the Constitution, and which shall be established by Law, be vested in the president of the United 
States with the Assistance of the [newly formed Executive] Council . . . .”). 
334 See id. at 822 (“But all Treaties so made or entered into [by the President], shall be subject 
to the Revision of the Senate and House of Representatives for their Ratication.”). 
335 Early drafts of the Articles of Confederation themselves thus generically referenced 
interactions by the national entity with “the Ocers in the several States who are entrusted with 
the executive powers of government.” E.g. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 69, at 687 (Aug. 20, 1776). For other examples of this usage as the generic reference to state-
level executive actors in their mailbox function, see, e.g., 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra, at 414 (Dec. 7, 1775) (“those Ocers, in whom the executive powers of 
government in those colonies may be vested”); id. at 431 (“such ocers in the several colonies as are 
entrusted with the executive powers of government”). 
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the state constitutions.336 The Continental Congress’s famous 1774 “Letter to 
the Inhabitants of Quebec,” for example, argued that the future of liberty in 
the North depended on its inhabitants’ proper understanding of 
Montesquieu—including his standard gloss on “executive power” as “the 
power of executing”:337 
You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive powers, or the 
powers of administration: In him, and in your Council, is lodged the power of 
making laws. You have Judges, who are to decide every cause aecting your 
lives, liberty or property.”338 
“Your countryman,” the Americans warned, would have told the Quebecois 
that any semblance of liberty in their government was but a “tinsel’d 
outside.”339 The reason was simple: the British Governor controlled each 
 
336 As a general matter, state constitutional drafting practice provides no comfort to residuum 
theorists. A number of state constitutions use the plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that all 
but requires either the disaggregated Law Execution understanding or the Cross-Reference 
interpretation. See generally FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 572 (1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (compiling early state 
constitutions that included the phrase “executive powers of government”). Massachusetts’s 1780 
constitution and New Hampshire’s 1784 and 1792 constitutions refer to the “executive part of 
government” in what is pretty clearly either the Cross-Reference or Law Execution sense. See MASS. 
CONST. of 1780, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1893, N.H. CONST. 
of 1784, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2457.  
A number of state constitutions refer to “executive power” or “executive authority” singular in 
a way that eectively mirrors Article II of the U.S. Constitution. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, reprinted 
in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2596; N.Y. Const. of 1777, reprinted in id. at 2624; PA 
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in id. at 3084, 3087-88, PA CONST. of 1790, reprinted in id. at 3095; S.C. 
CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3250; VT. CONST. 
of 1777, reprinted in id. at 3737; VT. CONST. of 1786, reprinted in id at 3754. 
 Two state constitutions do use the plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that could plausibly 
refer to something like the royal residuum. But in each case the phrase is susceptible to either the 
Law Execution or Cross-Reference understanding as well. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, supra (chief 
magistrate “may exercise all the other executive powers of government”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, 
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787 (governor “may exercise all the 
other executive powers of government”). 
337 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110 (“When the power of making 
laws, and the power of executing them, are united in the same person, or in the same body of 
Magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same Monarch or 
Senate, should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner . . . . [Likewise,] [t]here 
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Montesquieu)). Congress evidenced not a particular of shame in 
resorting to outright attery, using our northern neighbors to “exert[] the natural sagacity of 
Frenchmen” and consider the authority of that “truly great man,” “your countryman.” Id. at 110-11. 
338 Id. (emphasis added and omitted). 
339 Id.; see also id. (“Your Judges, and your Legislative Council, as it is called, are dependant on 
your Governor, and he is dependant on the servant of the Crown, in Great-Britain. The legislative, 
executive and judging powers are all moved by the nods of a Minister.”). 
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authority in the sequential process of creating, adjudicating, and executing 
legislative instructions. And his control of that complete sequence rendered 
the government of Quebec “a whited sepulchre, for burying your lives, liberty 
and property.”340 
That brings us to the nal characteristic of the executive power. Everyone 
agreed that it was an empty vessel authorizing only the implementation of 
instructions issued by a legislative authority. 
D. “The Executive Power” Was Unanimously Understood as an Empty Vessel, 
Both Subsequent and Subordinate in Character 
Beyond its denition as “the power to execute,” the signal characteristic 
of executive power was that it was derivative and subsequent. This Section 
will explore that derivative quality—which the founders drew directly from 
the legal and political theory on their bookshelves—by explaining two 
seemingly paradoxical features. First, the intrinsic subordination of executive 
authority to its legislative principal. Second, the immense latent power of 
executive authority, especially where its holder could inuence the exercise of 
legislative power to convey broad delegations of discretion and authority. 
1. As a Form of Agency Authority, the Exercise of Executive Power was 
Fully Subordinate to Instructions by its Legislative Principal. 
As generations of writers had explained, the power to execute was fully 
subordinate to the power to legislate. This claim had nothing to do with 
power struggles among political institutions in any particular regime. It was 
rather a logically entailed feature of the relationship between two intrinsically 
successive functions of government in the abstract.341 The failure to 
appreciate this distinction has frequently caused confusion for modern 
audiences. One often-misunderstood line of Federalist 49, for 
example, describes the branches of federal government as “co-ordinate” with 
one another.342 A shallow reading of that sentence might seem in tension with 
the mass of evidence that the founders understood executive power as 
subordinate to legislative power.343 But it isn’t. Publius’s statement about the 
 
340 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
341 Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section III.C (discussing the dominance of this frame on the 
eighteenth-century bookshelf). 
342 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
16, 16 (1986). This description is important more because it has become a standard judicial reference 
in modern caselaw than because it was thought to be particularly common at the Founding. (It 
wasn’t). E.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (“[T]he acts of a co-ordinate branch 
of the government . . . .”). 
343 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 342, at 17 (“The several departments being perfectly 
co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to 
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coordinacy of institutional branches had nothing to with the subordination of 
functional powers; invoking the former to refute the latter conates the 
political entity called “the executive” with the conceptual function of 
government called “the executive power.”344 
The founders denitely talked about the new constitutional entities as 
organizationally parallel. The founders denitely created a structure that 
would protect the President qua entity from becoming categorically 
subordinate to the institution of Congress. And the founders denitely meant 
for the institution of the presidency (which possessed a variety of powers, 
including but not limited to the executive) to be in some respects coordinate 
to the institution of Congress (which possessed a variety of powers, including 
but not limited to the legislative). But when it came to the functional 
question, the founders agreed—without contradiction of which I am aware—
that “the executive power” vested by Article II was fully subordinate to the 
“legislative powers” vested elsewhere in the Constitution. 
The Founding records are replete with versions of this observation, itself 
practically a paraphrase of John Locke,345 David Hume,346 and many other 
writers on whom the founders relied.347 Start with the famously pro-executive 
John Adams, who defended the gubernatorial veto as necessary because “the 
legislative power is naturally and necessarily sovereign and supreme over the 
 
an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers . . . .”). Less 
well remembered is Madison’s use of the same phrase during the Virginia debates in service of an 
argument that sits uncomfortably with a strong departmentalist reading of Publius. See Madison, supra 
note 131, at 1413 (“It may be no misfortune that in organizing any Government, the explication of its 
authority should be left to any of its co-ordinate branches. There is no example in any country where 
it is otherwise.”). Madison went on to discuss examples of judicial review of action by the states. Id. 
344 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 342, at 18-19.. This is a version of what I have elsewhere 
called the metonymy error. See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section IV.A; see also Blake Emerson, The 
Departmental Structure of Executive Power: Subordinate Checks from Madison to Mueller 17 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3533508 (“A department 
is a specialized division of government in which officials exercise their powers. A department is thus 
different from a power. It is the confined domain and rule-structure in which power operates.”). The 
Federalist Papers were themselves elsewhere quite clear that obeying the law is different from obeying the 
legislative branch. Consider also that the entities most often described as “co-ordinate” were the states and 
the federal government, rather than the departments of the federal government themselves. That 
characteristic was apparently quite consistent with their shared understanding that the federal government 
would be supreme (for better or worse) within its field of activity. 
345 See LOCKE, supra note 240, at 149-50 (“[T]here can be but one supreme power, which is the 
legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate . . . . In all cases, whilst the government 
subsists, the legislative is the supreme power; for what can give laws to another, must needs be 
superior to him . . . .”). 
346 Hume made the point repeatedly. DAVID HUME, Essay VI, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, 
AND LITERARY 44 (Eugene F. Miller, ed. 1985) (1758) (“The executive power in every government 
is altogether subordinate to the legislative . . . .”); HUME, Essay XVI, supra, at 524 (“[T]he legislative 
power [is] being always superior to the executive . . . .”). 
347 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section III.D. 
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executive.”348 Continue from there to an array of others across the ideological 
spectrum, all agreeing with A Farmer that “[t]he power of making rules or 
laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of sovereignty, for by this 
the executive and judicial powers are directed and controuled, to this every 
ministerial agent is subservient . . . .”349 Centinel was to the same eect: “It 
will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in 
government, and that all others are subordinate to it.”350 The Old Whig 
emphasized this observation’s distinguished pedigree: “[I]n the opinion of 
Montesquieu, and of most other writers, ancient as well as modern, the 
legislature is the sovereign power.”351 And A Landholder suggested the 
negative implication: “a legislative power without a judicial and executive 
under their own control is in the nature of things a nullity.”352 
This all just followed from the denition of the thing. Executive power 
was intrinsically an empty vessel, awaiting instructions from an exercise of 
the legislative power that would give it something to execute. This 
understanding pervaded the discourse. It grounded Gad Hitchcock’s 
observation, in a famous Election Day sermon from 1774, that “the executive 
power is strictly no other than the legislative carried forward, and of course, 
controllable by it.”353 It was necessary to Elbridge Gerry’s claim that reading 
the Articles of Confederation to permit troop requisitions by Congress “must 
preclude the states from a right of deliberating, and leave them only an 
executive authority on the subject.”354 It surfaced in Theodorick Bland’s 
 
348 1 JOHN ADAMS, Letter LIII, in 1 DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 362, 363 (3d ed. 1797) (1778) (“[A]nd therefore, . . . The 
latter must be made an essential branch of the former, even with a negative, or it will not be able to 
defend itself . . . .”). 
349 A Farmer, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 16 & 23, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 133, 134 (1995); see also id. (“[T]o this all corporate or privileged bodies are subordinate: this 
[legislative] power not only regulates the conduct, but disposes of the wealth and commands the 
force of the nation.”). 
350 Centinel, supra note 316, at 162. 
351 An Old Whig, II, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 399, 401 (1981). 
352 A Landholder, supra note 220, at 484. Comments like these have too often been mistaken 
for being the end of an argument (i.e., contestable assertions of republican ideology) rather than the 
beginning of one (i.e., an attempt to build from common ground). But that reading is demonstrably 
wrong—not least because so many Federalists not only recognized but armatively relied on the 
point as a key descriptive element of their arguments. 
353 Gad Hitchcock, Election Sermon (1774) in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING 
THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 295 (1983); see also id. (“Legislators . . . should know how to give 
force, and operation to their laws . . . . This, indeed, is to be done by means of the executive 
part . . . .”). For more on the context of this annual sermon series, see LINDSAY SWIFT, THE 
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION SERMONS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1897). 
354 Motion of Elbridge Gerry (June 2, 1784), in 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 518; see also Motion of Elbridge Gerry (May, 26, 1784), id. at 433 
(depicting an earlier version of this same motion). 
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argument that there was a profound distinction between “‘levy[ing]’ an 
impost” and “‘collect[ing]’ an impost,” because “the rst word imported a 
legislative idea, & the latter an executive only.”355 It was reected in references 
to debt payment as “a simple executive operation”356 and contrasts between 
“triing executive Business” and “Objects of the greatest Magnitude.”357 And 
it was emphasized in the Board of Treasury’s denials of compensation claims 
grounded in equity rather than the statutory framework. “As the Executive 
Ocers of Congress,” they explained, they had no independent policy 
prerogative.358 The Board’s only authority—even in the face of demands from 
the likes of Pennsylvania359 and Virginia360—was to implement the letter of 
legislative instruction as written. 
For eighteenth-century Americans, the executive power’s subordinate role 
in a principal-agent relationship was “naturally and necessarily” true361—
simply inherent in the very “nature of things.”362 Indeed, the empty vessel 
nature of executive power made it a useful metaphor for enumerated 
constitutionalism itself: “[A]s the constitution comes immediately from the 
people; so ought the laws to ow immediately from the constitution; it should 
like a circle circumscribe all legislative power as the legislat[i]ve ought to 
 
355 Motion by Theodorick Bland (Mar. 27, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 945; see also id. at 945-46 (“[A]nd consequently the latter might be less 
obnoxious to the States.”). The other congressional delegates were unpersuaded by the claim that 
levying and collecting should be read as distinct phases of a process as opposed to synonyms in a 
more pragmatic sense. But no one challenged the principle behind Bland’s proposed sales pitch; just 
the way Bland was applying it to the semantics of their particular case. 
356 Report of the Oce of Finance (Aug. 5, 1782), in 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 46, at 435 (“Already Congress have adopted a plan for liquidating all past 
accounts, and if the States shall make the necessary grants of Revenue, what remains will be a simple 
executive operation which will presently be explained.”). 
357 Letter from James M. Varnum to William Greene (Apr. 2, 1781), in 17 LETTERS OF THE 
DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 115, 117 (“Our Time is consumed in triing executive Business, while 
Objects of the greatest Magnitude are postponed . . . .”). 
358 Report of the Board of Treasury (July 3, 1786), in 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 386 (noting that “[i]t is not for this Board to enter into the Merits of 
[a] Claim” that contradicts an “Explicit[]” statute). Recall also Adam Smith’s observation that if “the 
leading men of America . . . . feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies . . . should be so far degraded 
as to become . . . executive ocers of parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be 
at an end.” 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 452 (A. Strahan & T. Cadell, eds., 6th ed. 1791) (1776). 
359 See Report of the Board of Treasury, supra note 358, at 386 (explaining that “[a]s the 
Executive Ocers of Congress,” it was “not for this Board to enter into the Merits of [a] Claim” 
that would require reassessment of a statute). 
360 See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 327 (July 11, 
1787)(“It is with regret that the Board observe that a strict adherence on their part, to their duty as 
Executive Ocers, should expose the United States to the risque of not receiving from the State of 
Virginia that support towards the Expences of the Current Year . . . .”). 
361 See ADAMS, supra note 348, and accompanying text. 
362 See A Landholder, supra note 352, and accompanying text. 
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circumscribe the executive . . . .”363 Celebrating South Carolina’s ratication, 
another Federalist amplied the point: “The legislative powers are 
resolveable into this principle, that the sober second thoughts and 
dispassionate voice of the people, shall be the law of the land. The executive 
department amounts to no more than that the man of the people shall carry 
into eect the will of the people.”364 
This “no more than” was common ground across ideological lines For each 
committed republican telling the drafting convention that “the Executive 
magistracy [w]as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the 
Legislature into eect,”365 you can nd a strong advocate for the 
constitutional Presidency telling a ratifying convention that “[e]xecutive 
ocers . . . have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is, by 
positive grant and commission, delegated to them.”366 The Remarker put the 
point sharply: “[t]he executive . . . hath its own [inherent] limits,” since “[t]o 
make laws is an unlimited authority; but to execute them when made, is 
limited to their existence.”367 And A Federal Republican used notably 
identical language in defending the President’s veto: 
It hath been made an objection to this constitution, that the legislative and 
executive are not kept perfectly distinct and seperate. This, I think, is not 
valid. The executive should have a check on the legislative for this simple 
reason–that the executive hath its own limits—but the legislative 
independent of it, would have none at all. To make laws is unconned and 
indenite, but to execute them when made, is limited by their existence.368 
 
363 Republicus, supra note 188, at 378; see id. (“[A]nd both take their form from tΔhe people as 
the great centre of all . . . .”). 
364 Speech of David Ramsay, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, June 5, 1788, reprinted in 
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 432, 433; see also id. at 432 (“I congratulate you my fellow-citizens on 
the ratication of the new constitution. This event, replete with advantages, promises to repay us 
for the toils, dangers and waste of the late revolution.”). 
365 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 65 (Roger Sherman). Note that Sherman started 
in the same place as his ideological opponent John Adams, but came to very dierent conclusions 
about the institutional implications that should follow. Id. at 68 (arguing “for the appointment by the 
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which 
was to be executed”); id. at 64 (similar). It’s a wonderful example of how the debaters used identical 
descriptive terminology and an identical conceptual toolkit even when making otherwise 
contradictory normative arguments. 
366 McKean, supra note 327, at 542. 
367 Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 527, 530 
(2016); see also id. (“The executive should always have a negative upon the legislative, for this simple 
reason, that the former hath its own limits, but the latter, independent of it, would have none at all. To 
make laws is an unlimited authority; but to execute them when made, is limited to their existence.”). 
368 A Federal Republican, supra note 60, at 255. Note that this description of the conceptual 
nature of executive power came from an Antifederalist who nonetheless viewed that the 
constitutional President as a threatening gure. See id. at 272 (“The executive, as vested in the 
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Even Federalists could thus conclude in private that “[a]s to the executive 
powers . . . there is nothing of any great importance in [the President’s] 
power solely”369 or in public that “the cases, in which he can exercise an 
exclusive power, are too insignificant to be productive of dangerous 
consequences.”370 
So when Charles Francis Adams commented decades later that “[the] 
legislative power is then the precise measure of the executive power,”371 he was 
just channeling the true legacy of the Founding. Standing alone, the executive 
power was a thin authority that did no more than authorize the implementation 
of instructions from some other source. That’s why the founders returned so 
often to the idea of a “correspondent,” “consequent,” or “commensurate” 
relationship between legislative and executive power. Certainly George 
Washington’s letter transmitting the draft Constitution to the Confederation 
Congress began by emphasizing the necessary “corresponden[ce]” between 
legislated intention and the executive power of implementation: 
The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of 
making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating 
commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should 
be fully and eectually vested in the general government of the Union . . . .372 
Consider not just Washington’s logic, but his vocabulary. He rst identies 
some of the new government’s most important subject matter competences—
themselves spread, it is worth noting, across Article I and Article II. He then 
emphasizes that the government is also vested with the “executive and judicial 
authorities” that “correspond[]” to the implementation of these competences. 
Washington’s idea of an intrinsic “correspondence” between specic 
legislative authorities and the ensuing executive power of implementation 
 
president is too pointedly supreme. The fears of the people will and ought easily to be agitated by 
such an extent of power in a single man . . . .”). 
369 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing, supra note 292, at 571-72 (“As to 
the executive powers, some appear to apprehend danger; but . . . I think no man of considerable 
discernment can have fears from this quarter unless he has also very weak nerves.”). Note that this 
description was of the President’s various powers standing alone. As the next section will discuss, 
the founders understood very well that when executive authority was used to implement legislative 
instructions that were suciently broad and discretionary, it could be very powerful indeed. 
370 Americanus, II, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
244, 245 (1988) (oering the President’s executive power as an example of just such an “exclusive 
power,” emphasizing “[the] unity of the executive authority” and that “the executive power” was not 
“lodged in the hands of many persons”). 
371 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS IN 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE SENATE’S COURSE, & PARTICULARLY OF MR. WEBSTER’S SPEECH 
UPON THE EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE BILL 15 (1835). 
372 Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in 19 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 526, 526 (2003). 
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recurred throughout the debates.373 For James Wilson, the word was 
“commensurate”: as he told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, “the 
executive powers of government ought to be commensurate with the 
government itself, and . . . a government which cannot act in every part is so 
far defective.”374 For Valerius Agricola, the relationship was better described 
as “consequent,” with the rst “right[] of sovereignty” dened as the standard 
trio: “Legislation, and the consequent executive and Judicial rights.”375 But 
everyone agreed on the underlying structure. Executive power was 
subsequent, subordinate, and dependent on instructions from a prior exercise 
of its legislative counterpart. 
2. Executive Authority Was Immensely Potent, Especially When Its 
Holder Could Inuence the Exercise of Legislative Power to Convey 
Broad Delegations of Authority and Discretion 
A nal point. It might be thought that the founders’ understanding of 
executive power would reduce its bearer to a factotum. But that would 
radically underappreciate both the essence and the potential of executive 
authority. The signicance of any particular grant of executive power isn’t 
self-explanatory. Rather, it depends entirely on a series of decisions 
subsequently made by the bearer(s) of legislative power. Just as an empty 
vessel can be lled with water, small beer, fortied wine, or distilled spirits, 
the signicance of executive power depends entirely on the instructions its 
bearer is later given to execute. And that, of course, can change over time. 
 
373 See, e.g., A Freeholder, NEWPORT HERALD, Feb. 25, 1790, reprinted in 26 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 731, 732 (2013) (“The Constitution is calculated for a confederacy of States. It vests in Congress 
the power, of making war, peace, and treaties; over concerns of a foreign and general nature, of 
regulating commerce, providing for the support of government, and establishing correspondent 
judicial and executive authorities . . . .”); Solon, junior, PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1790, 
reprinted in 26 DHRC, supra note 46, at 737, 737-38 (quoting Washington’s letter transmitting the 
draft Constitution to the states). 
374 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratication Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 550, 559 (1976). In its entirety, Wilson stated: 
Let us examine these objections; if this government does not possess internal as well as 
external power, and that power for internal as well as external purposes, I apprehend, 
that all that has hitherto been done must go for nothing . . . . I presume, sir, that the 
executive powers of government ought to be commensurate with the government itself, 
and that a government which cannot act in every part is so far defective. 
Id. at 557, 559. 
375 P. Valerius Agricola, An Essay on the Constitution Recommended by the Federal Convention to the 
United States, ALBANY GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 186, 188-89 
(2003) (emphasis in original). Agricola went on to set out various subject matter competences to which 
these three great powers of formulating intentions, assessing applications, and implementing results 
could be applied. Id. (listing the subject matters of “making war and peace,” “raising money,” “making 
commercial regulations,” and “promoting . . . the wealth and happiness of [the] community”). 
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Consider by analogy the diverse range of instructions that the Continental 
Congress imposed on General George Washington in his role as commander-
in-chief.376 On one hand, he was subject to unbelievably particularized 
instructions from his national principal, sometimes half-drowning in a ood 
of orders ranging from the distribution of our barrels,377 to the 
transportation of refugees from Charleston to ports of their choice,378 to the 
suspension of court-martial sentences until Congress could review the trial 
records.379 On the other hand, Congress regularly delegated substantive 
rulemaking authority of startlingly open-ended dimensions. Consider the 
order “direct[ing]” General Washington “to carry . . . into the most eectual 
execution” Congress’s desire to end the circulation of “dangerous and 
criminal . . . correspondence” from England “contain[ing] ideas insidiously 
calculated to divide and delude the good people of these states.”380 The statute 
contained nothing more than a goal—to suppress English propaganda—and 
 
376 As the pathbreaking work of David Barron and Marty Lederman have shown, Americans 
adopted the British understanding of commander-in-chief as “a purely military post under the 
command of political superiors” rather than a font of independent substantive authority. David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-Chief at the Lowest Ebb, Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 772 (2008); see also generally id. at 772-
86 (surveying eighteenth-century practice in England, under the Continental Congress, and in the 
separate states). 
377 See 12 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 902-03 (Sept. 11, 1778) 
(informing General Washington that “Congress have given orders for the purchase of 20,000 barrels of flour”). 
378 The issue was recorded as follows: 
Therefore, Resolved, That General Washington take order for procuring from the 
British General the necessary passports, and the proper means of re-conveying back 
to the State of South Carolina, by water carriage at the expence of the King of Great 
Britain, the persons, families and baggage of those of the inhabitants of the said State 
who are entitled to the benet of the capitulation of Charles Town and who have been 
sent from that State to other distant parts of these States by order of the Commanding 
Ocer of the British Troops in Charles Town . . . . 
22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 330-32 (June 14, 1782). 
379 See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 509-10 (Aug. 15, 
1783) (“Resolved . . . that the execution of the sentences against the several oenders who have been 
tried for convicted of mutiny by the general court-martial now sitting at Philadelphia, be suspended, 
until the further order of Congress ten days after a full report of all the proceedings of the said 
court-martial respecting the mutiny, shall have been laid before Congress . . . .”). 
380 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 616 (June 17. 1778). In 
full, the Congress stated: 
Resolved, That it be, and it is hereby earnestly recommended to the legislative and 
executive authorities of the several states, to . . . take the most eectual measures to 
put a stop to so dangerous and criminal a correspondence. Resolved, That the 
Commander in Chief . . . [is] hereby directed to carry the measures recommended in 
the above resolution into the most eectual execution. 
Id. 
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an open-ended full-powers authorization to pursue the goal by any means 
necessary. 
The increasing prevalence of such open-ended instructions was surely due 
in part to Washington’s increasing prestige. And that point is generalizable: 
the more inuence an executive has over the legislative process, the more 
empowering and less constraining his instructions are likely to be. So as a 
practical matter, the congressional “instructions” issued to General 
Washington often consisted of legislative ratication of some proposal for 
which he had himself sought approval,381 or a forward-looking authorization 
for the great man to investigate some problem and take action if he saw t.382 
As Madison explained, this exact dynamic might yield tyrannical power for 
the President precisely as an executive—unless Congress’s legislative 
authority were limited: 
One consequence must be, to enlarge the sphere of discretion allotted to the 
Executive Magistrate. Even within the legislative limits properly dened by 
the Constitution, the diculty of accommodating legal regulations to a 
country so great in extent and so various in its circumstances has been much 
felt, and has lead to occasional investments of power in the Executive, which 
involve perhaps as large a portion of discretion as can be deemed consistent 
with the nature of the Executive trust. In proportion as the objects of 
legislative care might be multiplied, would the time allowed for each be 
 
381 E.g., 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1004 (Aug. 27, 
1779) (“Resolved, That the plan prepared by General Washington for conducting the western 
expedition, is in the opinion of Congress wise and judicious; that the measures he has taken for the 
execution of it are proper and prudent; and that Congress are perfectly satised with the General’s 
conduct relative to the same.”); cf. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, 
at 630 (Aug. 11, 1777) (“Congress took into consideration the letter from General Washington, 
respecting the river defence necessary to be adopted for the protection of Philadelphia. Ordered, 
That . . . the Board of War . . . be directed to carry the General’s plan of defence into execution with 
all possible despatch.”). 
An executive’s political ability to inuence legislative instructions presumably varies based on 
a range of factors, including his political coalition and his popular support. In this respect, the 
President’s authority to participate in the Article I legislative process is a crucial lever of inuence 
on the content of the instructions that he is then entitled to implement under Article II. 
382 See, e.g., 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1108 (Sept. 
26, 1779) (providing “that General Washington be authorized and directed to concert and execute 
such plans of co-operation with the Minister of France, or the Count, as he may think proper”). Yet 
another Congressional declaration stated: 
[W]hether a reduction of the stationary teams cannot be made consistently with the 
good of the service, or whether ox-teams cannot, in the present seat of war, be 
substituted in a great measure for horse-teams; and if General Washington shall be of 
opinion that both or either of these measures are advisable, that the quarter master 
general take measures for carrying the same into execution . . . . 
12 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 906 (Sept. 12, 1778). 
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diminished, and the diculty of providing uniform and particular regulations 
for all be increased. From these sources would necessarily ensue a greater 
latitude to the agency of that department which is always in existence, and 
which could best mould regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to 
the diversity of particular situations.383 
That’s at least in part why the Continental Congress would sometimes pair 
such open-ended instructions with short-cycle sunset provisions.384 
The latent possibility of such immense delegated authority thus posed a 
recurring question for legislators: how much discretion to embed in any 
particular instruction. Some contemporaries certainly argued that “laws should 
be so formed as to leave little or nothing to the discretion of those by whom 
they are executed.”385 Where a statute was written that way, any executive 
authority parasitic on its instructions was indeed close to the caricature of an 
automaton or messenger boy. But lots of statutes rejected this advice, instead 
delegating broad authority for discretionary execution by its recipient.386 And 
the consequence of such decisions was well understood. Thus the Board of 
Treasury urged the Continental Congress not to extend the same discretionary 
authority to its state commissioners for settling accounts with states that those 
commissioners had for settling accounts with individuals: 
That altho’ the powers vested by Congress in the said Commissioners for 
settling Accounts with Individuals are as extensive as a regard to the Public 
Security can possibly admit of . . . . it would be inconsistent with those 
principles of equality which ought to Govern in the settlement of the 
Accounts of the Individual States with the United States to vest the 
Commissioners with those extensive powers, in settling the accounts of the 
State, which they have a right to Exercise in the case of Individuals . . . .387 
Discretion in questions of such magnitude, the Board explained, should be 
reserved for truly high level executive entities—such as, for example, itself. 
An analogous problem arose when interpreting existing statutes: how 
much discretion should ambiguous legislative instructions be read to convey? 
 
383 JAMES MADISON, Report on the Virginia Resolves, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
358 (Daillard Hunt, ed. 1906) (1799). 
384 See, e.g., 20 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 556 (May 28, 
1781) (“And be it further resolved that the powers herein granted to the Commander in Chief 
continue for the space of six months, unless sooner revoked by Congress, and that he be fully 
impowered and directed to execute the same . . . by all ways and means that to him shall appear 
conducive thereto or the necessity of the case may require.”). 
385 Report of the Oce of Finance, supra note 356, at 442 (emphasis added) (treating revenue 
laws as a special case of this general principle). 
386 For a more detailed discussion, see Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at Section III.A. 
387 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 536-37 (July 14, 1785). 
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The Continental Congress often used the formulation “take order,” for 
example, when issuing instructions to executive agents—as with a resolution 
instructing that “the Superintendent of Finance take order for furnishing 
[discharged soldiers] two months pay.”388 But was the formulation a 
discretionary authorization or a mandatory command? When the point was 
pressed, the delegates had a hard time agreeing. John Rutledge moved to 
resolve that “when a matter was referred to any of the [national executive] 
departments to take order, it was the sense & meaning of Congress that the 
same should be carried into execution.”389 The secretary’s notes suggest that, 
after some discussion, it “seemed to be the general sense of the house that a 
reference to take order implied a discretionary power.”390 James Madison’s 
account is more detailed: 
On this motion some argued that such reference amounted to an absolute 
injunction, others insisted that it gave authority, but did not absolutely 
exclude discretion in the Executive Departments. The explanation which was 
nally acquiesced in as most rational & conformable to practice was that it 
not only gave authority, but expressed the sense of Congress that the measure 
ought to be executed: leaving it so far however in the discretion of the 
Executive Department, as that in case it diered in opinion from Congress 
it might suspend execution & state the objections to Congress that their nal 
direction might be given.391 
The focus of their discussion was thus not what Congress could authorize or 
require, but rather how Congress’s instructions should be understood if the 
wording wasn’t clear. 
That’s entirely consistent with the fact that executive power was 
understood to have an immense latent potency. The scope of executive 
departments’ authority and discretion was a function of legislative intent. The 
legislature might decide to impose rote obligations in minute detail, or it 
might decide to simply state a goal and authorize appropriate action. Either 
way, executive power was neither intrinsically weak nor intrinsically strong. 
Rather, its sweep turned on the revisable legislative decision of what 
instructions to convey and how broadly to formulate their parameters. 
 
388 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 521 (June 2, 1784). 
389 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 848-49 (Nov. 12, 1782); 
see also id. at 722-23 (similar). 
390 Id. at 722; see also id. (“But it was argued by Mr Madison that if the thing was not done the 
ocer should report the reasons that prevented.”). Madison’s failure to quote his own intervention 
here is consistent with my sense that his notes are unlikely to have overstated his role at the 
Constitutional Convention. 
391 Id. at 848. In the end, the motion was withdrawn, “the mover alledging that as he only 
aimed at rendering an uncertain point clear, & this had been brought about by a satisfactory 
explanation, he did not wish for any Resolution on the subject.” Id. at 849. 
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*      *      * 
That in turn brings us back to perhaps the most important impetus for 
the Constitution in the rst place. We saw above how people on all sides of 
the ratication debates recognized that the Confederation Congress wasn’t 
cutting it. And we saw how all sides agreed that its worst problem was the 
lack of an eective mechanism to eectuate its intentions. That’s why national 
governance was so fundamentally transformed by vesting executive power in 
a single President.392 That’s why it was sometimes suggested that the new 
constitution didn’t change the “ends” or “objects” of the national government 
so much as it changed the mechanisms available to execute them.393 And that’s 
why Publius said that “the executive power” was not only “restrained within 
a narrower compass” than its legislative counterpart, but also “more simple in 
its nature.”394 When the essence of a function is to implement instructions, 
it’s just not that hard to explain. 
IV. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” WAS NOT ANOTHER WORD FOR 
ROYAL PREROGATIVE 
At this point the armative case for the meaning of “executive power” is 
complete. What remains is to explore its implications for the larger structure 
of Article II, and to more squarely address the principal competing theory in 
its own right. In broad strokes, this Part will proceed as follows. Section IV.A 
will sketch the radical implausibility of the residuum claim as a matter of 
Founding-era politics, political theory, and legal terminology. Section IV.B 
will show that, when engaging the question directly, the founders rejected 
 
392 This wasn’t the only way that execution was transformed; also important were the new 
Congress’s legislative competences, from Commerce to Necessary & Proper authorities. The idea of 
legislative execution was especially important to Gouverneur Morris, who emphasized that each of the 
three powers could be framed with relatively more or less compulsive aspect to its implementation: 
“The foederal gov. has no such compelling capacities, whether considered in their legislative, judicial 
or Executive qualities.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 43 (Gouverneur Morris). 
393 William Cushing made such a suggesting, arguing 
[T]he Confederation, in appearance imparted many, if not most of the great powers, 
now inserted in the proposed Constitution . . . but not one ecient power, to carry a 
single article into eect . . . . These govermental powers, in order to have full & proper 
eect, must, in the nature of things, consist of the Executive, the Legislative, & judicial. 
Without these govmt cannot be carried an End. 
Cushing, supra note 251, at 1439-40. See also Jonathan Gienapp, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 54-56 (2018) (“[The Continental] 
Congress’s inability to exercise its power was less an issue of legal authority (it enjoyed the power) 
than a matter of practical legitimacy (the states simply did not allow itand Congress lacked the 
resources to coerce them”). 
394 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 3, 5 (1986). 
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even the possibility of residual executive authority as absurd. Section IV.C 
will explore residuum theory’s “dog that didn’t bark” problem, emphasizing 
the sheer number of instances where at least someone would have referred to 
the possibility of a Vesting Clause residuum if such a thing were even 
plausibly in play. 
A. The Royal Residuum is Facially Implausible 
The first thing to say about the royal residuum is that it is wildly 
implausible on any serious account of the era’s politics. To be sure, the 
incompetence and excesses of state legislatures had created a vocal constituency 
for a structurally independent executive branch and a presidential veto. While 
not everyone agreed, there’s no denying the appeal of state constitutions with 
strong executives like those of New York and Massachusetts.395 But here are 
two more things that are every bit as undeniable: the virulently anti-
monarchical cast of American politics, and the radical semantic unsuitability of 
“executive” as an umbrella term for royal power. 
1. It’s Politically Implausible 
As discussed above, founders of all ideological stripes recognized that 
anti-monarchism was perhaps the dening feature of American politics. 
Other than anxiety about national consolidation, the biggest problem in 
selling the Constitution was probably American revulsion for even the 
slightest pong of monarchy. On this point, there may be no prose more purple 
than Hamilton’s: 
[T]he writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize 
their talent of misrepresentation, calculating upon the aversion of the people 
to monarchy, they have endeavoured to inlist all their jealousies and 
apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States; 
not merely as the embryo but as the full grown progeny of that detested 
parent. To establish the pretended anity they have not scrupled to draw 
resources even from the regions of ction. The authorities of a magistrate . . . 
have been magnied into more than royal prerogatives. He has been 
decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a King 
 
395 See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 
254-73 (1973); WOOD, supra note 54, at 430-38 (describing states’ apprehension of the popular nature 
of the Revolutionary constitutions and the tension between “the inherited dread of magisterial 
despotism and a fear of popular disorder” in states’ constitutional reform eorts). But see MARC W. 
KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 15 (1997) (suggesting that other historians attribute too much 
signicance to “the Massachusetts Moment”). 
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of Great-Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his 
brow, and the imperial purple owing in his train. He has been seated on a 
throne surrounded with minions and mistresses; giving audience to the 
envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The 
images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting 
to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been almost taught to tremble at 
the terric visages of murdering janizaries; and to blush at the unveiled 
mysteries of a future seraglio.396 
Hamilton set out to rout such comparisons with a relentlessly systematic 
demolition of this “gross pretence of a similitude between a King of Great-Britain 
and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United 
States.”397 Such Federalist mockery, of course, only evinced the Federalists’  
political concern about this line of attack: “The enemies of the new form of 
government endeavour to persuade others, what I can scarcely think they believe 
themselves; that the President of the United States is only another name for King, 
and that we shall be subject to all the evils of a monarchical government.”398 
For now, suce it to say that the Federalists’ urgent need to disprove such 
comparisons marks the political implausibility of the Executive Power Clause 
as the site of some royal residuum: 
We have seen that the late honorable Convention, in designating the nature 
of the chief executive oce of the United States, have deprived it of all the 
dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its 
limited powers—As our President bears no resemblance to a King, so we shall see 
the Senate have no similitude to nobles.399 
On this background, it would be deeply weird to imagine that the Framers 
snuck in—much less that the Ratiers approved—an amorphous mass of 
royal power that no English monarch had claimed since James II. The much-
rehearsed Whig history of English constitutionalism depended on the 
elimination of exactly such open-ended “sovereignty” in the king. Sure, many 
American patriots were increasingly dissatised with unchecked unicameral 
republicanism. But it’s implausible in the extreme that the revolutionary 
generation would have responded by re-introducing the substance of Crown 
prerogative under a dierent name. 
 
396 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 149, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton). 
397 Id. 
398 Publicola, supra note 68, at 496. 
399 An American Citizen II, On the Federal Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 
28, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 264, 264 (1981). 
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2. It’s Doctrinally Implausible 
The residuum’s sheer political implausibility is compounded by its 
doctrinal impossibility in a robustly transatlantic legal culture.400 For one 
thing, the idea that “the executive power” was an umbrella term for all of the 
king’s powers runs into a brick wall when you consider that the royal 
prerogative also included a veto401—which without exception of which I am 
aware was classied as legislative.402 More fundamentally, the founders 
followed Blackstone (and the rest of English law) in expressly distinguishing 
executive power from the other branches of royal authority, whether in 
foreign aairs, national security, nance, commerce, or church government. 
Residuum theory requires us to believe that that this standard term of art for 
one subset of the royal prerogative suddenly became the catchall for naming 
the full motley array. Far from suggesting a sudden abandonment of black 
letter terminology, however, the evidence all points to a rather dull carrying 
forward of the standard framework. 
There’s just no getting past the array of writers who expressly 
distinguished between “legislation and the consequent executive and judicial 
rights” on one hand and foreign aairs powers like “[t]he rights of making 
 
400 See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2008); 
DANIEL HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE (2005). 
401 That the crown’s negative had basically fallen into disuse domestically left it no less a black 
letter component of royal prerogative. Certainly the Founding generation had recent experience 
with crown representatives vetoing the legislative projects of the colonial legislatures. “The king of 
England has an unconditional negative,” wrote one Federalist, “and has often exercised it in his former 
colonies.” Plain Truth, Reply to An Ocer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 
10, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 216, 220 (1976); see also Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in 
Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1113-16 (2011) (discussing Thomas 
Jeerson’s 1774 “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in which Jeerson “insists that the 
King ought to withhold royal assent to bills passed by Parliament that would infringe on the colonies’ 
rights of self-governance”). 
402 For just a few examples, see, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 139 (James 
Madison); John Leland, Objections to the Constitution (Feb. 28, 1788), in 8 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 425, 425 (1988); Instructions to Daniel Adams (Dec. 31, 1787), in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, 
at 1055, 1055 (1998). Some discussions of the veto expressly contrasted “the supreme executive 
power” or “the sole executive authority” and the royal negative—which was “a branch of legislative 
jurisdiction.” See The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609-10; see also 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 140 (James Wilson) (describing the President’s “revisionary duty” as 
“extraneous” from his “[e]xecutive duties”). 
The choice to create a presidential veto—the veto as such occasioned remarkably little resistance 
at the convention, though it was more controversial during ratication—was just another example 
of why it is far more accurate to speak of the Constitution’s distribution of powers rather than its 
separation of them. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 94 (June 4, 1787) (adopting the 
qualied negative); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 612 (C.C. Little & J. Brown, eds., 2d ed. 1851) (1833) (“In the convention there 
does not seem to have been much diversity of opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to 
the president a negative on the laws.”). 
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war and peace, consequently of raising troops, establishing navies, arsinals, 
&c” on the other.403 Caroliniensis was typical in reminding South Carolinians 
that “[n]ot only all executive power is lodged in” the King, but also twelve 
more specically enumerated “powers and prerogatives . . . together with 
many others, with which any person may make himself more particularly 
acquainted by reading the learned and accurate judge Blackstone on the 
subject.”404 The point is equally unmistakable in Publius’s implication that the 
Executive Power Clause didn’t even bear mention: 
[While] the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a 
single magistrate[,] . . . [t]his will scarcely . . . be considered as a point upon 
which any comparison can be grounded; for if in this particular there be a 
resemblance to the King of Great-Britain, there is not less a resemblance to 
the Grand Signior, to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains, 
or to the Governor of New-York.405 
Because executive power was just the basic enforcement authority 
possessed by any chief magistrate, in other words, you could only assess the 
Antifederalists’ royal comparisons by comparing the other presidential powers 
to the other elements of crown prerogative. And so Hamilton pivoted to a 
drumbeat of contrasts between the other elements of Crown prerogative and 
 
403 P. Valerius Agricola, supra note 375, at 189 (emphasis omitted). For a mere sampling of 
other examples, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 481, 482 (distinguishing between “the power of making treaties” and “the class of 
executive authorities”); Caroliniensis, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, Apr. 1 & 2, 1788, reprinted in 
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 235, 236 (2016) (distinguishing between the English King’s possession 
of “all executive power” and his separate possession of foreign aairs authorities); Cincinnatus, V: 
To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 319, 324 (2003) 
(“[S]overeignty consists in three things—the legislative, executive, and negociating powers . . . .” ); 
Luther Martin, Address No. III, MD. J., Mar. 28, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 456, 
458 (2015) (“the general government [possesses] extensive and unlimited powers . . . in the executive 
legislature and judicial departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of 
establishing a standing army . . . .”); Draft Essay in Defense of the Constitution, in 23 DHRC, supra 
note 46, at 2536, 2538 (2009) (“The United Netherlands were also of distinct republicks possessing 
however a common council a common treasury & a common military establishment & a 
common executive . . . .). Fabius made a similar point when he argued: 
Is there more danger to our liberty, from such a president as we are to have, than to 
that of Britons, from an hereditary monarch . . . in the exercise of the whole executive 
power; in the command of the militia, eets, and armies, . . . who can at his will, make 
war, peace, and treaties irrevocably binding the nation; and who can grant pardons or 
titles of nobility, as it pleases him? 
Fabius, IX, PA. MERCURY, May 1, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 261, 262 (1995). 
404 Caroliniensis, supra note 403, at 235; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander 
Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 387, 387 (1986). 
405 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 404, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton). 
1350 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1269 
the other authorities enumerated in Article II.406 Residuum theory, which 
constantly cites such federative competences as being contained within 
“executive power,” simply can’t make sense of these constant distinctions.407 
B. The Royal Residuum Was Expressly Rejected 
Standing alone, this semantic and political implausibility is fatal to the 
cause of residuum theory. But we needn’t limit ourselves to linguistic or 
historical inference alone, because residuum theory is even worse o than its 
failure to cite armative evidence might suggest. That’s true in two respects: 
rst, the founders’ repeated an unmistakable denial of any such residual 
authority; and second, the number of instances where their failure to mention 
such authority is basically impossible to explain unless it didn’t exist. 
1. They Knew Exactly What a Residuum Structure Looked Like 
The founders were thoroughly familiar with residuum structure as a 
doctrinal tool. The common law was understood as residual in precisely this 
sense,408 and the concept was well-established as a structuring device for other 
kinds of legal authority as well. The 1774 case of Campbell v. Hall, well known 
to the colonists, expressly deployed the notion of a defeasible residuum to 
explain royal power in foreign aairs.409 McCulloch v. Maryland drew on this 
framework in imagining a government structure where “the people conferred 
on the general government the power contained in the constitution, and on 
the States the whole residuum of power,”410 and Gibbons v. Ogden engaged the 
appellants’ claim that “full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the 
whole power, and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is 
incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it.”411 
While the question of defeasibility might vary from system to system, the 
 
406 See id. at 387-94. For the full list of contrasts, see infra, note 436. 
407 Cf. Letter from Marine Committee to William Aylett (Mar. 26, 1779), in 12 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES, supra note 75 (quoting a separate letter written to James Maxwell and Paul Loyall) 
(contrasting “the executive part of [] [military] business” and the non-executive part). 
408 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1221 (“Like the common law more generally, the [King’s] 
prerogative as described by Blackstone thus provided the default rule of decision for questions of 
Crown authority—until Parliament chose, by contrary or supplementary legislation, to displace it.”). 
409 See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048, 1 Cowp. 204, 210 (“[I]f the King (and 
when I say the King, I always mean the King without the concurrence of Parliament) has a power to 
alter the old and to introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being subordinate, 
that is, subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to 
fundamental principles . . . .”). On the contemporary salience of Campbell, see JOHN PHILIP REID, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 158 (1986) (noting “the discussion 
[Campbell] generated during the months leading up to the American Revolution”). 
410 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819). 
411 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824). 
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underlying conceptual structure was an o-the-shelf move: residual authority 
was that component of an original grant which remained after adjustment by 
some superior source of legal authority. 
The structural concept of a legal residuum was thus regularly invoked in 
a wide range of discussions and by all sides of the Founding debates. They 
used a variety of words for the idea, from “residuum”412 and “residue”413 in 
the most general sense to “prerogative” when talking specically about 
executive magistrates.414 They deployed the concept to describe the 
fundamental allocation of authority in state and federal government when 
discussing the need for a bill of rights.415 And they deployed it again when 
discussing the British system’s distinctive approach to the residual authorities 
of an executive magistrate. 
At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, George Nicholas leaned 
hard on the residuum structure of English crown power as a reason not to 
adopt a bill of rights in America: 
In England, in all disputes between the King and people, recurrence is had 
to the enumerated rights of the people to determine. Are the rights in dispute 
secured—Are they included in Magna Charta, Bill of Rights . . . ? If not, they 
are, generally speaking, within the King’s prerogative. In disputes between 
Congress and the people, the reverse of the proposition holds. Is the disputed 
right enumerated? If not, Congress cannot meddle with it. Which is the most 
 
412 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 138 (statement of Samuel Spencer) 
(discussing “those unalienable rights, which are called by some respectable writers the residuum of 
human rights”); Federal Farmer: An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XIII 
(May 2, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1033 (2004) (specifying certain appointments 
provisions, noting “we shall then want to lodge some where a residuum of power, a power to appoint 
all other necessary ocers . . . . The ttest receptacle for this residuary power is . . . the rst 
executive magistrate, advised and directed by an executive council . . . .”). 
413 See, e.g., An Annapolitan, ANNAPOLIS MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 218, 220 (2015) (“One of these branches possesses a great share of the executive 
authority, the residue of which is committed to a single man.”). For more on the sense in which the 
Senate had executive power, see infra, Section IV.B. 
414 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 146, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (“In England 
for a long time after the Norman conquest the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. 
Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of liberty, rst by the Barons and 
afterwards by the people, ‘till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct.”). 
415 See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 138 (statement of Samuel Spencer) (“There has 
been a comparison made of our situation with Great Britain. We have no crown, or prerogative of a 
king, like the British constitution.”); Statement of Thomas Hartley, Pennsylvania Ratication 
Debates (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 425, 430 (1976) (“[W]hatever portion of those 
natural rights we did not transfer to the government was still reserved and retained by the people; 
for, if no power was delegated to the government, no right was resigned by the people . . . .”); A 
Citizen of New-York (John Jay), supra note 73, at 933 (“In days and countries where Monarchs and 
their subjects were frequently disputing about prerogative and privileges, the latter often found it 
necessary . . . [to] oblige the former to admit by solemn acts, called bills of rights, that certain 
enumerated rights belonged to the people, and were not comprehended in the royal prerogative.”). 
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safe? The people of America know what they have relinquished, for certain 
purposes. They also know that they retain every thing else, and have a right 
to resume what they have given up, if it be perverted from its intended object. 
The King’s prerogative is general, with certain exceptions. The people are 
therefore less secure than we are.416 
When Patrick Henry rose the following week to dispute Nicholas’s 
conclusion, he began by agreeing that crown power was residual: “Every 
possible right which is not reserved to the people by some express provision 
or compact, is within the King’s prerogative.” According to Henry, however, 
the American context rendered this consideration irrelevant.417 Nicholas 
returned to the point shortly thereafter, again invoking the residual structure 
of English royal authority as a contrast to American governance structure: “It 
is easier to enumerate the exceptions to [the King’s] prerogative, than to 
mention all the cases to which it extends.”418 
This agreement at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum exemplifies 
what earlier work has already shown. Eighteenth-century English indeed had a 
specific word for any catchall residual authority held by a magistrate. And that 
word was “prerogative,”419 used perhaps most frequently in reference to the 
English king’s residual authorities in the realms of foreign and military affairs.420 
 
416 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 10, 1788), in 9 DHRC, 
supra note 6 at 1092, 1135-36 (1990). 
417 Statement of Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 1299, 1333 (1993) (“[I]f implication be allowed, you are ousted of those rights. If the 
people do not think it necessary to reserve them, they will be supposed to be given up.”). 
418 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 1299, 1333 (1993). 
419 See, e.g., Congress’s Proclamation to Colonies (Feb. 13, 1776), in 4 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 135 (“The Share of Power, which the King derives 
from the People, or, in other Words, the Prerogative of the Crown, is well known and precisely 
ascertained . . . .”); 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 287 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) 
(“[T]he great prerogatives of the [German] emperor, as head of the empire . . . .”); Americanus, VII, 
N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 629, 630 (2004) 
(noting “the ideas we have imbibed from our English ancestors” include an understanding of “[t]he 
extensive prerogatives and regal state, which the Supreme Executive in England have always 
possessed”); see also generally, Mortenson, supra note 5. 
420 For a few examples from documents not cited elsewhere in this Article, see generally 
Congress’s Response to the King’s Proclamation (Aug. 20, 1782), reprinted in 23 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 471, 510 (stating that it is “the prerogative of the crown 
to manage the aairs of peace”); Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 
18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1387, 1388 (1993) (noting the “King’s prerogative to make 
treaties, leagues, and alliances”); Westchester Farmer, To the Citizens of America, N.Y. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, June 8, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 128, 129 (1981) (“The powers of 
the supreme executive council should be well dened, and be perfectly enabled to maintain its 
independence and vigor. It should possess the prerogative of making peace and war, of sending and 
receiving all ambassadors, of making treaties, leagues and alliances with foreign states and 
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2. They Repeatedly Denied that Any Such Residuum Existed in Article II 
On this background, the founders’ repeated denial of any royal residuum 
is unmistakable. The residuum concept was standard operating procedure. 
The terms “executive prerogative”421 and “prerogatives of the president”422 
were readily available—as was the move of building new structures from 
existing governance templates.423 But the founders roundly rejected the 
whole apparatus when it came to presidential power, precisely because of 
American “jealousy of this danger” from “a monarch . . . [with] prerogatives 
very considerable.”424 Indeed, this rejection was a pillar of Federalist 
responses to the likes of Patrick Henry roaring that “there is to be a great and 
mighty President, with very extensive powers; the powers of a King”;425 and 
Luther Martin prophesying that the President will “when he 
pleases . . . become a king in name, as well as in substance.”426 Over and over 
again, Federalists responded to such loose emotive comparisons by dragging 
their opponents back to the plain text of the Constitution, the well-known 
doctrinal structure of English constitutionalism, and the patent dierence 
between the two. 
It would be hard to make the point more clearly than “A Native of 
Virginia” did in criticizing the Glorious Revolution for undershooting its 
mark. It was true, he acknowledged, that William of Orange had dropped any 
 
princes . . . .”); 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 522 (James Madison) (“[T]he Royal 
prerogatives of war & peace, treaties coinage . . . .”). 
421 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 553 (James Madison Report) (“[I]t is in 
this latitude, as a supplement to the deciency of the laws, that the degree of executive prerogative 
materially consists.”). 
422 This phrase was used more casually, but it was available as well. See, e.g., Americanus,  supra 
note 370, at 247 (noting “the province of the president, and . . . the exercise of his prerogatives”); Cato, 
IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 195, 197-98 (2003) (describing “the 
direct prerogatives of the president”). 
423 See, e.g., Andrew Cecchinato, William Blackstone as Interpreter of the European Legal 
Tradition 68 (2019) (unpublished manuscript). (“[E]ven within those doctrines that accompanied 
and sustained the rise of nation-states, the paradigm of sovereign power could not be understood if 
not by attributing to kings those same prerogatives that had been traditionally attributed to the 
emperor himself.”). 
424 Marcus, supra note 171, at 384; see also id. (noting that “a constant jealousy” toward executive 
authority “is both natural and proper”). A similar point was made by Americanus. See Americanus, 
supra note 419, at 630 (“The [King’s] extensive prerogatives and regal state . . . have ever been, and 
with reason too, the object of terror to the friends of liberty. All their eorts have been directed 
to . . . circumscribe and limit these dangerous powers within proper bounds.”). 
425 Statement of Patrick Henry, supra note 111, at 961; see also, e.g., Statement of Patrick Henry, 
Virginia Ratification Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1371, 1384 (1993) 
(“Gentlemen say, that the King of Great-Britain has the same right of making treaties that our President 
has here. I will have no objection to this, if you make your President a King.”); Statement of Edmund 
Randolph, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1006, 1018 (1990) 
(describing antifederalist claim that “the President can . . . establish himself a monarch”). 
426 Martin, supra note 268, at 496. 
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pretense “to a divine right of governing,” had “acknowledged his [authority] 
to ow from the people,” and had even “entered into a compact with them, 
which recognized that just and salutary principle.”427 The problem was that 
all these changes left the legal substance of Crown prerogative in place: 
Had the English at this time limited the regal power in denite terms, instead 
of satisfying themselves with a Bill of Rights, there would have been an end 
of prerogative; but they from habit were contented with a Bill of Rights, 
leaving the prerogative still inaccurately dened, to claim by implication, the 
exercise of all the powers not denied it by that declaration.428 
Could there be a better denition of residuum theory than “[a] 
prerogative . . . to claim by implication, the exercise of all the powers not 
denied” elsewhere in a constitutional document? And “A Native of Virginia” 
didn’t stop there. The draft Constitution, he said, had confronted and 
resolved this problem, precisely by rejecting that structure and so nally 
nishing the project of their ideological forebears. Under the Constitution: 
“The powers of the President are not kingly, any more than the ensigns of his 
oce. He has no guards, no regalia, none of those royal trappings which 
would set him apart from the rest of his fellow citizens.”429 
No more than the President had purple robes and a sparkling diadem, in 
other words, could he “claim by implication” the right to any powers not 
expressly enumerated.430 That was because the Constitution did what the 
English had failed to do: “limit[] the [magistrate’s] power in denite terms” 
and make “an end of prerogative.” 
Federalist polemicists were relentless on this point in refuting claims that 
a unitary executive magistracy would be an elective monarchy in all but 
name.431 The President would possess the executive power, they 
emphasized—and properly so. But he would have nothing like the default 
suite of magisterial authorities known to British law as prerogative: “the 
doctrine of prerogative and other peculiar properties of the royal character” 
 
427 A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, at 660. 
428 Id. (emphasis added). 
429 Id. at 679. 
430 Id. at 655 (discussing structural reasons to omit a bill of rights and presidential term limits). 
431 A typical argument along such lines was published in a local newspaper: 
Mr. Adams . . . seems to bring us back again to the English government; as he . . . is 
particularly fond of a strong Executive. Surely the air of Europe has not infected our 
Plenipotentiary? This language is by no means consistent with republicanism, and 
there are other passages in this writer which point direct to monarchy, or what is the 
same, a rst Magistrate possessed exclusively of the Executive power. 
BALT. GAZETTE, July 3, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 89, 89 (1981) (emphasis 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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were simply “incompatible with the view of these states when they are settling 
the form of a republican government.”432 Instead, “[t]he Constitution plainly, 
openly, and without disguise tells us the titles, oces, powers, and privileges 
of [the President, Senators, and Representatives] and the purposes of their 
appointment. What snake in the grass is there here?”433 
Time and again their pamphlets, essays, and speeches made this point by 
contrasting a recitation of Crown prerogatives—in both its detailed 
administrative aspects and its amorphously residual nature—with the 
President’s far shorter and expressly dened suite of authority: 
It must excite ridicule and contempt in every man when he considers on one 
side, the dreadful catalogue of unnecessary, but dangerous, prerogatives, 
which, in the British Government, is vested in the Crown; and, on the other 
side, takes a view of the powers with which this Constitution has cloathed the 
President.434 
From here, Federalist authors would catalogue the Crown prerogatives, in 
language practically cut and pasted from the canonical Blackstone litany. 
Americanus’s version was on the short side, comparatively speaking: 
Imperial dignity, and hereditary succession—constituting an independent 
branch of the Legislature—the creation of Peers and distribution of titles and 
dignities—the supremacy of a national church—the appointment of Arch-
bishops and Bishops—the power of convening, proroguing, and dissolving 
the Parliament—the fundamental maxim that the King can do no wrong—to 
be above the reach of all Courts of law—to be accountable to no power 
whatever in the nation—his person to be sacred and inviolable—all these 
unnecessary, but dangerous prerogatives, independent of many others, such 
as the sole power of making war and peace—making treaties, leagues and 
alliances—the collection, management and expenditure of an immense 
revenue, deposited annually in the Royal Exchequer—with the appointment 
of an almost innumerable tribe of ocers, dependent thereon—all these 
prerogatives, besides a great many more, which it is unnecessary to detail 
here, (none of all which are vested in the President) put together, form an 
accumulation of power of immense magnitude; but which, it seems, are only 
immaterial incidents . . . . 
You institute a comparison between a King of England, and a President, and 
because you nd that some of the powers necessarily vested in this President, 
 
432 The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1610. 
433 Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 382; see also id. (“What reason have we therefore 
to be jealous that the Constitution, under the disguise of such humble appellations, aims at the 
dignity and powers of the King, Lords, and Commons of the British Parliament?”). 
434 Americanus, supra note 370, at 288. 
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and some of the prerogatives of that King are alike, you place them on a 
footing, and talk of a President possessing the powers of a Monarch.435 
This pivot from mockery to a rote itemization of black letter prerogative 
doctrine was standard.436 And the incredulous conclusion was inevitable: 
“[L]et me pause and seriously ask you sir,” one Federalist wrote to his friend, 
“to compare this tremendous catalogue of powers, privileges and prerogatives, 
with those of our fœderal President . . . .”437 The bare comparison—between 
 
435 Id. at 288-89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
436 The Blackstonian detail from Publius was typical of the genre: 
[T]here is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the 
King of Great-Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it 
may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer groupe. 
The President of the United States would be an ocer elected by the 
people for four years. The King of Great-Britain is a perpetual and 
hereditary prince. 
The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace: The 
person of the other is sacred and inviolable. 
The one would have a qualied negative upon the acts of the legislative 
body: The other has an absolute negative. 
The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of 
the nation: The other in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring 
war, and of raising and regulating eets and armies by his own authority. 
The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature 
in the formation of treaties: The other is the sole possessor of the power of 
making treaties. 
The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to oces: 
The other is the sole author of all appointments. 
The one can infer no privileges whatever: The other can make denizens 
of aliens, noblemen of commoners, can erect corporations with all the 
rights incident to corporate bodies. 
The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of 
the nation: The other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and 
in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and 
measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can 
authorise or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. 
The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: The other is the supreme 
head and Governor of the national church!— 
What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike 
resemble each other?—The same that ought to be given to those who tell us, that a 
government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and 
periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 404, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton). 
437 Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short, supra note 323, at 478 (detailed 
itemization of prerogative contrasted to presidential power); see also, e.g., Fabius, supra note 403, 
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England’s “hereditary Monarch, with all the appendages of royalty, and 
immense powers” and “the feeble power of the President,” armed only “with 
a small revenue and with limitted powers, sucient only for his own 
support”—spoke for itself.438 
Indeed, once charges of kingship were dissected to their component parts, 
the modal response was baement. Prerogative structure just wasn’t how a 
government of limited and dened powers worked. It was precisely because 
the President’s powers were “so clearly dened,” wrote Caroliniensis, that 
they could “never can be dangerous.”439 Article II left no room for 
implication: What you see is what you get. 
The 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia serves well as a summary of the 
conventional framework. In the course of discussing the legal dispute in that 
case, the Supreme Court expressly contrasted the empty vessel of “executive” 
power with the open-ended inherent authority implied by “prerogative.” “A 
Governor of a State,” the majority observed 
is a mere Executive ocer; his general authority very narrowly limited by the 
Constitution of the State; with no undened or disputable prerogatives; without 
power to eect one shilling of the public money, but as he is authorised under 
the Constitution, or by a particular law; having no colour to represent the 
sovereignty of the State, so as to bind it in any manner to its prejudice, unless 
specially authorised thereto.440 
If you keep the eighteenth-century doctrinal framework rmly in mind, the 
Court’s point here can’t be missed. “Executive” authority is by its nature 
grounded in “special[] authoris[ations]” rather than general implications of 
“undened . . . prerogatives.”441 Chisholm may have been talking about a state 
executive, but its vocabulary was thoroughly generic. Certainly there is no 
way to reconcile it with a view of “executive” authority as a hidey hole for 
residual prerogative. 
 
at 262 (describing the difference between a “hereditary monarch” and “such a president as we are 
to have . . . .”) 
438 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 915, 926, 928 (1990) (detailing an itemization of prerogative contrasted to 
presidential power). 
439 Caroliniensis, supra note 403, at 238 (contrasting the “supreme executive authority” that 
was “vested” in the President with other Crown prerogatives like the veto and the treaty power). 
440 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 446 (1793) (emphasis added); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398 
(1798) (“If . . . a government . . . were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits on the 
legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to 
enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void.”). 
441 A Native of Virginia, supra note 68. 
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C. A Play Park of Silent Dogs 
Others have observed the failure of royal residuum theorists to identify 
even one positive assertion of the claim during drafting or ratication.442 I’ve 
managed no better on their behalf. Despite reviewing tens of thousands of 
pages of commentary from hundreds of writers and speakers—and going to 
an abundance of caution to ag all instances that even vaguely tickled my 
antennae for a second and third review with as generous a mindset as could 
be mustered—I have been unable to nd a single statement that the Executive 
Power Clause contained a substantive residuum.443 
But the research for this Article reveals something much more important. 
This silence reigned even among participants who had a strong situational motivation 
to speak. If there had been any possibility of reading the Executive Power 
Clause to contain even a sliver’s residuum of substantive authority, it is simply 
impossible to explain why no one in two groups of commentators thought to 
propose, engage with, or at least mention the idea. First, authors who were 
conducting a treatise-style march through the powers of the President. 
Second, polemicists who attacked the constitutional president as a tyrant. If 
the royal residuum had been even a colorable interpretive possibility, each 
group would have had strong intrinsic motivation to engage it. And yet none 
of them—not one—did so. 
 
442 See Bradley &. Flaherty, supra note 22, at 551 (“[T]he historical sources that are most 
relevant to the Founding, such as the records of the Federal Convention, the Federalist Papers, and 
the state ratication debates, contain almost nothing that supports the Vesting Clause Thesis, and 
much that contradicts it.”). 
443 One of the most notable things worth flagging should speak to what I’ve meant to serve as 
the interpretive generosity of review. In the course of Alexander White’s general defense of the 
proposed constitution, he launched into a meandering digression into Roman constitutional structure. 
First noting that “[t]he legislative power was vested in the assemblies of the people,” he then observed 
that “[w]here the executive power was vested, and how distributed, I will give you in language better 
than mine,” and proceeded to quote verbatim Polybius’s description of the Roman consuls and senators. 
That description made clear that each had powers that were part of the Law Execution understanding 
of executive power: “the administration of all public affairs” as well as the appointments power. It also 
made clear that each officer had other powers as well, including some that were part of crown 
prerogative (declaring war) and some that were not (power of the purse). See Alexander White, 
WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 401, 406 (1988). 
White’s discussion is no different in substance from Blackstone’s survey of similar authorities in 
England. And it’s hard to see how his introductory line about “the executive power” could be an 
umbrella category for everything described in the Polybius excerpt, since the list includes several 
uncontestedly non-executive authorities like spending power. But it’s the closest thing I’ve found to 
something that could be read as even ambiguous on the point at issue, so I cite it here. 
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In the rst category of treatise-style surveys of presidential power fall the 
antifederalist Cato444 and the federalists Americanus,445 Cassius,446 James 
Iredell,447 and Publius.448 Cassius’s comment was pithiest: “Section one, of 
article second, provides, that the executive power shall be vested in a 
president of the United States. The necessity of such a provision must appear 
reasonable to any one; any further remarks, therefore, on this head, will be 
needless.”449 
Only the standard understanding that the executive power is the power 
to execute, of course, could render “needless” any commentary beyond the 
mere quotation of the Executive Power Clause. But the loudest silence came 
from Publius, whose eighty-ve essays left no argument unrebutted, no 
criticism unrebuked, and no rejoinder unsaid. Yet nowhere in the Federalist’s 
relentlessly over-explanatory hard sale will you nd a whi of a suggestion 
that the Executive Power Clause might reference anything beyond the 
standard eighteenth century denition. Certainly none of the Federalist’s 
many long essays on the presidency, the Senate, or the young nation’s foreign 
aairs powers even hint at the possibility of a complicated interaction—one 
that would have cried out for explanation next to the endless trivia its authors 
did elaborate—between a prerogative-style grant to the President and a 
partial reallocation of that authority elsewhere in the document. 
This obliviousness to “the executive power” as a possible font of 
substantive authority is telling, especially from such careful itemizers of 
constitutional authority. But it is almost more striking among opponents of 
the constitutional draft—some practically hysterical about monarchy in 
disguise. Not two sentences after passing over the President’s “supreme 
executive power” without blinking, the “Impartial Examiner” burst into a 
fury about the Constitution’s importation of crown prerogative—because it 
included a veto: 
It is ordained, as a necessary expedient in the fœderal government, that a 
president of the United States (who is to hold the supreme executive power) 
 
444 See generally Cato, supra note 422. 
445 See generally Americanus, supra note 370. 
446 See generally Cassius, VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 
46, at 479 (1998). 
447 See generally 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 106-08 (James Iredell). 
448 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 223 (Alexander Hamilton); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 447 (1986); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in id. at 478; THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, 
supra note 403 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted 
in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 4 (1995); see also The Federalist No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted 
in id. at 9 (“We have now compleated a survey of the structure and powers of the executive 
department . . . .”). 
449 Cassius, supra note 446, at 482. 
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should also concur in passing every law . . . . [T]he British monarch being 
founded on maxims extremely dierent from those, which prevail in the 
American States, the writer hereof is inclined to hope that he will not be 
thought singular, if he conceives an impropriety in assimilating the 
component parts of the American government to those of the British: and as 
the reasons, which to the founders of the British constitution were motives 
superior to all others to induce them thus to give the executive a controul 
over the legislative, are so far from existing in this country, that every 
principle of that kind is generally, if not universally, exploded; so it should 
appear that the same public spirit, which pervades the nation, would proclaim 
the doctrine of prerogative and other peculiar properties of the royal 
character, as incompatible with the view of these states when they are settling 
the form of a republican government.450 
It’s basically impossible to take residuum theory seriously when reading the 
torrent of words devoted to charges like this without coming across a single 
reference to the Executive Power Clause as granting any kind of substantive 
authority, let alone a residual royal prerogative.451 
Consider what opponents of the constitution had to say in the North 
Carolina ratifying convention after the Executive Power Clause was read 
aloud for discussion: nothing. Nothing. This silence was notable even at the 
time; indeed, it armatively infuriated the federalist William Davie. After 
what was apparently an extended pause following the reading of the clause, 
he nally burst out: 
What is the cause of this silence and gloomy jealousy in gentlemen of the 
opposition? This department has been universally objected to by them. The 
 
450 The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609-10 (emphasis omitted). This passage comes 
just after the Impartial Examiner has explained why the royal negative is not just consistent with, 
but required by, English constitutional theory: 
In monarchy, where the established maxim is, that the king should be respected as a great 
and transcendent personage, who knows no equal—who in his royal political capacity can 
commit no wrong—to whom no evil can be ascribed—in whom exists the height of 
perfection—who is supreme above all, and accountable to no earthly being, it is 
consistent with such a maxim, that the prince should form a constituent branch of the 
legislature . . . . This secures to him the intended superiority in the constitution, and 
gives him the ascendant in government; else his sovereignty would become a shadow. 
Id. 
451 For others not previously cited who criticized the President as a king without saying a word 
about the Vesting Clause, see generally Luther Martin, Genuine Information I, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, 
Dec. 28, 1787, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 126 (2015); Luther Martin, Genuine Information 
VI, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted in id. at 177; Luther Martin, Genuine Information IX, 
BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788, reprinted in id. at 212; Tamony, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 9, 
1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 286 (1988); GAZETTE OF THE ST. OF GA., Mar. 20, 
1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 442 (1986). 
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most virulent invectives, the most opprobrious epithets, and the most 
indecent scurrility, have been used and applied against this part of the 
Constitution. It has been represented as incompatible with any degree of 
freedom. Why, therefore, do not gentlemen oer their objections now, that 
we may examine their force, if they have any? The clause meets my entire 
approbation. I only rise to show the principle on which it was formed. The 
principle is, the separation of the executive from the legislative—a principle 
which pervades all free governments.452 
Davie’s rhetorical ourish usefully makes the awkward pause leap o the 
transcribed page. It wasn’t exactly fair in context, however, because the 
opposition had plenty to say about the rest of the President’s powers. Indeed, 
the convention went on to spend days on the remaining provisions of Article 
II. But the Executive Power Clause? Nothing but “silence” greeted it among 
North Carolina antifederalists who had otherwise come loaded for bear. 
The lack of reference to residuum theory at the Virginia convention may 
be even more striking, because the antifederalists in Virginia were 
simultaneously among the most talented lawyers and the most paranoid 
republicans of their generation. Their orid fantasies of despotism were 
enough to drive the earnest James Madison to distraction.453 And yet, even 
though the crown prerogative was the subject of extended discussion in the 
Virginia convention,454 the antifederalists’ frantic eorts to pu up the 
Constitution into the foetus of monarchy failed to gesture even once at the 
Executive Power Clause as a source of authority even worth comment, let 
alone concern. Over two full days spent discussing Section 1 of Article II, the 
only thing they discussed was its mechanism for electing the President.455 The 
Executive Power Clause itself was never even mentioned. It wasn’t until they 
got to the article’s second section—the part with clauses complicated or 
controversial enough to be worth actual discussion—that they started talking 
 
452 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 103 (William Davie); see also id. at 102 (“Is it not highly 
improper to pass over in silence any part of this Constitution which has been loudly objected to?”). 
453 These ranged from the idea that the future District of Columbia was designed as a refuge 
for traitors to the claim that Congress’s power to “govern[]” the militia was meant to smuggle in 
permanent martial rule for the entire male citizenry. “We must,” Madison nally said, “keep within 
the compass of human probability.” Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratication Debates 
(June 14, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1258, 1295 (1993). For more background on the last 
fear, see Bernadette Myler, Originalism and a Forgotten Conict over Martial Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
1335, 1340-43 (2019). 
454 See Statement of Patrick Henry, supra note 417, at 1328-29 (“[I]n Great-Britain . . . every 
possible right which is not reserved to the people by some express provision or compact, is within 
the King’s prerogative.”); see also Statement of George Nicholas, supra note 418, at 1333 (“It is easier 
to enumerate the exceptions to his prerogative, than to mention all the cases to which it extends.”). 
455 See generally Virginia Ratication Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 
1371 (1993); Virginia Ratication Debates (June 17, 1788), in id. at 1388. 
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about the powers of the oce. And then they leapt directly into the fray, with 
Mason expressing “alarm[]” at “the magnitude of the powers of the President” 
from his authority as Commander-in-Chief to his power to pardon,456 and the 
other delegates o to the races from there. 
The point of all this isn’t that the evidentiary record is spotty. To the 
contrary, it’s voluminous, and there was no lack of motivation to raise the 
issue if it existed. And yet residuum theory doesn’t appear once in their 
discussions—across an enormous array of instances where only a ninny would 
have failed to raise it if the idea were vaguely plausible, let alone the obvious 
implication of a well-known phrase. 
*      *      * 
Consider too the following coda. It’s a mistake to fetishize the sequence of 
recorded discussion at the drafting Convention, a project that too often 
devolves into the archival equivalent of haruspicy. But note how one of the most 
puzzled-over exchanges in the Philadelphia records reveals itself as perfectly 
sensible if you just take the standard eighteenth-century framework seriously. 
On June 1, the Convention opened the topic of presidential power. The 
starting point was the Virginia Plan, which proposed 
that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National 
Legislature . . . ; and that besides a general authority to execute the National 
laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation.457 
The plural formulation tracked longstanding references by the Continental 
Congress to “the executive powers, or the powers of administration.” The 
term “executive rights,” however, was so unusual as to be a little weird; indeed, 
the phrase appears nowhere else in the materials I have canvassed.458 Unless 
Madison’s subsequent explanation was a bad faith eort to cover up a failed 
attempt to smuggle in the royal prerogative,459 either the Virginia drafters 
either hadn’t done a careful word-by-word parsing of this language, or they 
 
456 See Statement of George Mason, Virginia Ratication Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10 
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1371, 1378 (1993). 
457 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21. 
458 I have been unable to nd the phrase anywhere else in the Philadelphia records, and it does 
not seem to appear in the Documentary History, the Letters of the Delegates, or the Journals of the 
Continental Congress. As ratied, of course, the Constitution used “the executive power” as a 
standard term of art—and as the ensuing discussion shows, this was no accident. 
459 As subterfuges go, this one would be passing strange from the man who ve years later 
would write Helvidius No. 1. See Helvidius No. 1 (Aug 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-34 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (“[T]he two powers to declare war and 
make treaties . . . can never fall within a proper denition of executive powers.”). 
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simply meant the reference to “Executive rights” as a reference to the 
disaggregated components of law execution.460 
The oddness of the formulation certainly struck Charles Pinckney. 
Channeling the standard monarchical paranoia of his era, he rose to warn that 
unless they were careful to dene their terms, the Virginia Plan’s unusual 
formulation might open a loophole for the new chief magistrate to to claim a 
broad suite of implied powers analogous to the actual royal prerogative and 
thus “render the Executive a Monarchy.”461 Pinckney appears to have worried, 
in other words, that a bare reference to “Executive rights” might be susceptible 
to exactly the metonymic reading that modern-day residuum theorists seek 
to impose on (the very dierent wording of) the Executive Power Clause. 
Each of the next three speakers hastened to assure Pinckney that there 
was no plausible scenario under which the Convention would or even could 
adopt the residual prerogative that was the essence of such monarchy. They 
all knew such a proposal would render any draft dead on arrival. John 
Rutledge began, declaring that while “he was for vesting the Executive power 
in a single person,” he “was not for giving him the power of war and peace,” 
and urging his fellow delegates to chime in on the point.462 Roger Sherman 
followed up with doctrinaire republicanism, asserting that “he considered the 
Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will 
of the Legislature into eect.”463 And then James Wilson—famously a 
forceful advocate for a strong executive—signed on to Rutledge’s point in full, 
expressing it in the traditional Blackstone framework: 
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide 
in dening the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a 
Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers 
he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and 
 
460 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110. For more on the disaggregated 
view of the coercive power, the implementation power, and the appointment power as component 
parts of law execution, see supra Section III.C. Note that the Virginia state constitution used the 
plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that cannot be understood as a reference to the royal 
residuum. See 1776 Virginia Const., THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vol. 7, p. 3816-3817 
(“[H]e shall . . . exercise the executive powers of government, according to the laws of this 
Commonwealth; and shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue 
of any law, statute or custom of England”). 
461 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 50, at 64-65 (Charles Pinckney) (“Mr. Pinkney was for 
a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend 
to peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an 
elective one.”). 
462 Id. at 65 (John Rutledge) (emphasis added) 
463 Id. at 65 (Roger Sherman). 
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appointing ocers, not <appertaining to and> appointed by the 
Legislature.464 
Wilson thus saw “only” two “strictly Executive” powers among those 
contained in royal prerogative: “executing the laws” and “appointing ocers.” 
The other elements of royal prerogative were “legislative”—explicitly 
including “that of war & peace &c.”465 Certainly any particular political 
system might decide to allocate this legislative control over foreign and 
military aairs to the same political institution that held executive power. But 
like the other elements of royal prerogative, neither foreign aairs nor 
military authority was among the “executive powers, or the powers of 
administration”466—much less of the executive power that was eventually 
vested by the actual text of the Constitution. 
After a brief squabble about whether the executive should be a single 
person, James Madison—an influential member of the Virginia delegation that 
had written the proposal under discussion—herded them back to Pinckney’s 
concern. Echoing Wilson’s observation that “executive powers ex vi termini, 
do not include the Rights of war & peace &c,”467 Madison responded to 
“General Pinckney[’s fear of] improper powers” by offering a clarifying 
amendment to more precisely specify the substance of what the Virginia 
delegation had intended to propose.468 As he explained, “certain powers were 
in their nature Executive,” and “a definition of their extent would assist the 
judgment in how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer.”469 
Don’t miss the point: Madison’s amendment was proposed, understood, 
and adopted, not as a narrowing revision, but as a more specic “denition” 
of which powers were “in their nature” executive in the sense that the Virginia 
Plan’s drafters had always intended to convey. As adopted, Madison’s 
amendment listed exactly two powers that were, per his introduction, “in 
 
464 Id. at 65-66 (James Wilson). King’s notes are to the same eect: “Extive. powers are 
designed for the execution of Laws, and appointing Ocers not otherwise to be appointed.” Id. at 
70 (James Wilson). And Pierce’s notes suggests that Wilson explicitly included the power of 
“[m]aking peace and war” in the “legislative powers” of the king. Id. at 73-74 (James Wilson) 
(emphasis added). 
465 Id. at 65-67 (emphasis added). 
466 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110. 
467 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 70 (James Madison). Madison’s notes of his own 
speech do not reect this explicit claim. 
468 Madison’s meeting notes conrm this claim. His summary of the Virginia Plan proposal 
replaced “executive rights” with the more standard phrase: “that a national Executive . . . possess the 
executive powers of Congress.” Id. at 62-63 (James Madison) (emphasis added). Just like his 
subsequent clarifying amendment, Madison’s abbreviated description of the Virginia Plan treated as 
irrelevant its nowadays-much-obsessed-over distinction between “Executive rights” and the “general 
authority to execute the National laws.” 
469 Id. at 66-67 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
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their nature Executive.”470 And those powers were (of course) the same ones 
Wilson had just nished saying were the “only” ones “strictly Executive” in 
nature: the power to execute the laws, and the power to make at least some 
appointments.471 The clarifying revision was quickly adopted without dissent. 
Did the Convention later come to believe that the President should have 
other powers as well? For sure. But those subsequent additions were in addition 
to, rather than part of, “the executive power.” That’s why Madison’s 
amendment was proposed, that’s how he explained it when introduced, and 
that’s what they voted on without dissent. The notes are so brief, at least in 
part, because the basic point was so obvious to those discussing it. 
CONCLUSION 
As a historical matter, the competition between the royal residuum and 
the law execution interpretations of the Executive Power Clause isn’t close. 
On one hand, you have an interpretation that is unanimously commanded by 
eighteenth-century legal treatises, political theory tracts, and dictionaries; 
that ts with everything we know about the political valence of monarchy in 
late eighteenth-century America; that was expressly embraced by scores of 
founders; and that makes sense of literally every reference to “executive” in 
the framing and ratication debates. On the other hand, you have an 
interpretation whose proponents have yet to identify a single sentence of 
direct armative support among the millions of words contained in our 
records of framing and ratication. 
It might well be asked how anyone has concluded otherwise. At least 
where academic residuum theorists are concerned, the answer comes down 
to a few pervasive errors. First, and easily the most important, is what earlier 
work has described as the Metonymy Error: misunderstanding the 
metonymic logic of using the noun “executive” to name a political entity that 
possesses both “the executive power” and also many others.472 A second and 
related error involves taking prescriptive claims that the executive branch 
 
470 Id. at 67 (James Madison). 
471 Id. at 66 (James Wilson); see id. at 67 (recording the amendment as stating “with power to 
carry into eect. the national laws. [and] to appoint to oces in cases not otherwise provided for”). 
The full colloquy is even better. Madison’s first draft of the amendment included a third category 
of presidential authority: “and to execute such other powers <‘not Legislative nor Judiciary in their 
nature’> as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature.” Id. at 66 (James Madison). 
Pinckney spoke up immediately to “amend the amendment by striking out the last [category].” Id. 
(Charles Pinckney). His earlier concerns apparently fully allayed by Wilson’s reminder of the doctrinal 
point, he viewed it as “unnecessary, the object [already] being included in the power to carry into effect 
the national laws.” Id. (Charles Pinckney) (internal quotation marks omitted). He wasn’t interested, in 
other words, in distinguishing between the negatively prohibitory and affirmatively implementatory 
aspects of law execution; for him they were features of the same authority. 
472 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1245-49. (explaining this problem in detail). 
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should have various powers, and using them as evidence for the descriptive 
proposition that the executive power already includes them.473 The third 
error is a failure to realize that the founders’ occasional references to 
“executive powers” plural were typically grounded in the disaggregated 
understanding of Law Execution described in Section III.B.474 The fourth 
error looks to Founding-era claims that both the Continental Congress475 
and the constitutional Senate476 had executive power, which residuum 
theorists suggest can only be explained as a description of these bodies’ 
foreign affairs competences. 
In light of the arguments and evidence presented above, the gist of the 
rst three errors should be obvious. The fourth category, which takes more 
time to address, is addressed at some length in forthcoming work that begins 
to map the implications of the Law Execution thesis for contemporary 
doctrine.477 But a brief summary seems advisable, if only for those who are 
aware of the objections and would like to hear something about them here. 
In short, and without exception of which I am aware, every single 
description of the Continental Congress and the constitutional Senate as 
“executive” either unmistakably relied on or was fully consistent with the 
standard Law Execution understanding of executive authority. The 
Continental Congress was said to have executive power because it had the 
power to execute laws, both by coercing compliance with prohibitions478 and 
by implementing armative legislative projects.479 Comparable claims about 
 
473 See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 32, at 267 (“Where did the [foreign aairs] power 
rest? With whoever wielded the executive power. Although the two powers were distinct in Locke’s 
treatment . . . the two powers, he said, are always almost united.” (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
474 See, e.g., id. at 299 (quoting John Jay’s reference to “the ‘great executive powers’ that were 
formerly held by Congress.”). 
475 E.g., McConnell, supra note 3, at 191 (“The ‘Executive rights’ of the Confederation 
Congress went far beyond law execution—indeed, the Congress did not have the power of law 
execution. Law execution was performed by the states.”). As frequently discussed during the 
ratication debates, the Continental Congress did have the power of law execution; it just did a 
terrible job of implementing it. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at 433-44, 63-64 & n.225 
(describing congressional experimentation with various modes of execution). 
476 E.g., PRAKASH, supra note 25, at 118-19 (2015) (“The Senate would serve as an executive 
council on treaties and diplomatic appointments . . . . [But] the Senate’s executive powers over 
foreign aairs raised hackles” among Anti-Federalists, and “Federalists generally agreed that treaty-
making was an executive power.”). 
477 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at 38-60. 
478 See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 447 (statement of James Madison) 
(noting the power to “operate immediately on . . . persons & properties” already “is the case in some 
degree as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in <a far greater degree> 
under the plan proposed to be substituted”). 
479 See, e.g., 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 785 (Oct. 8, 
1777) (“[T]he committee appointed to carry into execution the resolution of Congress, ordering a 
medal to be struck and presented to General Washington.”). 
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the Senate relied on varying combinations of three theories, each plainly 
grounded in the same Law Execution understanding. First, some founders 
thought that the Senate’s role in appointments was conceptually executive.480 
Second, some thought the Vice President’s voting role forced a member of 
the executive branch into the constituent membership of the legislature.481 
Third, some shared a forthrightly functional concern that regular interactions 
between the two bodies—including but not limited to what they described as 
the executive activity of appointments and the legislative activity of 
treatymaking—would produce a dangerous entanglement likely to yield 
functionally unied control over the full sequence of complete 
government.482 Not one of these theories lends the slightest support to 
residuum theory. 
And so we end where we started. For once, the original understanding of 
constitutional text is both clear and simple. When Article II vested “the 
executive power,” it conveyed the authority to execute the laws. This power 
was an empty vessel that authorized only those actions previously specied 
by the laws of the land. Sometimes statutory terms delegated far-reaching 
policy discretion; other times statutes would specify in minute detail the 
precise and limited action that was authorized. Either way, the conceptual 
gist of executive action was implementation of instructions and authority that came 
from elsewhere. Make no mistake: the presidency thus created was a massively 
powerful institution. Just not one with a free-oating foreign aairs power, a 
residual national security authority, or indeed any other power not specically 
listed in the Constitution. To the contrary, the President thus created was 
“guided by law,” “fetter’d by system,” and “manacled both by man and 
measures.”483 Is he still? 
 
480 See supra Section III.C (discussing the view that the executive power entailed the right to 
appoint “assistances”). 
481 See, e.g., Cincinnatus, supra note 320, at 283 (noting “the union of the executive with the 
legislative functions” and emphasizing “[t]he union established between them and the vice 
president, who is made one of the corps”). Cincinnatus also argued that the separation of powers 
was separately violated by the Senate’s roles in appointments and impeachment. Id. 
482 E.g., Statement of George Mason, supra note 456, at 1376 (“[T]he Constitution has married 
the President and Senate—has made them man and wife. I believe the consequence that generally 
results from marriage, will happen here. They will be continually supporting and aiding each other: 
They will always consider their interests as united . . . . The Executive and Legislative powers thus 
connected, will destroy all balances . . . .”); Cato, VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, 
supra note 46, at 416, 419 (2003) (“They are so intimately connected, that their interests will be one 
and the same . . . .”). 
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